From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Hui Zhu" <hui.zhu@linux.dev>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 2/2] selftests/bpf: add memcg async reclaim test
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 06:22:16 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260820062216.AA0BC1F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <53762e3403fe8e8c263cf685cea5d55377ec5204.1787205002.git.zhuhui@kylinos.cn>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] Insecure temporary file creation pattern leading to a TOCTOU race condition.
--
--- Patch [2]: [PATCH bpf-next v4 2/2] selftests/bpf: add memcg async reclaim test ---
commit 690f8d9075834023b364e130547a2026753c92e6
Author: Hui Zhu <zhuhui@kylinos.cn>
selftests/bpf: add memcg async reclaim test
Add memcg_async_reclaim selftest that verifies BPF-driven async
proactive reclaim can mitigate refault-induced slowdown under memory
pressure.
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/memcg_async_reclaim.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/memcg_async_reclaim.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000..ece7bceaab3c4
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/memcg_async_reclaim.c
[ ... ]
> +static int
> +run_high_low_workload(double *high_elapsed, double *low_elapsed, int read_times)
> +{
> + char high_data_file[PATH_MAX];
> + char low_data_file[PATH_MAX];
> + char high_time_file[PATH_MAX];
> + char low_time_file[PATH_MAX];
> + const char *dir = workload_files_dir();
> + pid_t high_pid = -1, low_pid = -1;
> + pid_t wait_ret;
> + int fd, status;
> + int ret = -1;
> +
> + snprintf(high_data_file, sizeof(high_data_file),
> + "%s/memcg_async_high_data_XXXXXX", dir);
[ ... ]
> + fd = mkstemp(high_data_file);
> + if (!ASSERT_GE(fd, 0, "mkstemp"))
> + goto cleanup;
> + close(fd);
[Severity: Medium]
Is this temporary file creation vulnerable to a time-of-check to time-of-use
race condition?
By immediately closing the file descriptor securely created by mkstemp()
and reopening it by name later in write_file():
write_file() {
fp = fopen(filename, "wb");
}
Could this allow a symlink attack in the window between the close and the
open if the file is replaced?
While selftests run in a controlled environment, this pattern is frequently
flagged as a security anti-pattern by static analysis tools.
Would it be possible to pass the file descriptor directly to the child
process instead of closing it, or use exclusive creation flags when
reopening?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/cover.1787205002.git.zhuhui@kylinos.cn?part=2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-20 6:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-20 6:12 [PATCH bpf-next v4 0/2] bpf: BPF-driven proactive memcg reclaim Hui Zhu
2026-08-20 6:12 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 1/2] mm/bpf: Add bpf_proactive_reclaim kfuncs Hui Zhu
2026-08-20 6:24 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-20 7:05 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-20 6:12 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 2/2] selftests/bpf: add memcg async reclaim test Hui Zhu
2026-08-20 6:22 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-08-20 7:05 ` bot+bpf-ci
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