[PATCH v3 bpf-next 0/2] bpf: Fix Null-Pointer Dereference in kernel_clone() via BPF fmod_ret on security_task_alloc

[PATCH v3 bpf-next 0/2] bpf: Fix Null-Pointer Dereference in kernel_clone() via BPF fmod_ret on security_task_alloc

[Feng Yang]

From: Feng Yang <yangfeng@kylinos.cn>

This patch set adds return value validation for fmod_ret
to prevent system crashes caused by incorrect return values.

Changes in v3:
- Do not move the code, and make some formatting changes. Thanks, Leon
  Hwang.
- Error injection always ensures that 0 is a valid return value. Thanks,
  Menglong Dong.
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260410061037.149532-1-yangfeng59949@163.com/
Changes in v2:
- Add validation for fault injection and include selftests. Thanks, Jiri
  Olsa, Jiayuan Chen.
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260408094816.228322-1-yangfeng59949@163.com/

Feng Yang (2):
  bpf: Fix Null-Pointer Dereference in kernel_clone() via BPF fmod_ret
    on security_task_alloc
  selftests/bpf: Add selftests for verifying return values of fmod_ret.

 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                         | 114 +++++++++++++++++-
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c       |   2 +
 .../bpf/progs/verifier_fmod_ret_return.c      |  59 +++++++++
 3 files changed, 173 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_fmod_ret_return.c

-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v3 bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Fix Null-Pointer Dereference in kernel_clone() via BPF fmod_ret on security_task_alloc

[Feng Yang]

From: Feng Yang <yangfeng@kylinos.cn>

Using the following BPF program will cause a kernel panic:
SEC("fmod_ret/security_task_alloc")
int fmod_task_alloc(void *ctx)
{
        return 1;
}

[  383.899321] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000b99
[  383.899327] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  383.899330] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  383.899332] PGD 8000000108a60067 P4D 8000000108a60067 PUD 104550067 PMD 0
[  383.899341] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[  383.899346] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 12925 Comm: test Kdump: loaded Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[  383.899349] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[  383.899351] RIP: 0010:get_task_pid+0x20/0x80
[  383.899358] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89 f5 53 48 89 fb e8 0b 98 0a 00 85 ed 75 32 48 81 c3 98 0b 00 00 <48> 8b 1b 48 85 db 74 14 b8 01 00 00 00 f0 0f c1 03 85 c0 74 27 8d
[  383.899362] RSP: 0018:ffffd3ca0ab13b38 EFLAGS: 00010206
[  383.899367] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000b99 RCX: 0000000000000008
[  383.899371] RDX: ffff8b2c85860000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001
[  383.899374] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000010754cf50c8 R09: 0000010754cf50c8
[  383.899377] R10: ffffffff95a6c000 R11: 0000000000000024 R12: 0000000000000000
[  383.899380] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000001200000
[  383.899384] FS:  00007f3eae907740(0000) GS:ffff8b2d05e5c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  383.899388] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  383.899390] CR2: 0000000000000b99 CR3: 0000000106a94003 CR4: 00000000000706f0
[  383.899393] Call Trace:
[  383.899397]  <TASK>
[  383.899401]  kernel_clone+0xe8/0x480
[  383.899406]  __do_sys_clone+0x65/0x90
[  383.899410]  do_syscall_64+0xca/0x860
[  383.899421]  ? next_uptodate_folio+0x85/0x2a0
[  383.899427]  ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x4c/0x90
[  383.899434]  ? filemap_map_pages+0x3b7/0x4d0
[  383.899437]  ? do_read_fault+0x107/0x210
[  383.899442]  ? do_fault+0x1b2/0x330
[  383.899445]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x49b/0x7a0
[  383.899448]  ? count_memcg_events+0xc4/0x160
[  383.899453]  ? handle_mm_fault+0xbb/0x370
[  383.899456]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x209/0x680
[  383.899459]  ? irqentry_exit+0x7a/0x660
[  383.899462]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  383.899466] RIP: 0033:0x7f3eaeb426e7
[  383.899470] Code: 5d c3 90 f3 0f 1e fa 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00 00 45 31 c0 31 d2 31 f6 bf 11 00 20 01 4c 8d 90 d0 02 00 00 b8 38 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 39 89 c2 85 c0 75 2c 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00
[  383.899472] RSP: 002b:00007fff23a2c838 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038
[  383.899477] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3eaeb426e7
[  383.899479] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000001200011
[  383.899481] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  383.899483] R10: 00007f3eae907a10 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[  383.899485] R13: 00007fff23a2dbe8 R14: 0000000000403de0 R15: 00007f3eaecf5000
[  383.899488]  </TASK>
[  383.899489] Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set rfkill nf_tables sunrpc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency_common intel_pmc_core pmt_telemetry snd_intel8x0 pmt_discovery pmt_class snd_ac97_codec intel_pmc_ssram_telemetry ac97_bus intel_vsec snd_pcm snd_timer snd rapl soundcore joydev sg i2c_piix4 pcspkr vboxguest i2c_smbus nfnetlink sr_mod cdrom sd_mod ata_generic vmwgfx ahci libahci ata_piix drm_ttm_helper ghash_clmulni_intel video ttm e1000 wmi libata serio_raw dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_multipath dm_mod fuse i2c_dev autofs4
[  383.899624] CR2: 0000000000000b99

