From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from out-180.mta0.migadu.com (out-180.mta0.migadu.com [91.218.175.180]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 391E31DB54C for ; Wed, 8 Apr 2026 04:40:18 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=91.218.175.180 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1775623221; cv=none; b=KgUKJWK1RXpERaZ6mebVU46V4E8ckUgehrVvubWnuI4fO1fIYyrf3wC/0BNPWpvtXlSiwNs4diGCi3LEISvK+NyawKJa+M2szAPBb//oIZvV2/TCgNEZYHaCoCZo8Y2G2NF/gGWmhZZfmwATDq1LluDxTNyVTRCEBAnbfcgoHlk= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1775623221; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Y3isKEchURZbQ6Ydqlm5QtFCTRvHAaYvNimCZbmShDc=; h=Message-ID:Date:MIME-Version:Subject:To:Cc:References:From: In-Reply-To:Content-Type; b=fI3cO/c/8EyOQiFHcYkopzlpn6GJneyx5JwbrqP0MxtiyvmQdxIOmi8nvJlq2V6/MXRFigheCtAlSH/Q2DeOkE7DGFQqULqjWMCJsbTxEEkpnBPZhjj/Fc0oeep0moN+aDqyXtCAiOXFYPVt/doSVN44D+uqKGV4NOEmgVlg3gI= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.dev; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.dev; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.dev header.i=@linux.dev header.b=uzygir8J; arc=none smtp.client-ip=91.218.175.180 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.dev Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.dev Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.dev header.i=@linux.dev header.b="uzygir8J" Message-ID: <5dfadfd4-ea02-4c3f-8d01-5d979ea06747@linux.dev> DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.dev; s=key1; t=1775623216; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=ZEaWV9Sj1IH2DEAtm2AJ329ZFSVnt4YsBRZwegYYwFY=; b=uzygir8JJn8sIZcM8L4CKyuyt11+JaUOabku7p+fa6d9hkLlMvMLj4u2xwD8Qb/HV9V0rl mg2RZnp4Nrpk06dM7wWEoUNDQMVJ/3v3nvhGLrnDlv1l8saWUfi3VOxQuj33XuStyaBeVN xgAykm4nGNtV1pu8loUkWe8QOfclT6w= Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2026 21:40:07 -0700 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: bpf@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/20] BPF interface for applying Landlock rulesets To: Justin Suess , ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org, kpsingh@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, mic@digikod.net, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, kees@kernel.org Cc: gnoack@google.com, jack@suse.cz, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, song@kernel.org, yonghong.song@linux.dev, martin.lau@linux.dev, m@maowtm.org, eddyz87@gmail.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com, sdf@fomichev.me, skhan@linuxfoundation.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org References: <20260407200157.3874806-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com> Content-Language: en-US X-Report-Abuse: Please report any abuse attempt to abuse@migadu.com and include these headers. From: Ihor Solodrai In-Reply-To: <20260407200157.3874806-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Migadu-Flow: FLOW_OUT On 4/7/26 1:01 PM, Justin Suess wrote: > Hello, > > This series lets sleepable BPF LSM programs apply an existing, > userspace-created Landlock ruleset to a program during exec. > > The goal is not to move Landlock policy definition into BPF, nor to create a > second policy engine. Instead, BPF is used only to select when an already > valid Landlock ruleset should be applied, based on runtime exec context. > > Background > === > > Landlock is primarily a syscall-driven, unprivileged-first LSM. That model > works well when the application being sandboxed can create and enforce its own > rulesets, or when a trusted launcher can impose restrictions directly before > running a trusted target. > > That becomes harder when the target program is not under first-party control, > for example: > > 1. third-party binaries, > 2. unmodified container images, > 3. programs reached through shells, wrappers, or service managers, and > 4. user-supplied or otherwise untrusted code. > > In these cases, an external supervisor may want to apply a Landlock ruleset to > the final executed program, while leaving unrelated parents or helper > processes alone. > > Why external sandboxing is awkward today > === > > There are two recurring problems. > > First, userspace cannot reliably predict every file a target may need across > different systems, packaging layouts, and runtime conditions. Shared > libraries, configuration files, interpreters, and helper binaries often depend > on details that are only known at runtime. > > Second, Landlock inheritance is intentionally one-way. Once a task is > restricted, descendants inherit that domain and may only become more > restricted. This is exactly what Landlock should do, but it makes external > sandboxing awkward when the program of interest is buried inside a larger exec > chain. Applying restrictions too early can affect unrelated intermediates; > applying them too late misses the target entirely. > > This series addresses that target-selection problem. > > Overview > === > > This series adds a small BPF-to-Landlock bridge: > > 1. userspace creates a normal Landlock ruleset through the existing ABI; > 2. userspace inserts that ruleset FD into a new > BPF_MAP_TYPE_LANDLOCK_RULESET map; > 3. a sleepable BPF LSM program attached to an exec-time hook looks up the > ruleset; and > 4. the program calls a kfunc to apply that ruleset to the new program's > credentials before exec completes. > > The important point is that BPF does not create, inspect, or mutate Landlock > policy here. It only decides whether to apply a ruleset that was already > created and validated through Landlock's existing userspace API. > > Interface > === > > The series adds: > > 1. bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm(), which applies a referenced ruleset to > struct linux_binprm credentials; > 2. bpf_landlock_put_ruleset(), which releases a referenced ruleset; and > 3. BPF_MAP_TYPE_LANDLOCK_RULESET, a specialized map type for holding > references to Landlock rulesets originating from userspace file > descriptors. > 4. A new field in the linux_binprm struct to enable application of > task_set_no_new_privs once execution is beyond the point of no return. > > The kfuncs are restricted to sleepable BPF LSM programs attached to > bprm_creds_for_exec and bprm_creds_from_file, which are the points where the > new program's credentials may still be updated safely. > > This series also adds LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS. On the BPF path, > this is staged through the exec context and committed only after exec reaches > point-of-no-return. This avoids side effects on failed executions while > ensuring that the resulting task cannot gain more privileges through later exec > transitions. This is done through the set_nnp_on_point_of_no_return field. > > This has a little subtlety: LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS in the BPF > path will not stop the current execution from escalating at all; only subsequent > ones. This is intentional to allow landlock policies to be applied through a > setuid transition for instance, without affecting the current escalation. > > Semantics > === > > This proposal is intended to preserve Landlock semantics as much as practical > for an exec-time BPF attachment model: > > 1. only pre-existing Landlock rulesets may be applied; > 2. BPF cannot construct, inspect, or modify rulesets; > 3. enforcement still happens before the new program begins execution; > 4. normal Landlock inheritance, layering, and future composition remain > unchanged; and > 5. this does not bypass Landlock's privilege checks for applying Landlock > rulesets. > > In other words, BPF acts as an external selector for when to apply Landlock, > not as a replacement for Landlock's enforcement engine. > > All behavior, future access rights, and previous access rights are designed > to automatically be supported from either BPF or existing syscall contexts. > > The main semantic difference is LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS on the BPF > path: it guarantees that the resulting task is pinned with no_new_privs before > it can perform later exec transitions, but it does not retroactively suppress > privilege gain for the current exec transition itself. > > The other exception to semantics is the LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC flag. > (see Points of Feedback section) > > Patch layout > === > > Patches 1-5 prepare the Landlock side by moving shared ruleset logic out of > syscalls.c, adding a no_new_privs flag for non-syscall callers, exposing > linux_binprm->set_nnp_on_point_of_no_return as an interface to set no_new_privs > on the point of no return, and making deferred ruleset destruction RCU-safe. > > Patches 6-10 add the BPF-facing pieces: the Landlock kfuncs, the new map type, > syscall handling for that map, and verifier support. > > Patches 11-15 add selftests and the small bpftool update needed for the new > map type. > > Patches 16-20 add docs and bump the ABI version and update MAINTAINERS. > > Feedback is especially welcome on the overall interface shape, the choice of > hooks, and the map semantics. > > Testing > === > > This patch series has two portions of tests. > > One lives in the traditional Landlock selftests, for the new > LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS flag. > > The other suite lives under the BPF selftests, and this tests the Landlock > kfuncs and the new BPF_MAP_TYPE_LANDLOCK_RULESET. > > This patch series was run through BPF CI, the results of which are here. [1] > > All mentioned tests are passing, as well as the BPF CI. > > [1] : https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/pull/11562 Hello Justin. I regret to disappoint you with a lame piece of feedback, but the series hasn't been picked up by automated BPF CI pipeline properly: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/pull/11709 I suggest you rebase on top of bpf-next/master [1], and re-submit to the mailing list with a bpf-next tag in subject: "[RFC PATCH bpf-next ...] bpf: ..." I'm pretty sure AI bot will find something annoying to address. Other than that, please be patient. It'll probably take a while for maintainers and reviewers to digest this work before anyone can meaningfully comment. Thanks! [1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next.git/ > > Points of Feedback > === > > First, the new set_nnp_on_point_of_no_return field in struct linux_binprm. > This field was needed to request that task_set_no_new_privs be set during an > execution, but only after the execution has proceeded beyond the point of no > return. I couldn't find a way to express this semantic without adding a new > bitfield to struct linux_binprm and a conditional in fs/exec.c. Please see > patch 2. > > Feedback on the BPF testing harness, which was generated with AI assistance as > disclosed in the commit footer, is welcomed. I have only limited familiarity > with BPF testing practices. These tests were made with strong human supervision. > See patches 14 and 15. > > Feedback on the NO_NEW_PRIVS situation is also welcomed. Because task_set_no_new_privs() > would otherwise leak state on failed executions or AT_EXECVE_CHECK, this series > stages no_new_privs through the exec context and only commits it after > point-of-no-return. This preserves failure behavior while still ensuring that > the resulting task cannot elevate further through later exec transitions. > When called from bprm_creds_from_file, this does not retroactively change the > privilege outcome of the current