From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795376157; b=Vq2U7Lltd5OvBzGPWOj4E+eHBGt2ZWCr9nlCd8f+gd1pgwWYY+qIwcEN5KCVKHRnYnnh 1AVEQCExciyIEIJ7yZtqH8cVKxlYH1B9g8N4CVB8gQ7vvBDJi3SQYRxSrb0rbOIje+wDa ssIKO6Q8K5L4PMLZe83LLDdnB1cSTqRAwIKgoN4whAuJcHy7SHa72gjRZ+UYdIeM/D9t2 rlLd8J14en7ecdDdeiexLAaHlopGjYFnwIAgQW/SdElZ/VieP3dzG2ukqsdYmENQah5rJ K4ZQaRfE/8mY4fWcNbeyvxVbE//r+fAPUfHhOjNk7gucUxgMq2cmuN+cr9FgaNzbgOQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795376157; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=z6BC8bTNkW2Kb/oWzgzzW0J38AL7u1XskPs2J4J0IMs=; b=5HAeAQzZjTWvi1fsQ9sSWYGU20D62g9k65ppMXre1vhFh7gkkWtk0m9iWJgV3arfCsrG S4z5ZHJ4eqH91E3XdQ0VrCoMBjejtOEDoLD9YFuX5WIT77Jry3jKdYMLk/MQ+JCdoZA47 +XAmOmI2pcp6Pib1UdFI6DJjK5VARIYYclmS0fDMDWGXo/Q7YqoDiFL8EQ6qoBvsaBjtZ 8vdp69pyYsLT37jn0gSerjY6Q1/BELV55mSqWXW2LqCRsvTXDpd8O+lrtbSOmuvdIUpYG x8qeLCMO0fyH02QXGZMiMzlKyV1YYCARKhGMNGvZOWTy1x84HButIxLr/sBmXtN88AA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b="afSm/rTg"; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPS id 10589606A31A; Sun, 22 Nov 2026 19:35:56 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=afSm/rTg Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPSA id B9F611F000C4; Sun, 22 Nov 2026 19:35:55 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795376156; bh=z6BC8bTNkW2Kb/oWzgzzW0J38AL7u1XskPs2J4J0IMs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date; b=afSm/rTgzZFMW4Yd8GBsTnSi9/k2rA1cJD3HY1AclLcTYC2Pw31SwD5cb38UUnt5h moA+Kqi0QCm1/F/hxeBnTNyIYcLusk85RFidS1GsWr5couz3pL+I1T1yIBypCTASGe XbUbdKrwjOFZa83YcBPm9SlCo8TjRp9S7RKJlOrFkc0NnR2SSFGLcS4WL3H/twPPag f8GxIQ+hSsoK3ofc5Ng5+leToB1vwlHPQ2DMkJItOwKoQm9xxNT6/xhH/V5k7PWBEw Mo/UCOByeRZwlG+JM1WWvB9HxaWLPKpZqmjCV+KRpaC0URJL4yccz9+7La7yWzW88A HVkmmV/DgCtYg== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , bpf@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux.dev, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Aleksa Sarai , Alexander Mikhalitsyn , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , David Howells , Eric Biggers , Giuseppe Scrivano , Hugh Dickins , Jan Kara , Jeff Layton , Jonathan Corbet , Josef Bacik , Kees Cook , KP Singh , Lennart Poettering , Neal Gompa , Oleg Nesterov , Paul Moore , Pavel Tikhomirov , Serge Hallyn , Shuah Khan , Zygmunt Krynicki Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 00/26] userland: Userland containers Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 21:35:13 +0200 Message-ID: <20261122193539.3334213-1-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.3 X-Mailing-List: bpf@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit OVERVIEW ======== A userland is an anonymous-inode control object with separate build and live phases that binds together: 1. A full set of detached namespaces owned by a fresh user namespace, with optional build-phase opt-in sharing (USERLAND_SHARE_NSFD). 2. A dedicated PID namespace for spawning processes into, signaling members, and polling or waiting on PID 1 exit. 3. An initially empty mount namespace (CLONE_EMPTY_MNTNS) populated directly in its target user namespace before going live, without inheriting host mounts or cloning staged trees, while still allowing new mounts to be attached at runtime. Work on this feature started in 2025 after reviewing David Howells' container object patch set [1], whose underlying mechanics made sense to me as a continuation of earlier container object efforts [2]. The lifecycle follows a staircase initialization model similar to the Intel SGX driver, without an embryonic task state or a parallel namespace syscall API, pairing a compact policy-agnostic implementation with an allow-list security model (with LSM hooks) and runtime mount hotplug. While the patch set is manually written, the original motivation came from isolating LLM agents. Running untrusted agent workloads made it clear that OCI runtimes need to minimize their live configuration surface. Assembling mounts, credentials, and namespaces inside helper processes with a half-configured container is what I see as the main challenge, and the existential debate around namespaces and container objects is an unfocused discussion topic. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/155059610368.17079.2220554006494174417.