This is because
1. The BPF program is designed to override the normal behavior of
`security_task_alloc` and forcibly return a non-zero error value (e.g.,
`-ENOMEM` or `1`).
2. User space triggers a process creation syscall (like `fork` or
`clone`). The kernel invokes `copy_process` to allocate and initialize a
new `task_struct` for the child process.
3. `copy_process` invokes `security_task_alloc`. Due to the attached BPF
program, it returns the positive value `1`.
4. `copy_process` treats any non-zero return from `security_task_alloc`
as a failure. It aborts initialization, cleans up, and returns the error
code cast to a pointer via `ERR_PTR(1)` (which evaluates to the memory
address `0x1`).
5. In `kernel_clone()`, the kernel uses the `IS_ERR()` macro to check if
the returned `task_struct *p` is an error pointer. However, `IS_ERR()`
only checks for negative error codes in the range `[-MAX_ERRNO, -1]`.
Since `0x1` is not in this range, the check `IS_ERR(p)` evaluates to
`false`.
6. The kernel incorrectly assumes `p` is a valid `task_struct` pointer
and proceeds to call `get_task_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID)`. This dereferences
the invalid address `0x1` (plus the offset of the `thread_pid` field),
triggering a general protection fault or null-pointer dereference.

Therefore, for security-related functions, similar to LSM,
the validity of their return values is verified to fix the issue.
Return value validation for fault injection is also added accordingly.

