From: "Alexis Lothoré" <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev,
"Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)" <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
Cc: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 01/10] bpf: propagate original instruction offset when patching program
Date: Wed, 08 Jul 2026 16:11:34 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <DJT91CC6V6TS.1U8K4LYH8LMZ2@bootlin.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260708081937.5D5031F000E9@smtp.kernel.org>
On Wed Jul 8, 2026 at 10:19 AM CEST, sashiko-bot wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
> - [Medium] Incorrect or inconsistent calculation of `insn_off_in_patch` causes loss or misassignment of `aux_data`.
> - [Medium] A single `insn_off_in_patch` integer is insufficient to propagate KASAN memory markings to patches that emit multiple memory accesses.
> --
>
> --- Patch [1]: [PATCH bpf-next v4 01/10] bpf: propagate original instruction offset when patching program ---
> commit 6ebaaf2368d2745f393ec38eb53d5857d5ec62b8
> Author: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
>
> bpf: propagate original instruction offset when patching program
>
> When the verifier patches an ebpf program with bpf_patch_insn_data, it
> then calls adjust_insn_aux_data to make sure that insn_aux_data takes
> into account the newly inserted patch.
>
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/fixups.c b/kernel/bpf/fixups.c
>> index 12a8a4eb757f1..f515fc9669ce2 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/fixups.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/fixups.c
>
> [ ... ]
>
>> @@ -856,16 +862,20 @@ int bpf_convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>> if (!ops->convert_ctx_access)
>> continue;
>> convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access;
>> + insn_off_in_patch = 0;
>
> [Severity: Medium]
> Will this properly track context accesses that are converted into multiple
> chained memory loads?
>
> By relying on a single integer to track the offset, it seems we might fail to
> account for multi-load patches emitted by ops->convert_ctx_access() (for
> example, reading skb->dev followed by dev->ifindex). The secondary memory
> accesses will receive zeroed aux_data and lack the required KASAN
> non_stack_access marking.
>
> Additionally, since the original instruction is completely replaced here, does
> it make sense to unconditionally assign its aux_data to the first generated
> instruction, which might not even be the actual memory access?
Hmmm, true, there's an issue here. I have checked many XXX_convert_ctx
accesses and naively assumed that the generated patch was always a
single ldx or stx, but indeed, there are corner cases:
- bpf_convert_ctx: __skb->ifindex becomes LDX + JPM + LDX
- bpf_convert_ctx: __skb->pkt_type becomes LDX + AND
- bpf_convert_ctx: __skb->queue_mapping becomes (JMP +) ST or STX
- and many more
For all of those XXX_convert_ctx_accesses, the accessed memory should
always be checked with KASAN since we are dealing with ctx pointers, so
it may be simpler just to pass -1 as insn_off_patches to
bpf_patch_insn_data for all of those, so that any LDX/STX/ST in the new
patch is instrumented.
>> @@ -1464,7 +1475,7 @@ static int add_hidden_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *pat
>> * ones for the hidden subprog. Hence all of the adjustment operations
>> * in bpf_patch_insn_data are no-ops.
>> */
>> - prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, env->prog->len - 1, patch, len);
>> + prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, env->prog->len - 1, patch, len, -1);
>
> [Severity: Medium]
> Is it intentional to pass -1 for the offset here?
>
> Since the original instruction is explicitly preserved in the patch buffer
> in bpf_do_misc_fixups():
>
> *patch++ = env->prog->insnsi[insn_cnt - 1];
>
> Passing -1 to bpf_patch_insn_data() will cause the aux_data associated with
> that instruction to be lost.
True, but: unless I am missing some corner cases, eBPF programs end with BPF_EXIT,
so it is pointless to forward an original instruction offset. But for
the sake of separating concerns, I'll update this to pass 0 instead of
-1.
>> @@ -1743,7 +1765,8 @@ int bpf_do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
>> cnt = patch - insn_buf;
>>
>> - new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
>> + new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf,
>> + cnt, -1);
>
> [Severity: Medium]
> In this pointer arithmetic rewrite, the original ALU instruction is preserved
> in the patch buffer (*patch++ = *insn).
>
> Should we calculate and pass its exact offset inside the patch buffer instead
> of passing -1, which discards its aux_data?
Ditto: having the exact instruction offset for this case is not useful
as it is not a load or store, but I'll still update the offset value (-1
-> cnt - 1)
Alexis
--
Alexis Lothoré, Bootlin
Embedded Linux and Kernel engineering
https://bootlin.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-08 14:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-08 8:00 [PATCH bpf-next v4 00/10] bpf: add support for KASAN checks in JITed programs Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 01/10] bpf: propagate original instruction offset when patching program Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 14:11 ` Alexis Lothoré [this message]
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 02/10] bpf: mark instructions accessing program stack Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:10 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 14:15 ` Alexis Lothoré
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 03/10] bpf: add BPF_JIT_KASAN for KASAN instrumentation of JITed programs Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 12:48 ` Andrey Konovalov
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 04/10] bpf, x86: add helper to emit kasan checks in x86 " Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:16 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 14:20 ` Alexis Lothoré
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 05/10] bpf, x86: refactor BPF_ST management in do_jit Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 06/10] bpf, x86: emit KASAN checks into x86 JITed programs Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:16 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 14:29 ` Alexis Lothoré
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 07/10] bpf, x86: enable KASAN for JITed programs on x86 Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 14:33 ` Alexis Lothoré
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 08/10] selftests/bpf: add helper to check whether eBPF KASAN is active Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 09/10] selftests/bpf: move bpf_jit_harden helper into testing_helpers Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:16 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 14:43 ` Alexis Lothoré
2026-07-08 8:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 10/10] selftests/bpf: add tests to validate KASAN on JIT programs Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
2026-07-08 8:28 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 14:47 ` Alexis Lothoré
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