From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
To: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/1] bpf: Simplify checking size of helper accesses
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2023 21:24:05 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ca3347ad8fee1a03afddf0d89ddca4d533ddacf3.camel@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEf4BzZPC0zV_ETO_BPe58aZnDx_GrhpVejr3=-Hzx176P1Kvw@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, 2023-12-19 at 11:08 -0800, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
[...]
> > > As a btw, I'll say that we don't allow variable-offset accesses to btf ptr [2].
> > > I don't know if this should influence how we treat the access size... but
> > > maybe? Like, should we disallow variable-sized accesses on the same argument as
> > > disallowing variable-offset ones (whatever that argument may be)? I don't know
> > > what I'm talking about (generally BTF is foreign to me), but I imagine this all
> > > means that currently the verifier allows one to read from an array field by
> > > starting at a compile-time constant offset, and extending to a variable size.
> > > However, you cannot start from an arbitrary offset, though. Does this
> > > combination of being strict about the offset but permissive about the size make
> > > sense?
> >
> > I agree with you, that disallowing variable size access in BTF case
> > might make sense. check_ptr_to_btf_access() calls either:
> > a. env->ops->btf_struct_access(), which is one of the following:
> > 1. _tc_cls_act_btf_struct_access() (through a function pointer),
> > which allows accessing exactly one field: struct nf_conn->mark;
> > 2. bpf_tcp_ca_btf_struct_access, which allows accessing several
> > fields in sock, tcp_sock and inet_connection_sock structures.
> > b. btf_struct_access(), which checks the following:
> > 1. part with btf_find_struct_meta() checks that access does not reach
> > to some forbidden field;
>
> wouldn't variable size access be problematic here without properly
> working with size range (instead of a max offset)? Just because max
> offset falls into allowed field, doesn't mean that min offset falls
> into allowed field. What's even worth, both min and max by themselves
> can fall into allowed fields (different ones, though), but between
> those two fields there will be a forbidden one?
As far as I understand that part, it checks for each forbidden field that
it does not intersect with full range [off, off + max_size].
> > 2. btf_struct_walk() checks that offset and size of the access match
> > offset and size of some field in the target BTF structure;
> >
> > Technically, checks a.1, a.2 and b.1 are ok with variable size access,
> > but b.2 is not and it does not seem to be verified.
> >
> > I tried a patch below and test_progs seem to pass locally
> > (but I have some troubles with my local setup at the moment,
> > so it should be double-checked).
> >
> > > I'll take guidance. If people prefer we don't touch this code at all, that's
> > > fine. Although it doesn't feel good to be driven simply by fear.
> >
> > Would be good if others could comment.
>
> Given the current (seemingly incomplete) checking logic Andrei change
> makes sense. But the variable-sized BTF access throws a wrinkle into
> this, no? It can't be checked just at min/max offset boundaries, as I
> mentioned above.
Yes, probably this patch makes sense as-is, as a logic is already not
consistent.
[...]
> but maybe BTF access has to be checked separately and then
> we can keep the check that does pure dump memory access checks simply
> and correctly?
check_helper_mem_access() is called form many places, so BTF handling
should probably remain there. What it lacks is a notion of variable
size access.
[...]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-12-19 19:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-17 1:06 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/1] bpf: Simplify checking size of helper accesses Andrei Matei
2023-12-17 1:06 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/1] " Andrei Matei
2023-12-19 0:04 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-12-19 2:54 ` Andrei Matei
2023-12-19 17:01 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-12-19 19:08 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-12-19 19:24 ` Eduard Zingerman [this message]
2023-12-19 19:31 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-12-20 3:33 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-12-19 19:03 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-12-19 19:53 ` Andrei Matei
2023-12-21 5:00 ` Andrii Nakryiko
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