Reported-by: Quan Sun <2022090917019@std.uestc.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd@hust.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210@hust.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Dongliang Mu <dzm91@hust.edu.cn>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/973a1b7b-8ee7-407a-890a-11455d9cc5bf@std.uestc.edu.cn/
Fixes: 6ba43b761c41 ("bpf: Attachment verification for BPF_MODIFY_RETURN")
Signed-off-by: Feng Yang <yangfeng@kylinos.cn>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 112 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 56fcc96dc780..8285f626919e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -18363,6 +18363,112 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION
+
+/*
+ * The return values corresponding to the error injection
+ * types shall be interpreted as follows:
+ *
+ * EI_ETYPE_NULL
+ *   This function will return `NULL` if it fails. e.g. return an allocated
+ *   object address.
+ *
+ * EI_ETYPE_ERRNO
+ *   This function will return an `-errno` error code if it fails. e.g. return
+ *   -EINVAL if the input is wrong. This will include the functions which will
+ *   return an address which encodes `-errno` by ERR_PTR() macro.
+ *
+ * EI_ETYPE_ERRNO_NULL
+ *   This function will return an `-errno` or `NULL` if it fails. If the caller
+ *   of this function checks the return value with IS_ERR_OR_NULL() macro, this
+ *   type will be appropriate.
+ *
+ * EI_ETYPE_TRUE
+ *   This function will return `true` (non-zero positive value) if it fails.
+ *
+ * Since returning 0 from modify_return means not modifying the return value,
+ * 0 must always be included.
+ */
+static int modify_return_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
+					  struct bpf_retval_range *range)
+{
+	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)prog->aux->dst_trampoline->func.addr;
+
+	if (within_error_injection_list(addr)) {
+		switch (get_injectable_error_type(addr)) {
+		case EI_ETYPE_NULL:
+			range->minval = 0;
+			range->maxval = 0;
+			break;
+		case EI_ETYPE_ERRNO:
+		case EI_ETYPE_ERRNO_NULL:
+			range->minval = -MAX_ERRNO;
+			range->maxval = 0;
+			break;
+		case EI_ETYPE_TRUE:
+			range->minval = 0;
+			range->maxval = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		range->return_32bit = true;
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* The system call return value is allowed to be an arbitrary value. */
+static int modify_return_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
+					  struct bpf_retval_range *range)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION */
+
+#define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_"
+/* hooks return 0 or 1 */
+BTF_SET_START(bool_security_hooks)
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+BTF_ID(func, security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match)
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+BTF_ID(func, security_audit_rule_known)
+#endif
+/*
+ * The inode_xattr_skipcap hook is called from within
+ * security_inode_removexattr and security_inode_setxattr.
+ * Since these two functions can also return values from
+ * inode_removexattr and inode_setxattr respectively,
+ * there is no need to restrict their return values to 0 or 1.
+ */
+BTF_SET_END(bool_security_hooks)
+
+/*
+ * Similar to bpf_lsm_get_retval_range,
+ * ensure that the return values of fmod_ret are valid.
+ */
+static int bpf_security_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
+					 struct bpf_retval_range *range)
+{
+	if (strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, prog->aux->attach_func_name,
+		    sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (btf_id_set_contains(&bool_security_hooks, prog->aux->attach_btf_id)) {
+		range->minval = 0;
+		range->maxval = 1;
+	} else {
+		range->minval = -MAX_ERRNO;
+		range->maxval = 0;
+	}
+	range->return_32bit = true;
+
+	return 0;
+}
 
 static bool return_retval_range(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_retval_range *range)
 {
@@ -18416,8 +18522,13 @@ static bool return_retval_range(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_retval_
 			*range = retval_range(0, 0);
 			break;
 		case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP:
-		case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
 			return false;
+		case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
+			if (!bpf_security_get_retval_range(env->prog, range))
+				break;
+			if (modify_return_get_retval_range(env->prog, range))
+				return false;
+			break;
 		case BPF_TRACE_ITER:
 		default:
 			break;
@@ -25460,7 +25571,6 @@ static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	return bpf_prog_ctx_arg_info_init(prog, st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].info,
 					  st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].cnt);
 }
-#define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_"
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION
 
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCH v3 bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Fix Null-Pointer Dereference in kernel_clone() via BPF fmod_ret on security_task_alloc

[Alexei Starovoitov]