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/1102593/ IMPLEMENTATION ============== Standalone fd-based namespace configuration (patches 01-07) decouples user and mount namespace setup from live helper tasks. userns_set_idmap() atomically configures USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED policy and UID, GID, and project ID mappings on a CLONE_NEWUSER nsfs fd, checking current_cred() so an unprivileged creator can delegate the fd via SCM_RIGHTS to a privileged mapping daemon. move_mount(..., MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS) operates on any non-anonymous mount namespace fd: on an empty mount namespace it installs "/" onto the nullfs root once, attaches relative submounts both before entry and into live mount namespaces, and supports MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE for recursive bind mounts without OPEN_TREE_CLONE. userland_open() allocates a userland instance backed by a pollable anonymous-inode fd, creating a fresh owning user namespace and a full set of detached namespaces: empty mount (CLONE_EMPTY_MNTNS), PID, UTS, IPC, network, cgroup, and time. ioctl(ufd, USERLAND_GET_NSFD, nstype) returns nsfs file descriptors for member namespaces, and ioctl(ufd, USERLAND_SHARE_NSFD, ns_fd) replaces a member cgroup, IPC, UTS, network, or time namespace while the userland is in USERLAND_INIT. Superblocks are configured directly in the target user namespace via fsopen(), FSCONFIG_SET_USERLAND, and fsmount() for filesystems opting into FS_USERLAND_MOUNT (tmpfs, ramfs, devpts, proc, mqueue) or FS_USERNS_DELEGATABLE, allowing unprivileged callers to assemble mounts without holding CAP_SYS_ADMIN in their own user namespace or entering the target user namespace first. Once "/" is installed, processes are spawned into the userland via clone3() with CLONE_INTO_USERLAND and struct clone_args.userland, without modifying the calling process's own live state first. Pairing CLONE_INTO_USERLAND with CLONE_VFORK and opening the target binary via openat2(..., RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) on the retained "/" mount fd allows spawning with execveat() directly into the target root. The first entrant becomes PID 1; once it exits and zap_pid_ns_processes() reaps all members, poll() reports EPOLLHUP and waitid(P_USERLAND, ufd, infop, options, NULL) returns init's exit status without consuming it. pidfd_send_signal(ufd, sig, NULL, 0) walks pid_ns->idr under tasklist_lock to signal member thread groups, and dedicated LSM hooks mediate userland allocation, teardown, namespace sharing, process entry, and signal delivery. SYSCALLS ======== Two new system calls are proposed: 1. userland_open(): open an opaque staircase-initialized container object (modeled on Intel SGX enclave initialization with separate build and live states) with no embryonic state, opting selected shared namespaces in via an allow-list instead of unshare semantics. 2. userns_set_idmap(): configure all UID, GID, and project ID map extents for a container user namespace in a single atomic system call. Extensions to existing system calls: 1. move_mount() (MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS, MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE): install "/" and relative submounts into a mount namespace fd before entry or at runtime, and recursively bind-clone mount trees without OPEN_TREE_CLONE. 2. clone3() (CLONE_INTO_USERLAND, struct clone_args.userland): spawn PID 1 and subsequent processes directly into a userland without modifying the calling process's own live state first. 3. fsopen() / fsconfig() / fsmount() (FSCONFIG_SET_USERLAND): bind a filesystem context to a userland's namespaces and create mounts without entering its user namespace. 4. waitid() (P_USERLAND): wait on a userland fd for PID 1 exit and read its exit status without consuming it. 5. pidfd_send_signal(): broadcast signals to member thread groups via a userland fd. 6. ioctl() (USERLAND_GET_NSFD, USERLAND_SHARE_NSFD): open member nsfs file descriptors and opt selected namespaces into existing nsfs fds during USERLAND_INIT. HOTPLUG ======= 1. Host calls userland_open(). 2. Host sets uid/gid maps with userns_set_idmap(). 3. Host populates "/" with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS, optionally combined with MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE for bind mounts. 4. Host spawns PID 1 with clone3(CLONE_INTO_USERLAND) (optionally passing an AF_UNIX socketpair fd for communication). 5. PID 1 watches /proc/self/ns/mnt via fanotify(FAN_REPORT_MNT | FAN_MARK_MNTNS, FAN_MNT_ATTACH) or polls /proc/self/mountinfo. 6. On hotplug, host mounts the filesystem via fsopen() / fsconfig(FSCONFIG_SET_USERLAND) / fsmount() (plus optional MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP). 