From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
To: memxor@gmail.com
Cc: brauner@kernel.org, kpsingh@kernel.org, ast@kernel.org,
john.fastabend@gmail.com, a.s.protopopov@gmail.com,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v2 02/11] bpf: Refuse caller-supplied keyrings when the bpf one is active
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2026 16:25:21 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260825142530.1329706-3-daniel@iogearbox.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260825142530.1329706-1-daniel@iogearbox.net>
Nothing changes for systems that do not use the bpf keyring. Without
bpf.keyring_unsealed=1 a caller-supplied keyring behaves exactly as
before, which also lets it serve as the staging step for software
installed onto a running system whose signing key is not enrolled
anywhere yet.
Passing bpf.keyring_unsealed=1 states that the bpf keyring is the trust
anchor for this boot, so from the first program load onwards a caller-
supplied keyring is refused with -EPERM. Deriving this from the boot
flag rather than from the keyring's runtime state keeps the decision
immutable from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
---
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +++++
include/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++++
kernel/bpf/keys.c | 5 ++++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 29 ++++++++++++-------
4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 2beb61092bb3..e70fb15757d4 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -673,6 +673,14 @@ Kernel parameters
keys. Once the keyring is restricted it becomes active
and can be used for BPF program signature verification.
+ Setting this also means that the bpf keyring is the
+ only non-system keyring a loader may select for the
+ rest of the boot: caller-supplied user/session
+ keyrings are refused with -EPERM, whether or not
+ provisioning actually completed. The system keyrings
+ stay selectable. Leaving it unset keeps the prior
+ behaviour, where a caller-supplied keyring is allowed.
+
See Documentation/bpf/signing.rst
bttv.card= [HW,V4L] bttv (bt848 + bt878 based grabber cards)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index 62b095f7f524..571f7792a5c4 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -3821,6 +3821,7 @@ struct bpf_key {
struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(s32 serial, u64 flags);
struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_system_key(u64 id);
struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_keyring(void);
+bool bpf_keyring_enforced(void);
void bpf_key_put(struct bpf_key *bkey);
int bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(const struct bpf_dynptr *data_p,
const struct bpf_dynptr *sig_p,
@@ -3846,6 +3847,11 @@ static inline struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_keyring(void)
return NULL;
}
+static inline bool bpf_keyring_enforced(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
static inline void bpf_key_put(struct bpf_key *bkey)
{
}
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/keys.c b/kernel/bpf/keys.c
index dc4d3a33158a..60cb85295c89 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/keys.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/keys.c
@@ -18,6 +18,11 @@ static bool bpf_keyring_unsealed __ro_after_init;
module_param_named(keyring_unsealed, bpf_keyring_unsealed, bool, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(keyring_unsealed, "Leave the bpf keyring unsealed");
+bool bpf_keyring_enforced(void)
+{
+ return bpf_keyring_unsealed;
+}
+
struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_keyring(void)
{
struct bpf_key *bkey;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 3be8d51d35ac..a93a8dc427d8 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -21018,21 +21018,28 @@ static int bpf_prog_verify_signature(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (!attr->signature_size ||
attr->signature_size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
- if (attr->keyring_id == VERIFY_USE_BPF_KEYRING) {
- key = bpf_lookup_keyring();
- if (!key) {
- verbose(env, "the bpf keyring is empty or has not been restricted\n");
- return -ENOKEY;
- }
- } else if (system_keyring_id_check(attr->keyring_id) == 0) {
+ if (!system_keyring_id_check(attr->keyring_id)) {
key = bpf_lookup_system_key(attr->keyring_id);
} else {
- key = bpf_lookup_user_key(attr->keyring_id, 0);
+ if (attr->keyring_id != VERIFY_USE_BPF_KEYRING) {
+ if (bpf_keyring_enforced()) {
+ verbose(env, "caller-supplied keyring refused, use bpf keyring\n");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ key = bpf_lookup_user_key(attr->keyring_id, 0);
+ } else {
+ key = bpf_lookup_keyring();
+ }
}
if (!key) {
- verbose(env, "cannot resolve signing keyring with keyring_id %d\n",
- attr->keyring_id);
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (attr->keyring_id == VERIFY_USE_BPF_KEYRING) {
+ verbose(env, "the bpf keyring is empty or has not been restricted\n");
+ return -ENOKEY;
+ } else {
+ verbose(env, "cannot resolve signing keyring with keyring_id %d\n",
+ attr->keyring_id);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
}
sig = kvmemdup_bpfptr(usig, attr->signature_size);
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-25 14:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-25 14:25 [PATCH bpf-next v2 00/11] BPF keyring and signed loader ML-DSA support Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-25 14:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 01/11] bpf: Add a bpf keyring for program signature validation Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-25 14:39 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-25 14:25 ` Daniel Borkmann [this message]
2026-08-25 14:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 03/11] bpf: Raise the bound on a program's signature size Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-25 14:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 04/11] bpftool: Support ML-DSA program signing Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-25 14:36 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-25 14:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 05/11] selftests/bpf: Add a test for the sealed bpf keyring Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-25 14:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 06/11] selftests/bpf: Rebuild signed lskels when signing key changes Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-25 14:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 07/11] selftests/bpf: Rename the verify_sig_setup.sh setup into setup-rsa Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-25 14:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 08/11] selftests/bpf: Add an end-to-end ML-DSA signed loader test Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-25 14:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 09/11] selftests/bpf: Allow appending to guest kernel cmdline in vmtest.sh Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-25 14:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 10/11] selftests/bpf: Add tests for bpf keyring in signed loader Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-25 14:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 11/11] Documentation/bpf: Document the bpf keyring and improve examples Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-28 1:38 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 00/11] BPF keyring and signed loader ML-DSA support Jarkko Sakkinen
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