On Sat, Apr 11, 2026 at 9:36 AM Feng Yang <yangfeng59949@163.com> wrote:
>
> From: Feng Yang <yangfeng@kylinos.cn>
>
> Using the following BPF program will cause a kernel panic:
> SEC("fmod_ret/security_task_alloc")
> int fmod_task_alloc(void *ctx)
> {
>         return 1;
> }
>
> [  383.899321] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000b99
> [  383.899327] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
> [  383.899330] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
> [  383.899332] PGD 8000000108a60067 P4D 8000000108a60067 PUD 104550067 PMD 0
> [  383.899341] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
> [  383.899346] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 12925 Comm: test Kdump: loaded Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
> [  383.899349] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
> [  383.899351] RIP: 0010:get_task_pid+0x20/0x80
> [  383.899358] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89 f5 53 48 89 fb e8 0b 98 0a 00 85 ed 75 32 48 81 c3 98 0b 00 00 <48> 8b 1b 48 85 db 74 14 b8 01 00 00 00 f0 0f c1 03 85 c0 74 27 8d
> [  383.899362] RSP: 0018:ffffd3ca0ab13b38 EFLAGS: 00010206
> [  383.899367] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000b99 RCX: 0000000000000008
> [  383.899371] RDX: ffff8b2c85860000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001
> [  383.899374] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000010754cf50c8 R09: 0000010754cf50c8
> [  383.899377] R10: ffffffff95a6c000 R11: 0000000000000024 R12: 0000000000000000
> [  383.899380] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000001200000
> [  383.899384] FS:  00007f3eae907740(0000) GS:ffff8b2d05e5c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> [  383.899388] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> [  383.899390] CR2: 0000000000000b99 CR3: 0000000106a94003 CR4: 00000000000706f0
> [  383.899393] Call Trace:
> [  383.899397]  <TASK>
> [  383.899401]  kernel_clone+0xe8/0x480
> [  383.899406]  __do_sys_clone+0x65/0x90
> [  383.899410]  do_syscall_64+0xca/0x860
> [  383.899421]  ? next_uptodate_folio+0x85/0x2a0
> [  383.899427]  ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x4c/0x90
> [  383.899434]  ? filemap_map_pages+0x3b7/0x4d0
> [  383.899437]  ? do_read_fault+0x107/0x210
> [  383.899442]  ? do_fault+0x1b2/0x330
> [  383.899445]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x49b/0x7a0
> [  383.899448]  ? count_memcg_events+0xc4/0x160
> [  383.899453]  ? handle_mm_fault+0xbb/0x370
> [  383.899456]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x209/0x680
> [  383.899459]  ? irqentry_exit+0x7a/0x660
> [  383.899462]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
> [  383.899466] RIP: 0033:0x7f3eaeb426e7
> [  383.899470] Code: 5d c3 90 f3 0f 1e fa 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00 00 45 31 c0 31 d2 31 f6 bf 11 00 20 01 4c 8d 90 d0 02 00 00 b8 38 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 39 89 c2 85 c0 75 2c 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00
> [  383.899472] RSP: 002b:00007fff23a2c838 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038
> [  383.899477] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3eaeb426e7
> [  383.899479] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000001200011
> [  383.899481] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
> [  383.899483] R10: 00007f3eae907a10 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
> [  383.899485] R13: 00007fff23a2dbe8 R14: 0000000000403de0 R15: 00007f3eaecf5000
> [  383.899488]  </TASK>
> [  383.899489] Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set rfkill nf_tables sunrpc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency_common intel_pmc_core pmt_telemetry snd_intel8x0 pmt_discovery pmt_class snd_ac97_codec intel_pmc_ssram_telemetry ac97_bus intel_vsec snd_pcm snd_timer snd rapl soundcore joydev sg i2c_piix4 pcspkr vboxguest i2c_smbus nfnetlink sr_mod cdrom sd_mod ata_generic vmwgfx ahci libahci ata_piix drm_ttm_helper ghash_clmulni_intel video ttm e1000 wmi libata serio_raw dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_multipath dm_mod fuse i2c_dev autofs4
> [  383.899624] CR2: 0000000000000b99
>
> This is because
> 1. The BPF program is designed to override the normal behavior of
> `security_task_alloc` and forcibly return a non-zero error value (e.g.,
> `-ENOMEM` or `1`).
> 2. User space triggers a process creation syscall (like `fork` or
> `clone`). The kernel invokes `copy_process` to allocate and initialize a
> new `task_struct` for the child process.
> 3. `copy_process` invokes `security_task_alloc`. Due to the attached BPF
> program, it returns the positive value `1`.
> 4. `copy_process` treats any non-zero return from `security_task_alloc`
> as a failure. It aborts initialization, cleans up, and returns the error
> code cast to a pointer via `ERR_PTR(1)` (which evaluates to the memory
> address `0x1`).
> 5. In `kernel_clone()`, the kernel uses the `IS_ERR()` macro to check if
> the returned `task_struct *p` is an error pointer. However, `IS_ERR()`
> only checks for negative error codes in the range `[-MAX_ERRNO, -1]`.
> Since `0x1` is not in this range, the check `IS_ERR(p)` evaluates to
> `false`.
> 6. The kernel incorrectly assumes `p` is a valid `task_struct` pointer
> and proceeds to call `get_task_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID)`. This dereferences
> the invalid address `0x1` (plus the offset of the `thread_pid` field),
> triggering a general protection fault or null-pointer dereference.
>
> Therefore, for security-related functions, similar to LSM,
> the validity of their return values is verified to fix the issue.
> Return value validation for fault injection is also added accordingly.
>
> Reported-by: Quan Sun <2022090917019@std.uestc.edu.cn>
> Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd@hust.edu.cn>
> Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210@hust.edu.cn>
> Reviewed-by: Dongliang Mu <dzm91@hust.edu.cn>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/973a1b7b-8ee7-407a-890a-11455d9cc5bf@std.uestc.edu.cn/
> Fixes: 6ba43b761c41 ("bpf: Attachment verification for BPF_MODIFY_RETURN")
> Signed-off-by: Feng Yang <yangfeng@kylinos.cn>
> ---
>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 112 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index 56fcc96dc780..8285f626919e 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -18363,6 +18363,112 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
>         return 0;
>  }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION
> +
> +/*
> + * The return values corresponding to the error injection
> + * types shall be interpreted as follows:
> + *
> + * EI_ETYPE_NULL
> + *   This function will return `NULL` if it fails. e.g. return an allocated
> + *   object address.
> + *
> + * EI_ETYPE_ERRNO
> + *   This function will return an `-errno` error code if it fails. e.g. return
> + *   -EINVAL if the input is wrong. This will include the functions which will
> + *   return an address which encodes `-errno` by ERR_PTR() macro.
> + *
> + * EI_ETYPE_ERRNO_NULL
> + *   This function will return an `-errno` or `NULL` if it fails. If the caller
> + *   of this function checks the return value with IS_ERR_OR_NULL() macro, this
> + *   type will be appropriate.
> + *
> + * EI_ETYPE_TRUE
> + *   This function will return `true` (non-zero positive value) if it fails.
> + *
> + * Since returning 0 from modify_return means not modifying the return value,
> + * 0 must always be included.
> + */
> +static int modify_return_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
> +                                         struct bpf_retval_range *range)
> +{
> +       unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)prog->aux->dst_trampoline->func.addr;
> +
> +       if (within_error_injection_list(addr)) {
> +               switch (get_injectable_error_type(addr)) {
> +               case EI_ETYPE_NULL:
> +                       range->minval = 0;
> +                       range->maxval = 0;
> +                       break;
> +               case EI_ETYPE_ERRNO:
> +               case EI_ETYPE_ERRNO_NULL:
> +                       range->minval = -MAX_ERRNO;
> +                       range->maxval = 0;
> +                       break;
> +               case EI_ETYPE_TRUE:
> +                       range->minval = 0;
> +                       range->maxval = 1;
> +                       break;
> +               }
> +               range->return_32bit = true;
> +
> +               return 0;
> +       }
> +
> +       return -EINVAL;
> +}
> +
> +#else
> +
> +/* The system call return value is allowed to be an arbitrary value. */
> +static int modify_return_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
> +                                         struct bpf_retval_range *range)
> +{
> +       return -EINVAL;
> +}
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION */

