Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 11/16] bpf: Support stack arguments for kfunc calls

sashiko-bot
2026-04-17T04:40:47Z

Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s):
- [Critical] Precision tracking (`mark_chain_precision`) is incorrectly bypassed or misapplied for kfunc scalar arguments passed via the stack, allowing malicious BPF programs to bypass verifier safety checks through state pruning.
- [High] `get_kfunc_arg_reg()` fetches lookahead stack arguments without bounds checking, leading to an out-of-bounds memory read or NULL pointer dereference when resolving memory sizes.
- [High] Overwriting `insn->off` in `bpf_fixup_kfunc_call` destroys the BTF file descriptor index, breaking module kfunc calls on architectures that use JIT far calls.
--

commit 15b2d48bd7c1080e972b83211cc9794ac2ba763f
Author: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>

bpf: Support stack arguments for kfunc calls

Extend the stack argument mechanism to kfunc calls, allowing kfuncs
with more than 5 parameters to receive additional arguments via the
r11-based stack arg area.

> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index 739c3127520c3..a3f307909e401 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c

[ ... ]

> @@ -11653,6 +11659,19 @@ bool bpf_is_kfunc_pkt_changing(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
> return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_xdp_pull_data];
> }
>
> +static struct bpf_reg_state *get_kfunc_arg_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int argno)
> +{
> + struct bpf_func_state *caller;
> + int spi;
> +
> + if (argno < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS)
> + return &cur_regs(env)[argno + 1];
> +
> + caller = cur_func(env);
> + spi = out_arg_spi(caller, argno - MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS);
> + return &caller->stack_arg_regs[spi];
> +}

Does get_kfunc_arg_reg() need to verify that spi is within bounds and the
stack slot is initialized?

When verifying pointer arguments that have a trailing size argument
(KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE), the verifier looks ahead at argno + 1. If a BPF
program maliciously omits the stack size argument, could spi exceed
caller->stack_arg_depth and lead to an out-of-bounds memory read?

[ ... ]

> @@ -12394,9 +12435,11 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
> reg_arg_name(env, argno));
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> - ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno);
> - if (ret < 0)
> - return ret;
> + if (regno > 0) {
> + ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ret;
> + }

Stack arguments use regno = -1, so it seems mark_chain_precision() is bypassed
for scalar constants and size arguments passed on the stack.

If precision tracking is bypassed, could the verifier's state equivalence logic
consider states with different scalar values in these stack slots as equivalent
and incorrectly prune them?

[ ... ]

> @@ -20145,6 +20209,16 @@ int bpf_fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
> if (!bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call())
> insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(desc->addr);
>
> + /*
> + * After resolving the kfunc address, insn->off is no longer needed
> + * for BTF fd index. Repurpose it to store the number of stack args
> + * so the JIT can marshal them.
> + */
> + if (desc->func_model.nr_args > MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS)
> + insn->off = desc->func_model.nr_args - MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS;
> + else
> + insn->off = 0;

For architectures where bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call() returns true
(such as s390x, loongarch, and powerpc), they resolve the address later
using bpf_get_kfunc_addr(), which requires the BTF file descriptor index
stored in insn->off.

If insn->off is overwritten here, could it destroy the BTF file descriptor
index and break module kfunc calls during JIT compilation?

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Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260417034658.2625353-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev?part=11