Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 11/16] bpf: Support stack arguments for kfunc calls

Yonghong Song
2026-04-18T18:04:53Z

On 4/17/26 6:04 PM, bot+bpf-ci@kernel.org wrote:
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> [ ... ]
>
>> @@ -11653,6 +11659,19 @@ bool bpf_is_kfunc_pkt_changing(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
>> +static struct bpf_reg_state *get_kfunc_arg_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int argno)
>> +{
>> + struct bpf_func_state *caller;
>> + int spi;
>> +
>> + if (argno < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS)
>> + return &cur_regs(env)[argno + 1];
>> +
>> + caller = cur_func(env);
>> + spi = out_arg_spi(caller, argno - MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS);
>> + return &caller->stack_arg_regs[spi];
>> +}
> Can the verifier crash here? Looking at get_kfunc_arg_reg, when
> argno >= MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS, the function returns
> &caller->stack_arg_regs[spi] without checking whether stack_arg_regs
> is NULL.
>
> The stack_arg_regs array is only allocated by grow_stack_arg_slots,
> which is called from check_stack_arg_write when the program writes
> outgoing stack args via r11. If a malformed BPF program invokes a
> kfunc without emitting any stack stores beforehand, stack_arg_regs
> will remain NULL.
>
> Consider get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type calling get_kfunc_arg_reg to peek at
> argument i+1 when checking for buffer+__sz pairs:
>
> kernel/bpf/verifier.c:get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type() {
> if (argno + 1 < nargs &&
> (is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1],
> get_kfunc_arg_reg(env, argno + 1)) ||
> ...
> }
>
> When argno=4 (pointer in r5) and argno+1=5 (size in first stack slot),
> get_kfunc_arg_reg(env, 5) enters the stack-arg branch and dereferences
> caller->stack_arg_regs even though it may be NULL. If the arg type is
> a scalar (which __sz/__szk suffixes imply), is_kfunc_arg_mem_size will
> try to read reg->type, causing a NULL pointer dereference.
>
> The is_stack_arg_slot_initialized gate you added in check_kfunc_args
> only fires when the loop reaches i=5; by then the peek at i=4 has
> already dereferenced the NULL pointer.
>
> Should get_kfunc_arg_reg verify that stack_arg_regs is non-NULL and
> spi < stack_arg_depth/BPF_REG_SIZE before returning the pointer?
> Alternatively, should check_kfunc_call add an out_stack_arg_mask
> pre-check mirroring the bpf-to-bpf gate that prevents
> check_func_arg_reg_off from reading uninitialized stack slots?

Good points. Indeed we should check validity of spi in
spi = out_arg_spi(caller, argno - MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS)

Will fix.

>
>> @@ -11660,8 +11679,6 @@ get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>> const char *ref_tname, const struct btf_param *args,
>> int argno, int nargs, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
>> {
>> - u32 regno = argno + 1;
>> - struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
>> bool arg_mem_size = false;
>>
>> if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx] ||
>> @@ -11670,8 +11687,8 @@ get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>> return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX;
>>
>> if (argno + 1 < nargs &&
>> - (is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], &regs[regno + 1]) ||
>> - is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], &regs[regno + 1])))
>> + (is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], get_kfunc_arg_reg(env, argno + 1)) ||
>> + is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], get_kfunc_arg_reg(env, argno + 1))))
>> arg_mem_size = true;
> [ ... ]
>
>> @@ -20145,6 +20209,16 @@ int bpf_fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
>> if (!bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call())
>> insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(desc->addr);
>>
>> + /*
>> + * After resolving the kfunc address, insn->off is no longer needed
>> + * for BTF fd index. Repurpose it to store the number of stack args
>> + * so the JIT can marshal them.
>> + */
>> + if (desc->func_model.nr_args > MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS)
>> + insn->off = desc->func_model.nr_args - MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS;
>> + else
>> + insn->off = 0;
>> +
> This concern was raised by the bpf-ci bot and sashiko-bot in the v5
> review thread but does not appear to have been addressed.
>
> Overwriting insn->off destroys the BTF file descriptor index required
> by bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model() for module kfunc lookups. Looking at
> the bsearch in kernel/bpf/fixups.c, it uses (insn->imm, insn->off) as
> the key:
>
> kernel/bpf/fixups.c:bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model() {
> key.addr = insn->imm;
> key.offset = insn->off;
> entry = bsearch(&key, tab, tab_count, sizeof(*tab), kfunc_addr_cmp);
> }
>
> For module kfuncs, insn->off stores a non-zero btf_fd_idx set during
> find_kfunc_desc. After this patch overwrites it with the stack arg
> count (or 0), the bsearch will fail to find descriptors that were
> stored with offset=btf_fd_idx.
>
> This breaks module kfunc calls on architectures using JIT far calls
> (s390x, loongarch, powerpc) for any module kfunc with 5 or fewer args
> (insn->off zeroed) or with more than 5 args (insn->off now contains
> the stack arg count instead of btf_fd_idx, still mismatching
> desc->offset). Vmlinux kfuncs with more than 5 args also get a
> nonzero insn->off that no longer matches desc->offset=0.
>
> Can the stack arg count be communicated to the JIT without clobbering
> the btf_fd_idx that bsearch still keys on?
>
> The original concern was raised here:
> https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/e5a6e801c10994cc2e03b0cd57e76152eb234493a6b7395a9859feade4a6575b@mail.kernel.org/
>
>
> ---
> AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
> See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
>
> CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/24592562564