I recall people already explained that this is no go.
We cannot break all fmod_ret because error injection is disabled.

Also see sashiko reports.

> +
> +#define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_"
> +/* hooks return 0 or 1 */
> +BTF_SET_START(bool_security_hooks)
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
> +BTF_ID(func, security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match)
> +#endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
> +BTF_ID(func, security_audit_rule_known)
> +#endif
> +/*
> + * The inode_xattr_skipcap hook is called from within
> + * security_inode_removexattr and security_inode_setxattr.
> + * Since these two functions can also return values from
> + * inode_removexattr and inode_setxattr respectively,
> + * there is no need to restrict their return values to 0 or 1.
> + */
> +BTF_SET_END(bool_security_hooks)
> +
> +/*
> + * Similar to bpf_lsm_get_retval_range,
> + * ensure that the return values of fmod_ret are valid.
> + */
> +static int bpf_security_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
> +                                        struct bpf_retval_range *range)
> +{
> +       if (strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, prog->aux->attach_func_name,
> +                   sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1))
> +               return -EINVAL;
> +
> +       if (btf_id_set_contains(&bool_security_hooks, prog->aux->attach_btf_id)) {
> +               range->minval = 0;
> +               range->maxval = 1;
> +       } else {
> +               range->minval = -MAX_ERRNO;
> +               range->maxval = 0;
> +       }
> +       range->return_32bit = true;
> +
> +       return 0;
> +}

let's copy paste bpf_lsm_get_retval_range() for no good reason?!

