From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jiayuan Chen" <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Cc: mptcp@lists.linux.dev, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf v1 1/2] mptcp, bpf: reject bpf_sk_release() on msk
Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 08:36:50 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260917083651.4B6851F00893@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260917081209.361367-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] bpf: verifier use-after-free via derived socket pointer fields
--
commit 4a3543a3768c369da5d09b5be8da85c1dbd33f90
Author: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
mptcp, bpf: reject bpf_sk_release() on msk
This commit fixes a reference leak by changing bpf_skc_to_mptcp_sock() to
derive its return value from the subflow using parent_id, preventing
bpf_sk_release() from dropping a refcount that was never taken.
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index 5d7080c260d84..8271d9214da52 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -11263,6 +11273,14 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
> bpf_diag_mod_begin(env, ®s[BPF_REG_0], NULL, BPF_DIAG_MOD_WRITE);
> regs[BPF_REG_0].type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
> regs[BPF_REG_0].id = meta.ref_obj.id;
> + } else if (is_ptr_derive_function(func_id) &&
> + find_reference_state(env->cur_state, meta.ref_obj.id)) {
> + err = validate_ref_obj(env, &meta.ref_obj);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> + /* Ensures we don't access the object after a release_reference() */
> + regs[BPF_REG_0].parent_id = meta.ref_obj.id;
[Severity: High]
Does assigning parent_id without setting a reference ID or PTR_TRUSTED leave
the returned msk pointer untrusted in the verifier?
Because msk is untrusted, if a program accesses its pointer fields
(e.g., sk = msk->first), it appears the access falls through to the deprecated
verifier compatibility block in check_ptr_to_btf_access():
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:check_ptr_to_btf_access() {
...
} else {
/* Old compat. Deprecated */
clear_trusted_flags(&flag);
}
...
}
This yields a plain PTR_TO_BTF_ID without the PTR_UNTRUSTED flag. Since
pointer field accesses do not propagate parent_id, sk->parent_id would be 0.
When bpf_sk_release(subflow) is called, the verifier invalidates registers
tied to subflow (including msk via parent_id).
Could sk escape this invalidation cascade since its parent_id is 0?
If so, would the program be able to pass this valid, plain PTR_TO_BTF_ID to
kernel helpers like bpf_skc_to_tcp_sock(sk)?
At runtime, the helper would dereference the pointer without PROBE_MEM
protection after it has been freed, potentially resulting in a use-after-free.
> } else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map.ptr)) {
> int id = acquire_reference(env, insn_idx, 0);
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260917081209.361367-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-17 8:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-17 8:11 [PATCH bpf v1 1/2] mptcp, bpf: reject bpf_sk_release() on msk Jiayuan Chen
2026-09-17 8:11 ` [PATCH bpf v1 2/2] selftests/bpf: add verifier tests for bpf_skc_to_mptcp_sock Jiayuan Chen
2026-09-17 9:19 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-17 8:36 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-09-17 9:39 ` [PATCH bpf v1 1/2] mptcp, bpf: reject bpf_sk_release() on msk Matthieu Baerts
2026-09-17 11:06 ` Kalpan Jani
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