7. Host creates the mountpoint with openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) + mkdirat() and attaches the mount with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS. 8. PID 1 receives FAN_MNT_ATTACH and queries the new mount via statmount(). CHANGES ======= v7: - Run userland_copy() after dropping tasklist_lock in copy_process() so userland->lock is never acquired with interrupts disabled, and loop under userland->lock in userland_waitid() so blocking waitid(P_USERLAND) never returns -EAGAIN across concurrent bootstrap retries (Sashiko). - Defer may_mount() in fsmount() until neither FSMOUNT_NAMESPACE nor fc->userland_bound applies, deduplicate idmap_maps_root() and unpriv_idmap_permitted() in kernel/user_namespace.c, compute foreign_ns once in mount_too_revealing(), hoist cross_child_src in attach_recursive_mnt(), and drop unreachable !current->nsproxy checks (Sashiko). - Document ->set_userland() and userland_bound in mount_api.rst, move all userland.rst prose into kernel-doc comments including lifecycle states and credential rules, and narrow pidfd_send_signal() commit description to forks by member processes (Sashiko). - Add TEST_INCLUDES for ksft.py, distinguish i386 from x32 on x86_64, tolerate CONFIG_TIME_NS=n in test_get_nsfd(), and switch AF_UNIX fd passing to SOCK_SEQPACKET in selftests/userland (Sashiko). v6: - Rename rootns to userland (CONFIG_USERLAND, userland_open(), userland_ prefix, CLONE_INTO_USERLAND, FSCONFIG_SET_USERLAND, P_USERLAND, USERLAND_GET_NSFD). - Replace ROOTNS_WAIT and ROOTNS_KILL ioctls with waitid(P_USERLAND) and pidfd_send_signal() support for userland file descriptors. - Add build-phase USERLAND_SHARE_NSFD ioctl and security_userland_share() LSM hook to opt cgroup, IPC, UTS, network, or time namespaces into an existing nsfs fd before process entry. - Pass USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED via userns_set_idmap() flags instead of in-struct request flags. - Gate FSCONFIG_SET_USERLAND and unprivileged fsopen() on explicit FS_USERLAND_MOUNT opt-in (tmpfs, ramfs, devpts, proc, mqueue), refresh fc->cred on bind, bound userns_set_idmap() size to PAGE_SIZE (-E2BIG), enforce projid_map privilege checks and atomic ns->flags updates, fix cross-userns slave mount locking in attach_recursive_mnt(), reject SB_NOUSER and cross-mntns nsfs loops in MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE, and walk ancestor PIDNS_ADDING flags in CLONE_INTO_USERLAND (Sashiko). v5: - Heavy reduction of cc-list. More added by request. - Re-slice the patch set into standalone fd-based user and mount namespace configuration (01-07) followed by rootns (08-25), and split proc, ipc/mqueue, and bpf_lsm changes into separate commits. - Add userns_set_idmap() system call to atomically configure setgroups and UID, GID, and project ID mappings on CLONE_NEWUSER nsfs fds without /proc//*_map, checking current_cred() so unprivileged userns fds can be delegated via SCM_RIGHTS to a privileged mapping daemon (Andy Lutomirski). - Add MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() to recursively bind-clone host mount subtrees into a target mount namespace fd without OPEN_TREE_CLONE. - Clarify in overview and uAPI documentation that rootns is an anonymous-inode control object rather than an nsfs namespace. - Fix upfront pidns ancestry check in ROOTNS_WAIT, bootstrap -EINVAL preservation in CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS, FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS user_ns delegation and fsmount() rootns_bound/seq_origin handling, proc pidns= mount option override check, cross-userns anonymous mount MNT_LOCKED propagation, and selftest wide-arch _IOC_NONE, socket blocking, and cleanup handling (Sashiko). - Extend selftests/rootns with userns_set_idmap(), SCM_RIGHTS delegation, MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE, and hotplug mount coverage. v4: - A single syscall API (and shenanigans e.g., in fsconfig). - I use a similar API model as I used in SGX driver, as like enclaves, containers are "closures". Instead of /dev/sgx_enclave like device file, anon inode is used. - Consolidate rootns_create(), rootns_wait(), and rootns_kill() into a single rootns() system call plus ROOTNS_WAIT and ROOTNS_KILL ioctls, dropping rusage from ROOTNS_WAIT. - LSM: lbs_rootns security blob management and security_rootns_alloc(), security_rootns_free(), security_rootns_clone(), and security_rootns_kill() LSM hooks wired into bpf_lsm. - Disallow CLONE_VM with CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS across time namespaces, require CAP_SYS_CHROOT, preserve caller umask, reset dumpability on user namespace transitions, and fix ROOTNS_WAIT, FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, fsmount(), and MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS locking and permission checks (Sashiko). - Rewrite selftests/rootns in Python. I used similar structure as I've used in selftests/tpm2. This "along the lines" mimics Cells style container manager. Rootns is a quite typical no policy solution and Cells is a managed solution, and they are at the far ends, which can also be witnessed from the patch set sizes. The question really is where we want to draw the borderline. I'm neither favoring nor supporting any possible solution because I don't know. I'm just saying where they live as a software stack. - Update documentation and architecture syscall tables for rootns(). v3: - The patch set size increased predominantly because the coverage of kselftest had to widened to cover the introduced changes. - Replace MOVE_MOUNT_T_ROOTNS_ROOT with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS targeting mnt_ns nsfs fds, and add ioctl(ROOTNS_GET_NSFD) to open member namespace fds (Andy Lutomirski). - Allow unprivileged fsopen(), FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, and fsmount() to configure and mount FS_USERNS_MOUNT filesystems directly in the target user namespace without entering it first (Andy Lutomirski). - Fix locking, refcounting, credential/dumpability/timens setup, pivot_root() lookup, and cross-userns mount checks across copy_rootns(), CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS, rootns_kill(), FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, and move_mount() (Sashiko). - Mark PowerPC rootns syscalls nospu (Sashiko). - Update documentation and kselftests. v2: - Drop rootns provenance tracking (rootns_id and rootns_may_setns()) and rely on user_namespace ownership for setns() isolation (Andy Lutomirski). - Replace the rootns_enter() system call with clone3(CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS) and struct clone_args.rootns (CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER3), allowing CLONE_VM | CLONE_VFORK and compatible per-child clone3() flags (Andy Lutomirski). - Drop the spurious task_no_new_privs() check in may_enter_rootns_creds() (Andy Lutomirski). - Update documentation, Kconfig, syscall tables, and kselftests for CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS. VERSIONS ======== v6: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20261122011809.2667684-1-jarkko@kernel.org/ v5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20261121000844.1863324-1-jarkko@kernel.org/ v4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20261119224312.1037966-1-jarkko@kernel.org/ v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20261118193539.240065-1-jarkko@kernel.org/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20261117231352.3816603-1-jarkko@kernel.org/ v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20261117050841.3289652-1-jarkko@kernel.org/ Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org Cc: containers@lists.linux.dev Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: Aleksa Sarai Cc: Alexander Mikhalitsyn Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: David Howells Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: Giuseppe Scrivano Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: Jan Kara Cc: Jeff Layton Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: Josef Bacik Cc: Kees Cook Cc: KP Singh Cc: Lennart Poettering Cc: Neal Gompa Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Paul Moore Cc: Pavel Tikhomirov Cc: Serge Hallyn Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: Zygmunt Krynicki Jarkko Sakkinen (26): userns: Factor out idmap validation and commit helpers userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call arch: Wire up userns_set_idmap() system call mount: Add mnt_ns_get_root() mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS userns: Factor out install_user_ns_cred() nsproxy: Expose create_new_namespaces() userland: Add core infrastructure userland: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace userland: Add userland_open() system call userland: Add USERLAND_GET_NSFD ioctl userland: Add USERLAND_SHARE_NSFD ioctl exit: Support P_USERLAND in waitid() signal: Support userland fds in pidfd_send_signal() fork: Support CLONE_INTO_USERLAND in clone3() fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_USERLAND