From: Song Liu <songliubraving@meta.com>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: "Song Liu" <songliubraving@meta.com>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>, "Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-Fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Kernel Team" <kernel-team@meta.com>,
"andrii@kernel.org" <andrii@kernel.org>,
"eddyz87@gmail.com" <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
"ast@kernel.org" <ast@kernel.org>,
"daniel@iogearbox.net" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"martin.lau@linux.dev" <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
"viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"jack@suse.cz" <jack@suse.cz>,
"kpsingh@kernel.org" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
"mattbobrowski@google.com" <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
"Liam Wisehart" <liamwisehart@meta.com>,
"Liang Tang" <lltang@meta.com>,
"Shankaran Gnanashanmugam" <shankaran@meta.com>,
"LSM List" <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: Add tests for bpf_get_dentry_xattr
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2024 05:42:58 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3C282464-5230-4607-A477-BBA19A199681@fb.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <DB8E8B09-094E-4C32-9D3F-29C88822751A@fb.com>
Hi Christian,
> On Aug 19, 2024, at 1:25 PM, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Christian,
[...]
> If you provide a bpf_get_parent() api for userspace to consume you'll
>> end up providing them with an api that is extremly easy to misuse.
>
> Does this make sense to have higher level API that walks up the path,
> so that it takes mounts into account. It can probably be something like:
>
> int bpf_get_parent_path(struct path *p) {
> again:
> if (p->dentry == p->mnt.mnt_root) {
> follow_up(p);
> goto again;
> }
> if (unlikely(IS_ROOT(p->dentry))) {
> return PARENT_WALK_DONE;
> }
> parent_dentry = dget_parent(p->dentry);
> dput(p->dentry);
> p->dentry = parent_dentry;
> return PARENT_WALK_NEXT;
> }
>
> This will handle the mount. However, we cannot guarantee deny-by-default
> policies like LandLock does, because this is just a building block of
> some security policies.
I guess the above is not really clear. Here is a prototype I got.
With the kernel diff attached below, we are able to do something
like:
SEC("lsm.s/file_open")
int BPF_PROG(test_file_open, struct file *f)
{
/* ... */
bpf_for_each(dentry, dentry, &f->f_path, BPF_DENTRY_ITER_TO_ROOT) {
ret = bpf_get_dentry_xattr(dentry, "user.kfunc", &value_ptr);
/* do work with the xattr in value_ptr */
}
/* ... */
}
With this helper, the user cannot walk the tree randomly. Instead,
the walk has to follow some pattern, namely, TO_ROOT, TO_MNT_ROOT,
etc. And helper makes sure the walk is safe.
Does this solution make sense to you?
Thanks,
Song
The kernel diff below.
============================== 8< ===============================
diff --git c/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c w/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
index 3fe9f59ef867..4b1400dec984 100644
--- c/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
+++ w/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();
@@ -154,13 +155,91 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name__str,
__bpf_kfunc_end_defs();
+struct bpf_iter_dentry {
+ __u64 __opaque[3];
+} __attribute__((aligned(8)));
+
+struct bpf_iter_dentry_kern {
+ struct path path;
+ unsigned int flags;
+} __attribute__((aligned(8)));
+
+enum {
+ /* all the parent paths, until root (/) */
+ BPF_DENTRY_ITER_TO_ROOT,
+ /* all the parent paths, until mnt root */
+ BPF_DENTRY_ITER_TO_MNT_ROOT,
+};
+
+__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();
+
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_dentry_new(struct bpf_iter_dentry *it,
+ struct path *path, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ struct bpf_iter_dentry_kern *kit = (void*)it;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct bpf_iter_dentry_kern) >
+ sizeof(struct bpf_iter_dentry));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(__alignof__(struct bpf_iter_dentry_kern) !=
+ __alignof__(struct bpf_iter_dentry));
+
+ if (flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (flags) {
+ case BPF_DENTRY_ITER_TO_ROOT:
+ case BPF_DENTRY_ITER_TO_MNT_ROOT:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ kit->path = *path;
+ path_get(&kit->path);
+ kit->flags = flags;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc struct dentry *bpf_iter_dentry_next(struct bpf_iter_dentry *it)
+{
+ struct bpf_iter_dentry_kern *kit = (void*)it;
+ struct dentry *parent_dentry;
+
+ if (unlikely(IS_ROOT(kit->path.dentry)))
+ return NULL;
+
+jump_up:
+ if (kit->path.dentry == kit->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
+ if (kit->flags == BPF_DENTRY_ITER_TO_MNT_ROOT)
+ return NULL;
+ if (follow_up(&kit->path)) {
+ goto jump_up;
+ }
+ }
+ parent_dentry = dget_parent(kit->path.dentry);
+ dput(kit->path.dentry);
+ kit->path.dentry = parent_dentry;
+ return parent_dentry;
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_dentry_destroy(struct bpf_iter_dentry *it)
+{
+ struct bpf_iter_dentry_kern *kit = (void*)it;
+
+ path_put(&kit->path);
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc_end_defs();
+
BTF_KFUNCS_START(bpf_fs_kfunc_set_ids)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_task_exe_file,
KF_ACQUIRE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS | KF_RET_NULL)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_put_file, KF_RELEASE)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_path_d_path, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
-BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_dentry_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_dentry_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE) /* Will fix this later */
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_file_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dentry_new, KF_ITER_NEW | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dentry_next, KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dentry_destroy, KF_ITER_DESTROY)
BTF_KFUNCS_END(bpf_fs_kfunc_set_ids)
static int bpf_fs_kfuncs_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 kfunc_id)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-20 5:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-07-25 23:47 [PATCH bpf-next 0/2] Add kfuncs to support reading xattr from dentry Song Liu
2024-07-25 23:47 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Add kfunc bpf_get_dentry_xattr() to read " Song Liu
2024-07-26 5:34 ` Al Viro
2024-07-26 7:01 ` Song Liu
2024-07-25 23:47 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: Add tests for bpf_get_dentry_xattr Song Liu
2024-07-26 7:06 ` Christian Brauner
2024-07-26 9:19 ` Song Liu
2024-07-26 11:51 ` Christian Brauner
2024-07-26 19:43 ` Song Liu
2024-07-29 13:46 ` Christian Brauner
2024-07-30 5:58 ` Song Liu
2024-07-30 8:59 ` Christian Brauner
2024-08-19 7:18 ` Song Liu
2024-08-19 11:16 ` Christian Brauner
2024-08-19 13:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-19 20:35 ` Song Liu
2024-08-20 12:45 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-20 17:42 ` Song Liu
2024-08-20 21:11 ` Paul Moore
2024-08-21 3:43 ` Song Liu
2024-08-23 10:38 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-19 20:25 ` Song Liu
2024-08-20 5:42 ` Song Liu [this message]
2024-08-20 6:29 ` Al Viro
2024-08-20 7:23 ` Song Liu
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