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From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] bpf: add bpf_real_inode() kfunc
Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2026 07:54:14 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <adUalnAyY9mm1LUr@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260407-unmengen-wahltag-474557ec0c58@brauner>

On Tue, Apr 07, 2026 at 12:25:29PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> Yes, I'm aware of that limitation. In this case we know exactly what
> type of filesystem is used. But thanks for reminding me that for btrfs
> it's s_dev is never the actual block device.
>   
> What I would ultimately would like in the future is to have a security
> hook that allows bpf to reject mounting any block devices that aren't
> dm-verity protected. Maybe we can chat about this at LSFMM as well. I
> know you will love this idea.

I'd much rather go right to that, with a slight tweak to clearly
specify the expected protection and not hard code dm-verity.  There's
ways to do full file system verity [1] much more efficiently inside the
file systems, and it would be good to not lock in a specific solution

[1] not to be confused with the existing fsverity for certain read-only
files.  Although a loopback image on that would probably also qualify.

  reply	other threads:[~2026-04-07 14:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-26 16:53 [PATCH] bpf: add bpf_real_inode() kfunc Christian Brauner
2026-03-26 17:02 ` Amir Goldstein
2026-03-27  5:28 ` Christoph Hellwig
2026-03-27  6:05   ` Darrick J. Wong
2026-04-07 10:25     ` Christian Brauner
2026-04-07 14:54       ` Christoph Hellwig [this message]
2026-04-09 13:19         ` Christian Brauner
2026-04-09 14:24           ` Christoph Hellwig
2026-04-09 14:37             ` Gao Xiang
2026-04-09 16:11               ` Christoph Hellwig
2026-04-09 16:42                 ` Gao Xiang
2026-04-10  6:15                   ` Christoph Hellwig
2026-04-10  6:46                     ` Gao Xiang
2026-04-10  7:06                       ` Christoph Hellwig
2026-04-10  7:29                         ` Gao Xiang
2026-03-27 12:19 ` bot+bpf-ci

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