in fsconfig() proc: Implement ->set_userland() fs_context operation ipc/mqueue: Implement ->set_userland() fs_context operation security: Add userland LSM hooks bpf: Register userland LSM hooks arch: Wire up userland_open() system call docs: Document userland uAPI selftests/userland: Add userland test suite MAINTAINERS: Add entry for USERLAND Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.rst | 32 +- Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst | 1 + .../userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst | 1 + Documentation/userspace-api/userland.rst | 77 + MAINTAINERS | 11 + arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 + arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 2 + arch/arm64/tools/syscall_32.tbl | 2 + arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 + arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 2 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 2 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 2 + arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 + arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 + arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 + arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 + arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 2 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 2 + arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 + fs/devpts/inode.c | 4 +- fs/filesystems.c | 15 + fs/fs_context.c | 21 +- fs/fsopen.c | 137 +- fs/internal.h | 7 +- fs/namespace.c | 358 ++- fs/proc/root.c | 26 +- fs/ramfs/inode.c | 2 +- include/linux/cred.h | 4 +- include/linux/fs.h | 1 + include/linux/fs_context.h | 6 + include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 8 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 + include/linux/mnt_namespace.h | 2 + include/linux/nsfs.h | 1 + include/linux/nsproxy.h | 8 +- include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 4 + include/linux/sched/task.h | 6 + include/linux/security.h | 37 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 5 + include/linux/user_namespace.h | 9 +- include/linux/userland.h | 135 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 10 +- include/uapi/linux/mount.h | 5 +- include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h | 46 + include/uapi/linux/sched.h | 5 + include/uapi/linux/userland.h | 58 + include/uapi/linux/wait.h | 1 + init/Kconfig | 10 + ipc/mqueue.c | 18 +- kernel/Makefile | 2 + kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 11 + kernel/cred.c | 27 +- kernel/exit.c | 4 + kernel/fork.c | 72 +- kernel/nsproxy.c | 15 +- kernel/pid_namespace.c | 2 + kernel/signal.c | 4 + kernel/sys_ni.c | 4 + kernel/user_namespace.c | 459 +++- kernel/userland.c | 717 +++++ mm/shmem.c | 5 +- scripts/syscall.tbl | 2 + security/lsm_init.c | 6 + security/security.c | 72 + tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 10 +- .../perf/arch/arm/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 + .../arch/mips/entry/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 2 + .../arch/powerpc/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 + .../perf/arch/s390/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 + tools/perf/arch/sh/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 + .../arch/sparc/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 + .../arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 2 + .../arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 2 + .../arch/xtensa/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 + tools/scripts/syscall.tbl | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/userland/Makefile | 6 + tools/testing/selftests/userland/config | 10 + .../testing/selftests/userland/test_smoke.sh | 10 + .../selftests/userland/userland_cells.py | 1088 ++++++++ .../selftests/userland/userland_test.py | 2330 +++++++++++++++++ 83 files changed, 5782 insertions(+), 201 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/userspace-api/userland.rst create mode 100644 include/linux/userland.h create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/userland.h create mode 100644 kernel/userland.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/userland/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/userland/config create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/userland/test_smoke.sh create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/userland/userland_cells.py create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/userland/userland_test.py -- 2.47.3