From: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Nicholas Carlini <npc@anthropic.com>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>,
kkd@meta.com, kernel-team@meta.com
Subject: [PATCH bpf v6 06/10] bpf: Restrict CO-RE poisoning to relocatable instructions
Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 13:11:18 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260917111127.3780880-7-memxor@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260917111127.3780880-1-memxor@gmail.com>
CO-RE relocation records can name any instruction offset. When a
relocation cannot be resolved, bpf_core_patch_insn() currently poisons its
target before checking whether that instruction is a valid relocation
target. Malformed metadata can therefore replace jumps, calls, exits,
register-source arithmetic, or non-immediate loads instead of failing at
the relocation step.
Handle poisoning only after the instruction has passed the same class and
operand-form checks used for a resolved relocation. Route invalid forms
through the existing diagnostic and return a hard error. Keep poisoning
supported instructions, including both halves of a plain ldimm64, so an
unresolved relocation in dead code remains valid.
Extend bpf_core_poison_insn() to poison both halves of ldimm64, and return
its status directly from each validated instruction case. This avoids
routing the success path through a common label and leaves the helper free
to report errors.
The shared relocation code applies this restriction to both libbpf and
in-kernel CO-RE. Update the early in-kernel regression to expect the
relocation step to reject its invalid exit target.
Fixes: d7a252708dbc ("libbpf: Improve handling of failed CO-RE relocations")
Reported-by: Nicholas Carlini <npc@anthropic.com>
Suggested-by: Nicholas Carlini <npc@anthropic.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
---
tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c | 58 ++++++++++---------
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/core_reloc_raw.c | 3 +-
2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c b/tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c
index 8ad2715721cf..2672623a4198 100644
--- a/tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c
+++ b/tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c
@@ -980,23 +980,30 @@ static int bpf_core_calc_relo(const char *prog_name,
}
/*
- * Turn instruction for which CO_RE relocation failed into invalid one with
+ * Turn instruction for which CO-RE relocation failed into invalid one with
* distinct signature.
*/
-static void bpf_core_poison_insn(const char *prog_name, int relo_idx,
- int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn)
+static int bpf_core_poison_insn(const char *prog_name, int relo_idx,
+ struct bpf_insn *insn, int insn_idx)
{
- pr_debug("prog '%s': relo #%d: substituting insn #%d w/ invalid insn\n",
- prog_name, relo_idx, insn_idx);
- insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL;
- insn->dst_reg = 0;
- insn->src_reg = 0;
- insn->off = 0;
- /* if this instruction is reachable (not a dead code),
- * verifier will complain with the following message:
- * invalid func unknown#195896080
- */
- insn->imm = 195896080; /* => 0xbad2310 => "bad relo" */
+ int insn_cnt = is_ldimm64_insn(insn) ? 2 : 1;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
+ pr_debug("prog '%s': relo #%d: substituting insn #%d w/ invalid insn\n",
+ prog_name, relo_idx, insn_idx + i);
+ insn[i].code = BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL;
+ insn[i].dst_reg = 0;
+ insn[i].src_reg = 0;
+ insn[i].off = 0;
+ /*
+ * If this instruction is reachable (not dead code), the verifier
+ * will complain with "invalid func unknown#195896080".
