From: "Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi" <memxor@gmail.com>
To: "Eduard Zingerman" <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
"Jiayuan Chen" <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>, <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Hiker Cl" <clhiker365@gmail.com>,
"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"John Fastabend" <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
"Andrii Nakryiko" <andrii@kernel.org>,
"Martin KaFai Lau" <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
"Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
"Yonghong Song" <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
"Jiri Olsa" <jolsa@kernel.org>,
"Emil Tsalapatis" <emil@etsalapatis.com>,
"Ihor Solodrai" <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>,
"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Paul Chaignon" <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>,
"Amery Hung" <ameryhung@gmail.com>,
"Shung-Hsi Yu" <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>,
"KaFai Wan" <kafai.wan@linux.dev>,
"Daniel Wade" <danjwade95@gmail.com>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf 1/2] bpf: fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithmetic
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 20:45:26 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <DKTZSGMQL5CC.18BOA9ZNRHQ5J@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <57a57ed806a954de19774b7c0833dc1742560cd2.camel@gmail.com>
On Thu Aug 20, 2026 at 8:25 PM CEST, Eduard Zingerman wrote:
> On Wed, 2026-08-19 at 20:58 +0800, Jiayuan Chen wrote:
>> Take the following unprivileged program as an example:
>>
>> r0 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(...) /* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, offset 0 */
>> ...
>> 14: r0 += r1 /* r1 is a bounded scalar */
>> 15: r9 = r0
>>
>> Loading it triggers a verifier warning from reg_bounds_sanity_check():
>>
>> verifier bug: REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (alu): const subreg tnum out
>> of sync with range bounds r64={.base=0x0, .size=0x0}
>> r32={.base=0x0, .size=0xffffffff} var_off=(0x0, 0x0)
>>
>> What happens:
>>
>> 1. Processing insn 14 (r0 += r1) in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the new
>> offset is computed into dst_reg's var_off and 32/64-bit ranges.
>>
>> 2. Because pointer registers do not track 32-bit subregister bounds,
>> __mark_reg32_unbounded() first sets r32 to the full range; r32 is
>> re-derived from the offset at the end of the function by
>> reg_bounds_sync().
>>
>> 3. On the unprivileged path, sanitize_ptr_alu() is called and, via
>> sanitize_speculative_path() -> push_stack(), snapshots the current
>> register state and schedules the next instruction (insn 15) to be
>> verified directly as a speculative path.
>>
>> 4. That snapshot is taken between step 2 and the final reg_bounds_sync():
>> at this point dst_reg's var_off still holds the (const) original
>> offset while r32 has just been blanked to the full range, i.e. the two
>> are out of sync. When the speculative path later verifies insn 15
>> (r9 = r0), the inconsistent state reaches reg_bounds_sanity_check() and
>> trips the warning.
>>
>> var_off and the 32-bit range must always be consistent. There are two
>> ways to keep the snapshot consistent:
>>
>> 1. sync var_off and r32 before the snapshot so they match, or
>> 2. leave r32 at its original (already consistent) value and blank it
>> only after the snapshot.
>>
>> The whole point of sanitize_ptr_alu() is to insert a harmless masking
>> sequence that keeps the access in bounds under speculation, so the state
>> it snapshots should faithfully represent that. Take approach 2: move
>> __mark_reg32_unbounded() to after sanitize_ptr_alu(), so the speculative
>> snapshot keeps the pointer's original, consistent r32. The non-speculative
>> path is unchanged: r32 is still blanked before the offset is applied and
>> re-derived by reg_bounds_sync().
>>
>> Fixes: 5f99f312bd3b ("bpf: add register bounds sanity checks and sanitization")
>> Reported-by: Hiker Cl <clhiker365@gmail.com>
>> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAGM=xGB1fJ9kT8XTitVo74B0WGqgjkoUHdLwzytwV0AyqeVApw@mail.gmail.com/
>> Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
>> ---
>
> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
>
>> kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 11 ++++++++---
>> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> index d17f14b35b79..d79038a8da10 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> @@ -14558,9 +14558,6 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn
>> return -EINVAL;
>> }
>>
>> - /* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */
>> - __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
>> -
>> if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
>> ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
>> &info, false);
>> @@ -14568,6 +14565,14 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn
>> return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret);
>> }
>>
>> + /* Pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. Blank r32
>> + * only after sanitize_ptr_alu() may have snapshotted dst_reg into a
>> + * speculative path: otherwise that snapshot freezes a const offset
>> + * with an unbounded r32, which later trips reg_bounds_sanity_check().
>> + * reg_bounds_sync() below re-derives r32 from the updated offset.
>> + */
>
> Nit: comment is a bit too verbose. "... otherwise reg_bounds_sanity_check()
> might hit some constraints violations" should have been enough.
>
Fixed style and verbosity while applying.
>> + __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
>> +
>> switch (opcode) {
>> case BPF_ADD:
>> /*
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-20 18:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-19 12:58 [PATCH bpf 1/2] bpf: fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithmetic Jiayuan Chen
2026-08-19 12:58 ` [PATCH bpf 2/2] selftests/bpf: Add reg-invariants test for " Jiayuan Chen
2026-08-19 13:49 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-20 18:26 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-08-19 13:06 ` [PATCH bpf 1/2] bpf: fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on " sashiko-bot
2026-08-20 18:25 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-08-20 18:45 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi [this message]
2026-08-20 18:50 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
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