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From: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ast@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
	andrii@kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
	renauld@google.com, revest@chromium.org, song@kernel.org,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2024 14:28:03 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87ikxuuo4s.fsf@trenco.lwn.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240516003524.143243-4-kpsingh@kernel.org>

KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> writes:

> LSM hooks are currently invoked from a linked list as indirect calls
> which are invoked using retpolines as a mitigation for speculative
> attacks (Branch History / Target injection) and add extra overhead which
> is especially bad in kernel hot paths:

I hate to bug you with a changelog nit, but this is the sort of thing
that might save others some work..

[...]

> A static key guards whether an LSM static call is enabled or not,
> without this static key, for LSM hooks that return an int, the presence
> of the hook that returns a default value can create side-effects which
> has resulted in bugs [1].

I looked in vain for [1] to see what these bugs were.  After sufficient
digging, I found that the relevant URL:

  https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20220609234601.2026362-1-kpsingh@kernel.org/

was evidently dropped in v4 of the patch set last September, and nobody
evidently noticed.  If there's a v13, I might humbly suggest putting it
back :)

Thanks,

jon

  reply	other threads:[~2024-06-27 20:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-16  0:35 [PATCH v12 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls KP Singh
2024-05-16  0:35 ` [PATCH v12 1/5] kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling KP Singh
2024-05-17  8:03   ` John Johansen
2024-05-16  0:35 ` [PATCH v12 2/5] security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time KP Singh
2024-05-17  8:09   ` John Johansen
2024-05-16  0:35 ` [PATCH v12 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls KP Singh
2024-06-27 20:28   ` Jonathan Corbet [this message]
2024-06-29  8:28     ` KP Singh
2024-05-16  0:35 ` [PATCH v12 4/5] security: Update non standard hooks to use " KP Singh
2024-05-16  0:35 ` [PATCH v12 5/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached KP Singh
2024-06-11  1:05   ` Paul Moore
2024-06-29  8:13     ` KP Singh
2024-07-01 23:40       ` Paul Moore
2024-05-18  6:01 ` [PATCH v12 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls Tetsuo Handa
2024-06-06 15:58 ` Kees Cook
2024-06-06 16:36   ` Paul Moore
2024-06-06 18:07     ` Kees Cook
2024-06-06 20:07       ` Paul Moore

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