+ */
+ insn[i].imm = 195896080; /* => 0xbad2310 => "bad relo" */
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
static int insn_bpf_size_to_bytes(struct bpf_insn *insn)
@@ -1047,17 +1054,6 @@ int bpf_core_patch_insn(const char *prog_name, struct bpf_insn *insn,
class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
- if (res->poison) {
-poison:
- /* poison second part of ldimm64 to avoid confusing error from
- * verifier about "unknown opcode 00"
- */
- if (is_ldimm64_insn(insn))
- bpf_core_poison_insn(prog_name, relo_idx, insn_idx + 1, insn + 1);
- bpf_core_poison_insn(prog_name, relo_idx, insn_idx, insn);
- return 0;
- }
-
orig_val = res->orig_val;
new_val = res->new_val;
@@ -1065,7 +1061,9 @@ int bpf_core_patch_insn(const char *prog_name, struct bpf_insn *insn,
case BPF_ALU:
case BPF_ALU64:
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K)
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto bad_insn;
+ if (res->poison)
+ return bpf_core_poison_insn(prog_name, relo_idx, insn, insn_idx);
if (res->validate && insn->imm != orig_val) {
pr_warn("prog '%s': relo #%d: unexpected insn #%d (ALU/ALU64) value: got %d, exp %llu -> %llu\n",
prog_name, relo_idx,
@@ -1082,6 +1080,8 @@ int bpf_core_patch_insn(const char *prog_name, struct bpf_insn *insn,
case BPF_LDX:
case BPF_ST:
case BPF_STX:
+ if (res->poison)
+ return bpf_core_poison_insn(prog_name, relo_idx, insn, insn_idx);
if (res->validate && insn->off != orig_val) {
pr_warn("prog '%s': relo #%d: unexpected insn #%d (LDX/ST/STX) value: got %d, exp %llu -> %llu\n",
prog_name, relo_idx, insn_idx, insn->off, (unsigned long long)orig_val,
@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ int bpf_core_patch_insn(const char *prog_name, struct bpf_insn *insn,
pr_warn("prog '%s': relo #%d: insn #%d (LDX/ST/STX) accesses field incorrectly. "
"Make sure you are accessing pointers, unsigned integers, or fields of matching type and size.\n",
prog_name, relo_idx, insn_idx);
- goto poison;
+ return bpf_core_poison_insn(prog_name, relo_idx, insn, insn_idx);
}
orig_val = insn->off;
@@ -1140,6 +1140,9 @@ int bpf_core_patch_insn(const char *prog_name, struct bpf_insn *insn,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (res->poison)
+ return bpf_core_poison_insn(prog_name, relo_idx, insn, insn_idx);
+
imm = (__u32)insn[0].imm | ((__u64)insn[1].imm << 32);
if (res->validate && imm != orig_val) {
pr_warn("prog '%s': relo #%d: unexpected insn #%d (LDIMM64) value: got %llu, exp %llu -> %llu\n",
@@ -1157,6 +1160,7 @@ int bpf_core_patch_insn(const char *prog_name, struct bpf_insn *insn,
break;
}
default:
+bad_insn:
pr_warn("prog '%s': relo #%d: trying to relocate unrecognized insn #%d, code:0x%x, src:0x%x, dst:0x%x, off:0x%x, imm:0x%x\n",
prog_name, relo_idx, insn_idx, insn->code,
(unsigned)insn->src_reg, (unsigned)insn->dst_reg, (unsigned)insn->off, (unsigned)insn->imm);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/core_reloc_raw.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/core_reloc_raw.c
index ee267289fd88..10bda3ff80eb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/core_reloc_raw.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/core_reloc_raw.c
@@ -124,7 +124,8 @@ static void test_early_core_relo(void)
enum_id, access_str_off, 2, true);
if (!ASSERT_LT(prog_fd, 0, "poisoned_load"))
goto cleanup;
- ASSERT_HAS_SUBSTR(log, "last insn is not an exit or jmp", "poisoned_load_log");
+ ASSERT_HAS_SUBSTR(log, "trying to relocate unrecognized insn #2",
+ "poisoned_load_log");
}
cleanup:
--
2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-17 11:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-17 11:11 [PATCH bpf v6 00/10] Misc bug fixes - part 5 Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-09-17 11:11 ` [PATCH bpf v6 01/10] bpf: Make post-verification instruction rewrites killable Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-09-17 11:11 ` [PATCH bpf v6 02/10] bpf: Preserve packet pointer class displacement in regsafe() Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-09-17 11:11 ` [PATCH bpf v6 03/10] selftests/bpf: Test packet pointer class displacement pruning Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-09-17 11:11 ` [PATCH bpf v6 04/10] bpf: Apply CO-RE relocations before subprogram validation Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-09-17 12:29 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-17 11:11 ` [PATCH bpf v6 05/10] selftests/bpf: Test early in-kernel CO-RE relocation Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-09-17 12:29 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-17 11:11 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi [this message]
2026-09-17 12:29 ` [PATCH bpf v6 06/10] bpf: Restrict CO-RE poisoning to relocatable instructions bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-17 11:11 ` [PATCH bpf v6 07/10] selftests/bpf: Test CO-RE instruction poisoning restrictions Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-09-17 11:11 ` [PATCH bpf v6 08/10] bpf: Assign lock identity to callback map values Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-09-17 12:29 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-17 11:11 ` [PATCH bpf v6 09/10] selftests/bpf: Check callback map value lock identity Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-09-17 11:11 ` [PATCH bpf v6 10/10] libbpf: Reject truncated ldimm64 CO-RE relocations Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
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