please don't send such poor quality patches.

pw-bot: cr

Re: [PATCH v3 bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Fix Null-Pointer Dereference in kernel_clone() via BPF fmod_ret on security_task_alloc

[Feng Yang]

On Sun, 12 Apr 2026 00:35:55 +0800 Alexei Starovoitov wrote:

> > +/* The system call return value is allowed to be an arbitrary value. */
> > +static int modify_return_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
> > +                                         struct bpf_retval_range *range)
> > +{
> > +       return -EINVAL;
> > +}
> > +
> > +#endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION */

> I recall people already explained that this is no go.
> We cannot break all fmod_ret because error injection is disabled.

When error injection is disabled, the returned -EINVAL will result in a false return.
This shouldn't change the previous logic.

 		case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP:
-		case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
 			return false;
+		case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
+			if (!bpf_security_get_retval_range(env->prog, range))
+				break;
+			if (modify_return_get_retval_range(env->prog, range))
+				return false;
+			break;

> Also see sashiko reports.
>

Okay.
Thansks.

> let's copy paste bpf_lsm_get_retval_range() for no good reason?!

So should we modify this part according to Jiayuan Chen's logic?

Jiayuan's previous reply:
Also, I think a whitelist approach would be better here.
The known danger is specifically those security hooks whose return 
values get fed into ERR_PTR() by callers, such as:
- security_task_alloc
- security_inode_readlink
- security_task_movememory
- security_inode_follow_link
- security_fs_context_submount
- security_dentry_create_files_as
- security_perf_event_alloc
- security_inode_get_acl

> please don't send such poor quality patches.

Re: [PATCH v3 bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Fix Null-Pointer Dereference in kernel_clone() via BPF fmod_ret on security_task_alloc

[Menglong Dong]

On 2026/4/12 00:35, Feng Yang wrote:
> From: Feng Yang <yangfeng@kylinos.cn>
> 
[...]
>  
>  static bool return_retval_range(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_retval_range *range)
>  {
> @@ -18416,8 +18522,13 @@ static bool return_retval_range(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_retval_
>  			*range = retval_range(0, 0);
>  			break;
>  		case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP:
> -		case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
>  			return false;
> +		case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
> +			if (!bpf_security_get_retval_range(env->prog, range))
> +				break;
> +			if (modify_return_get_retval_range(env->prog, range))
> +				return false;
> +			break;

return false by default, as what we did in the previous logic?

+		case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
+			if (!bpf_security_get_retval_range(env->prog, range))
+				break;
+			if (!modify_return_get_retval_range(env->prog, range))
+				break;
+			return false;

>  		case BPF_TRACE_ITER:
>  		default:
>  			break;
> @@ -25460,7 +25571,6 @@ static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>  	return bpf_prog_ctx_arg_info_init(prog, st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].info,
>  					  st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].cnt);
>  }
> -#define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_"
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION
>  
> 

Re: [PATCH v3 bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Fix Null-Pointer Dereference in kernel_clone() via BPF fmod_ret on security_task_alloc

[Feng Yang]

On Sun, 12 Apr 2026 11:39:53 +0800, Menglong Dong wrote:
> >  static bool return_retval_range(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_retval_range *range)
> >  {
> > @@ -18416,8 +18522,13 @@ static bool return_retval_range(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_retval_
> >  			*range = retval_range(0, 0);
> >  			break;
> >  		case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP:
> > -		case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
> >  			return false;
> > +		case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
> > +			if (!bpf_security_get_retval_range(env->prog, range))
> > +				break;
> > +			if (modify_return_get_retval_range(env->prog, range))
> > +				return false;
> > +			break;
> 
> return false by default, as what we did in the previous logic?
> 
> +		case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
> +			if (!bpf_security_get_retval_range(env->prog, range))
> +				break;
> +			if (!modify_return_get_retval_range(env->prog, range))
> +				break;
> +			return false;
> 

Okay, thank you very much.