exec transition itself. > > See patch 2 and 3. > > Next, the RCU in the landlock_ruleset. Existing BPF maps use RCU to make sure maps > holding references stay valid. I altered the landlock ruleset to use rcu_work > to make sure that the rcu is synchronized before putting on a ruleset, and > acquire the rcu in the arraymap implementation. See patches 5-10. > > Next, the semantics of the map. What operations should be supported from BPF > and userspace and what data types should they return? I consider the struct > bpf_landlock_ruleset to be opaque. Userspace can add items to the map via the > fd, delete items by their index, and BPF can delete and lookup items by their > index. Items cannot be updated, only swapped. > > Finally, the handling of the LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC flag. This flag has > no meaning in a pre-execution context, as the credentials during the designated > LSM hooks (bprm_creds_for_exec/creds_from_file) still represent the pre-execution > task. Therefore, this flag is invalidated and attempting to use it with > bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm will return -EINVAL. Otherwise, the flag would > result in applying the landlock ruleset to the wrong target in addition to the > intended one. (see patch 2). This behavior is validated with selftests. > > Existing works / Credits > === > > Mickaël Salaün created patchsets adding BPF tracepoints for landlock in [2] [3]. > > Mickaël also gave feedback on this feature and the idea in this GitHub thread. [4] > > Günther Noack initially received and provided initial feedback on this idea as > an early prototype. > > Liz Rice, author of "Learning eBPF: Programming the Linux Kernel for Enhanced > Observability, Networking, and Security" provided background and inspired me to > experiment with BPF and the BPF LSM. [5] > > [2] : https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250523165741.693976-1-mic@digikod.net/ > [3] : https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20260406143717.1815792-1-mic@digikod.net/ > [4] : https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/56 > [5] : https://wellesleybooks.com/book/9781098135126 > > Kind Regards, > Justin Suess > > Justin Suess (20): > landlock: Move operations from syscall into ruleset code > execve: Add set_nnp_on_point_of_no_return > landlock: Implement LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS > selftests/landlock: Cover LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS > landlock: Make ruleset deferred free RCU safe > bpf: lsm: Add Landlock kfuncs > bpf: arraymap: Implement Landlock ruleset map > bpf: Add Landlock ruleset map type > bpf: syscall: Handle Landlock ruleset maps > bpf: verifier: Add Landlock ruleset map support > selftests/bpf: Add Landlock kfunc declarations > selftests/landlock: Rename gettid wrapper for BPF reuse > selftests/bpf: Enable Landlock in selftests kernel. > selftests/bpf: Add Landlock kfunc test program > selftests/bpf: Add Landlock kfunc test runner > landlock: Bump ABI version > tools: bpftool: Add documentation for landlock_ruleset > landlock: Document LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS > bpf: Document BPF_MAP_TYPE_LANDLOCK_RULESET > MAINTAINERS: update entry for the Landlock subsystem > > Documentation/bpf/map_landlock_ruleset.rst | 181 +++++ > Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 22 +- > MAINTAINERS | 4 + > fs/exec.c | 8 + > include/linux/binfmts.h | 7 +- > include/linux/bpf_lsm.h | 15 + > include/linux/bpf_types.h | 1 + > include/linux/landlock.h | 92 +++ > include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 1 + > include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 14 + > kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 67 ++ > kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 145 ++++ > kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 4 +- > kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 15 +- > samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 7 +- > security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- > security/landlock/ruleset.c | 198 ++++- > security/landlock/ruleset.h | 25 +- > security/landlock/syscalls.c | 158 +--- > .../bpf/bpftool/Documentation/bpftool-map.rst | 2 +- > tools/bpf/bpftool/map.c | 2 +- > tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 1 + > tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 1 + > tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c | 6 + > tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h | 20 + > tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config | 5 + > tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config.x86_64 | 1 - > .../bpf/prog_tests/landlock_kfuncs.c | 733 ++++++++++++++++++ > .../selftests/bpf/progs/landlock_kfuncs.c | 92 +++ > tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 10 +- > tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h | 28 +- > tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 103 +-- > tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 55 +- > .../testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c | 14 +- > .../landlock/scoped_abstract_unix_test.c | 51 +- > .../selftests/landlock/scoped_base_variants.h | 23 + > .../selftests/landlock/scoped_common.h | 5 +- > .../selftests/landlock/scoped_signal_test.c | 30 +- > tools/testing/selftests/landlock/wrappers.h | 2 +- > 39 files changed, 1877 insertions(+), 273 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 Documentation/bpf/map_landlock_ruleset.rst > create mode 100644 include/linux/landlock.h > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/landlock_kfuncs.c > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/landlock_kfuncs.c > > > base-commit: 8c6a27e02bc55ab110d1828610048b19f903aaec