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From: "Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi" <memxor@gmail.com>
To: "Ning Ding" <dingning04@gmail.com>, <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <ast@kernel.org>, <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	<john.fastabend@gmail.com>, <andrii@kernel.org>,
	<eddyz87@gmail.com>, <martin.lau@linux.dev>, <song@kernel.org>,
	<yonghong.song@linux.dev>, <jolsa@kernel.org>,
	<emil@etsalapatis.com>, <shuah@kernel.org>,
	<danieltimlee@gmail.com>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf: Reject writes through untrusted allocated pointers
Date: Mon, 03 Aug 2026 01:32:26 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <DKEUME1DRKOR.2R2XVNQDZKVSR@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260728033837.1466123-1-dingning04@gmail.com>

On Tue Jul 28, 2026 at 5:38 AM CEST, Ning Ding wrote:
> A kptr loaded under an RCU read lock has MEM_ALLOC set. After
> bpf_rcu_read_unlock(), the verifier marks it PTR_UNTRUSTED, but
> check_ptr_to_btf_access() still allows writes because
> type_is_ptr_alloc_obj() ignores that flag.
>
> Reject writes through MEM_ALLOC pointers that are PTR_UNTRUSTED. Reads
> remain allowed and are converted to probe-memory accesses.
>
> Also skip the owning-reference check for these pointers, since they no
> longer have a live reference after leaving the RCU critical section.
>
> Add verifier tests for the rejected write and permitted read cases.
>
> Fixes: 503e4def5414 ("bpf: Replace open code with for allocated object check")
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260726021304.97ED91F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/
> Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol
> Signed-off-by: Ning Ding <dingning04@gmail.com>
> ---

Same comment for this one, split kernel and selftests into separate patches.

>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c                         |  6 +-
>  .../bpf/progs/local_kptr_stash_fail.c         | 58 +++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index 7aa47342dc65..24c151ad2e62 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -5804,13 +5804,15 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>  		 * program allocated objects (which always have id > 0),
>  		 * but not for untrusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC.
>  		 */
> -		if (atype != BPF_READ && !type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) {
> +		if (atype != BPF_READ &&
> +		    (!type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type) || reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)) {
>  			verbose(env, "only read is supported\n");
>  			return -EACCES;
>  		}

There is a PTR_UNTRUSTED check already earlier in this function, why is that not
working or not enough?

pw-bot: cr

>
>  		if (type_is_alloc(reg->type) && !type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) &&
> -		    !(reg->type & MEM_RCU) && !reg_is_referenced(env, reg)) {
> +		    !(reg->type & (MEM_RCU | PTR_UNTRUSTED)) &&
> +		    !reg_is_referenced(env, reg)) {
>  			verifier_bug(env, "allocated object must have a referenced id");
>  			return -EFAULT;
>  		}
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/local_kptr_stash_fail.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/local_kptr_stash_fail.c
> index fcf7a7567da2..d7b8cd6458bb 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/local_kptr_stash_fail.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/local_kptr_stash_fail.c
> @@ -8,14 +8,22 @@
>  #include "../bpf_experimental.h"
>  #include "bpf_misc.h"
>
> +extern void bpf_rcu_read_lock(void) __ksym;
> +extern void bpf_rcu_read_unlock(void) __ksym;
> +
>  struct node_data {
>  	long key;
>  	long data;
>  	struct bpf_rb_node node;
>  };
>
> +struct plain_data {
> +	long key;
> +};
> +
>  struct map_value {
>  	struct node_data __kptr *node;
> +	struct plain_data __kptr *plain;
>  };
>
>  struct node_data2 {
> @@ -31,6 +39,7 @@ struct node_data2 {
>   * [35] TYPE_TAG 'kptr_ref' type_id=34
>   */
>  struct node_data *just_here_because_btf_bug;
> +struct plain_data *just_here_because_btf_bug2;
>
>  struct {
>  	__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
> @@ -82,4 +91,53 @@ long drop_rb_node_off(void *ctx)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>
> +SEC("?tc")
> +__failure __msg("only read is supported")
> +long write_untrusted_alloc_obj(void *ctx)
> +{
> +	struct map_value *mapval;
> +	struct node_data *res;
> +	int idx = 0;
> +
> +	mapval = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&some_nodes, &idx);
> +	if (!mapval)
> +		return 1;
> +
> +	bpf_rcu_read_lock();
> +	res = mapval->node;
> +	if (!res) {
> +		bpf_rcu_read_unlock();
> +		return 2;
> +	}
> +	barrier_var(res);
> +	bpf_rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> +	res->key = 42;
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +SEC("?tc")
> +__success
> +long read_untrusted_alloc_obj(void *ctx)
> +{
> +	struct map_value *mapval;
> +	struct plain_data *res;
> +	int idx = 0;
> +
> +	mapval = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&some_nodes, &idx);
> +	if (!mapval)
> +		return 1;
> +
> +	bpf_rcu_read_lock();
> +	res = mapval->plain;
> +	if (!res) {
> +		bpf_rcu_read_unlock();
> +		return 2;
> +	}
> +	barrier_var(res);
> +	bpf_rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> +	return res->key;
> +}
> +
>  char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";


  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-02 23:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-26  1:53 [PATCH bpf] bpf: Keep refcount_acquire nullable for borrowed RCU kptrs Ning Ding
2026-07-26  2:13 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-28  3:38   ` [PATCH bpf] bpf: Reject writes through untrusted allocated pointers Ning Ding
2026-08-02 23:32     ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi [this message]
2026-08-03  2:29       ` Ning Ding
2026-08-03  2:35         ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-08-03  3:21           ` Ning Ding
2026-08-03  3:26             ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-08-03  4:06               ` Ning Ding

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