From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@meta.com,
andrii@kernel.org, eddyz87@gmail.com, ast@kernel.org,
daniel@iogearbox.net, martin.lau@linux.dev,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz,
kpsingh@kernel.org, mattbobrowski@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: Extend test fs_kfuncs to cover security.bpf xattr names
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2024 22:07:00 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Zw34dAaqA5tR6mHN@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241002214637.3625277-3-song@kernel.org>
On Wed, Oct 02, 2024 at 02:46:37PM -0700, Song Liu wrote:
> Extend test_progs fs_kfuncs to cover different xattr names. Specifically:
> xattr name "user.kfuncs", "security.bpf", and "security.bpf.xxx" can be
> read from BPF program with kfuncs bpf_get_[file|dentry]_xattr(); while
> "security.bpfxxx" and "security.selinux" cannot be read.
So you read code from untrusted user.* xattrs? How can you carve out
that space and not known any pre-existing userspace cod uses kfuncs
for it's own purpose?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-15 5:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-02 21:46 [PATCH bpf-next 0/2] security.bpf xattr name prefix Song Liu
2024-10-02 21:46 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] fs/xattr: bpf: Introduce " Song Liu
2024-10-07 8:39 ` Jiri Olsa
2024-10-07 17:15 ` Song Liu
2024-10-14 10:18 ` Christian Brauner
2024-10-02 21:46 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: Extend test fs_kfuncs to cover security.bpf xattr names Song Liu
2024-10-15 5:07 ` Christoph Hellwig [this message]
2024-10-15 5:21 ` Song Liu
2024-10-15 5:25 ` Christoph Hellwig
2024-10-15 5:52 ` Song Liu
2024-10-15 6:42 ` Christoph Hellwig
2024-10-15 13:54 ` Song Liu
2024-10-16 7:49 ` Christoph Hellwig
2024-10-16 13:51 ` Jan Kara
2024-10-16 14:51 ` Christian Brauner
2024-10-16 16:38 ` Song Liu
2024-10-17 15:03 ` Christoph Hellwig
2024-10-21 13:24 ` Christian Brauner
2024-10-23 6:45 ` Christoph Hellwig
2024-10-30 20:44 ` Song Liu
2024-10-31 6:56 ` Christoph Hellwig
2024-10-31 15:56 ` Song Liu
2024-10-31 16:10 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-10-11 17:40 ` [PATCH bpf-next 0/2] security.bpf xattr name prefix Song Liu
2024-10-14 10:18 ` Christian Brauner
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