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From: Mykyta Yatsenko <mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev, Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] libbpf: fix UAF in strset__add_str()
Date: Thu, 14 May 2026 14:38:01 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <89d34016-cf82-4beb-989c-e4fc2e3cd29e@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260514115711.133F4C2BCB3@smtp.kernel.org>



On 5/14/26 12:57 PM, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
> - [High] Unpatched Use-After-Free in strset__find_str()
> - [High] Use-After-Free in BTF add APIs due to btf_ensure_modifiable() freeing raw_data
> - [Medium] Early return in strset__add_str() breaks hash map deduplication invariants
> --
> 
> commit 2a7bfcb093726b849608e340f9bda7c5e3f56ac2
> Author: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
> 
> libbpf: fix UAF in strset__add_str()
> 
> This commit addresses a heap-use-after-free in strset__add_str() that occurs
> when the provided string points into the internal strset data buffer.
> It adds a boundary check to return the offset directly if the string is
> already within the buffer, avoiding a dangling pointer during reallocation.
> 
> [ ... ]
>>  |     #0 0x55d25155a2a7 in memcpy (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xcf2a7)
>>  |     #1 0x55d2515d708e in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:162:2
>>  |     #2 0x55d2515c730b in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2109:8
>>  |     #3 0x55d2515c9020 in btf__add_func_param tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:3108:14
> [ ... ]
> 
> Does btf__add_str() have another use-after-free when operating on a
> non-modifiable BTF object?
> 
> If a user calls btf__add_str(btf, s) where s is a pointer returned by
> btf__name_by_offset() (which points into btf->raw_data),
> btf_ensure_modifiable(btf) is called.
> 
> btf_ensure_modifiable() allocates new buffers and calls
> btf_invalidate_raw_data(btf), which frees btf->raw_data.
> 
> At this point, the argument s becomes a dangling pointer before
> strset__add_str() is even called, making the boundary check added by this
> patch evaluate against the freed raw_data.
> 
>> diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/strset.c b/tools/lib/bpf/strset.c
>> index 2464bcbd04e03..7d2b2784172e5 100644
>> --- a/tools/lib/bpf/strset.c
>> +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/strset.c
>> @@ -141,10 +141,15 @@ int strset__find_str(struct strset *set, const char *s)
> 
> Does strset__find_str() suffer from the same vulnerability being fixed here?
> 
> It follows the exact same pattern as strset__add_str(): it temporarily
> appends s by calling strset_add_str_mem(set, len), which may realloc() the
> internal buffer.
> 
> If s points into the internal buffer, the realloc() frees the old memory,
> leaving s dangling before the memcpy() occurs.
> 
>>   */
>>  int strset__add_str(struct strset *set, const char *s)
>>  {
>> +	const char *strs = strset__data(set);
>>  	long old_off, new_off, len;
>>  	void *p;
>>  	int err;
>>  
>> +	/* Check whether 's' is already in the strset data buffer */
>> +	if (strs && s >= strs && s < strs + set->strs_data_len)
>> +		return s - strs;
> 
> Can this early return break hash map deduplication invariants if s is a
> substring?
> 
> If a caller passes a pointer to a substring of an existing string, the
> function returns the substring's offset but skips inserting it into
> set->strs_hash.
> 
> Because the substring is never added to the hash map, subsequent lookups for
> it via strset__find_str() will fail, and future additions from an external
> pointer will duplicate the string.
> 
> Would it be safer to calculate the offset, perform the realloc(), and then
> re-calculate the s pointer instead of returning early?
> 

It looks like sashiko is right, addressing the same issue in strset__find_str()
and handling substring case could be useful.
maybe adding a helper like this:

/* 
 * Returns the offset of the string in set and length which set needs to
 * grow by to include the string.
 */
int strset__offset(struct strset *set, const char *s, long *off, long *grow)
{
	long len;
	const char *strs = strset__data(set);
	void *p;

	if (s >= strs && s < strs + set->strs_data_len) {
		*off = s - strs;
		*grow = 0;
		return 0;
	}

	len = strlen(s) + 1;
	p = strset_add_str_mem(set, len);
	if (!p)
		return -ENOMEM;
	memcpy(p, s, len);
	*off = set->strs_data_len;
	*grow = len;
	return 0;
} 

> [ ... ]
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2026-05-14 13:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-13 23:20 [PATCH] libbpf: fix UAF in strset__add_str() Carlos Llamas
2026-05-13 23:55 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-05-14  1:10   ` Carlos Llamas
2026-05-14 11:57 ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-14 13:38   ` Mykyta Yatsenko [this message]
2026-05-14 18:39     ` Carlos Llamas

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