> >  		case BPF_TRACE_ITER:

[PATCH v3 bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: Add selftests for verifying return values of fmod_ret.

[Feng Yang]

From: Feng Yang <yangfeng@kylinos.cn>

Add selftests for verifying return values of fmod_ret.
test_progs -t verifier_fmod_ret_return
569/1   verifier_fmod_ret_return/fmod_task_alloc_1:OK
569/2   verifier_fmod_ret_return/fmod_task_alloc_2:OK
569/3   verifier_fmod_ret_return/fmod_ret_sys_open_1:OK
569/4   verifier_fmod_ret_return/fmod_ret_sys_open_2:OK
569/5   verifier_fmod_ret_return/fmod_ret_sys_open_3:OK
569/6   verifier_fmod_ret_return/fmod_page_pool_alloc_netmems_1:OK
569/7   verifier_fmod_ret_return/fmod_page_pool_alloc_netmems_2:OK
569     verifier_fmod_ret_return:OK
Summary: 1/7 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED

Signed-off-by: Feng Yang <yangfeng@kylinos.cn>
---
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c       |  2 +
 .../bpf/progs/verifier_fmod_ret_return.c      | 59 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_fmod_ret_return.c

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c
index a96b25ebff23..5a8d14e3980e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include "verifier_div0.skel.h"
 #include "verifier_div_mod_bounds.skel.h"
 #include "verifier_div_overflow.skel.h"
+#include "verifier_fmod_ret_return.skel.h"
 #include "verifier_global_subprogs.skel.h"
 #include "verifier_global_ptr_args.skel.h"
 #include "verifier_gotol.skel.h"
@@ -185,6 +186,7 @@ void test_verifier_direct_stack_access_wraparound(void) { RUN(verifier_direct_st
 void test_verifier_div0(void)                 { RUN(verifier_div0); }
 void test_verifier_div_mod_bounds(void)       { RUN(verifier_div_mod_bounds); }
 void test_verifier_div_overflow(void)         { RUN(verifier_div_overflow); }
+void test_verifier_fmod_ret_return(void)      { RUN(verifier_fmod_ret_return); }
 void test_verifier_global_subprogs(void)      { RUN(verifier_global_subprogs); }
 void test_verifier_global_ptr_args(void)      { RUN(verifier_global_ptr_args); }
 void test_verifier_gotol(void)                { RUN(verifier_gotol); }
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_fmod_ret_return.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_fmod_ret_return.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2c7daeaf0b69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_fmod_ret_return.c
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+
+SEC("fmod_ret/security_task_alloc")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(fmod_task_alloc_1)
+{
+	return -1;
+}
+
+SEC("fmod_ret/security_task_alloc")
+__failure __log_level(2)
+__msg("At program exit the register R0 has smin=1 smax=1 should have been in [-4095, 0]")
+int BPF_PROG(fmod_task_alloc_2)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+SEC("fmod_ret/" SYS_PREFIX "sys_open")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(fmod_ret_sys_open_1)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("fmod_ret/" SYS_PREFIX "sys_open")
+__failure __log_level(2)
+__msg("At program exit the register R0 has smin=1 smax=1 should have been in [-4095, 0]")
+int BPF_PROG(fmod_ret_sys_open_2)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+SEC("fmod_ret/" SYS_PREFIX "sys_open")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(fmod_ret_sys_open_3)
+{
+	return -1;
+}
+
+SEC("fmod_ret/page_pool_alloc_netmems")
+__failure __log_level(2)
+__msg("At program exit the register R0 has smin=1 smax=1 should have been in [0, 0]")
+int BPF_PROG(fmod_page_pool_alloc_netmems_1)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+SEC("fmod_ret/page_pool_alloc_netmems")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(fmod_page_pool_alloc_netmems_2)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
2.43.0