From: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
To: bot+bpf-ci@kernel.org
Cc: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org,
eddyz87@gmail.com, memxor@gmail.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, void@manifault.com, arighi@nvidia.com,
changwoo@igalia.com, emil@etsalapatis.com,
sched-ext@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
martin.lau@kernel.org, yonghong.song@linux.dev, clm@meta.com,
ihor.solodrai@linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next] bpf: sched_ext: Mark ops argument container pointer fields as trusted
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2026 22:11:45 -1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aoa2wQABalEFo5FT@slm.duckdns.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <758be5cbbea1b61eeaad2454d28f13a1acb1f3d0d50893b7707d9afdcea131e7@mail.kernel.org>
On Thu, Aug 20, 2026 at 06:16:48AM +0000, bot+bpf-ci@kernel.org wrote:
> > bpf: sched_ext: Mark ops argument container pointer fields as trusted
> >
> > Walking an unannotated pointer field of a trusted struct yields a bare
> > PTR_TO_BTF_ID in non-sleepable programs, which kfuncs and helpers accept,
> > but PTR_UNTRUSTED in sleepable programs, which they reject. This gets in the
> > way of making ops.init_task() sleepable, which schedulers want for
> > allocations. For example, passing args->cgroup into bpf_cgrp_storage_get()
> > then fails verification and the only recourse is round-tripping through the
> > cgroup ID with bpf_cgroup_from_id().
> >
> > The pointer fields in the sched_ext ops argument containers are all pinned
> > by the callers for the duration of the ops calls and are never NULL. Add
> > them to the verifier's trusted-fields whitelist so that they are PTR_TRUSTED
> > in both sleepable and non-sleepable programs.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
>
> This looks like a bug fix for verification failures in sleepable programs.
> Should this include:
>
> Fixes: 8195136669661 ("sched_ext: Add cgroup support")
Nothing has been using it, so not strictly necessary but yeah I don't see
why not.
Thanks.
--
tejun
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-20 8:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-20 5:20 [PATCH bpf-next] bpf: sched_ext: Mark ops argument container pointer fields as trusted Tejun Heo
2026-08-20 6:16 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-20 8:11 ` Tejun Heo [this message]
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