[PATCH bpf-next v3 1/3] bpf: make reg_not_null() true for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP

[PATCH bpf-next v3 1/3] bpf: make reg_not_null() true for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP

[Ihor Solodrai]

When reg->type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, it can not be null. However the
verifier explores the branches under rX == 0 in check_cond_jmp_op()
even if reg->type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, because it was not checked for
in reg_not_null().

Fix this by adding CONST_PTR_TO_MAP to the set of types that are
considered non nullable in reg_not_null().

An old "unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero" selftest fails with this
change, because now early out correctly triggers in
check_cond_jmp_op(), making the verification to pass.

In practice verifier may allow pointer to null comparison in unpriv,
since in many cases the relevant branch and comparison op are removed
as dead code. So change the expected test result to __success_unpriv.

Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                               | 3 ++-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index a7d6e0c5928b..0c100e430744 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -405,7 +405,8 @@ static bool reg_not_null(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 		type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
 		type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON ||
 		(type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && is_trusted_reg(reg)) ||
-		type == PTR_TO_MEM;
+		type == PTR_TO_MEM ||
+		type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
 }
 
 static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
index a4a5e2071604..28200f068ce5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ __naked void pass_pointer_to_tail_call(void)
 
 SEC("socket")
 __description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero")
-__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison")
+__success __success_unpriv
 __retval(0)
 __naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_zero(void)
 {
-- 
2.47.1

[PATCH bpf-next v3 2/3] selftests/bpf: add cmp_map_pointer_with_const test

[Ihor Solodrai]

Add a test for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP comparison with a non-0 constant. A
BPF program with this code must not pass verification in unpriv.

Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
---
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c       | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
index 28200f068ce5..c4a48b57e167 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
@@ -634,6 +634,23 @@ l0_%=:	r0 = 0;						\
 	: __clobber_all);
 }
 
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with const")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison prohibited")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_const(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("					\
+	r1 = 0;						\
+	r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;				\
+	if r1 == 0xdeadbeef goto l0_%=;		\
+l0_%=:	r0 = 0;						\
+	exit;						\
+"	:
+	: __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
 SEC("socket")
 __description("unpriv: write into frame pointer")
 __failure __msg("frame pointer is read only")
-- 
2.47.1

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 2/3] selftests/bpf: add cmp_map_pointer_with_const test

[Alexei Starovoitov]

On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> wrote:
>
> Add a test for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP comparison with a non-0 constant. A
> BPF program with this code must not pass verification in unpriv.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
> ---
>  .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c       | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
> index 28200f068ce5..c4a48b57e167 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
> @@ -634,6 +634,23 @@ l0_%=:     r0 = 0;                                         \
>         : __clobber_all);
>  }
>
> +SEC("socket")
> +__description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with const")
> +__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison prohibited")
> +__retval(0)
> +__naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_const(void)
> +{
> +       asm volatile ("                                 \
> +       r1 = 0;                                         \
> +       r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;                         \
> +       if r1 == 0xdeadbeef goto l0_%=;         \

I bet this doesn't fit into imm32 either.
It should fit into _signed_ imm32.

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 2/3] selftests/bpf: add cmp_map_pointer_with_const test

[Ihor Solodrai]

On 6/4/25 3:41 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> wrote:
>>
>> Add a test for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP comparison with a non-0 constant. A
>> BPF program with this code must not pass verification in unpriv.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
>> ---
>>   .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c       | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>>   1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
>> index 28200f068ce5..c4a48b57e167 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
>> @@ -634,6 +634,23 @@ l0_%=:     r0 = 0;                                         \
>>          : __clobber_all);
>>   }
>>
>> +SEC("socket")
>> +__description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with const")
>> +__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison prohibited")
>> +__retval(0)
>> +__naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_const(void)
>> +{
>> +       asm volatile ("                                 \
>> +       r1 = 0;                                         \
>> +       r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;                         \
>> +       if r1 == 0xdeadbeef goto l0_%=;         \
> 
> I bet this doesn't fit into imm32 either.
> It should fit into _signed_ imm32.

Apparently it's fine both for gcc and clang:
https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/15454151804

I guess the value from inline asm is just put into IMM bytes as
is. llvm-objdump is exactly the same, although the value is pretty
printed as negative:

0000000000000320 <cmp_map_pointer_with_const>:
      100:       b7 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = 0x0
      101:       18 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = 0x0 ll
      103:       15 01 00 00 ef be ad de if r1 == -0x21524111 goto +0x0 
<l0_11>

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 2/3] selftests/bpf: add cmp_map_pointer_with_const test

[Alexei Starovoitov]

On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 8:04 PM Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev> wrote:
>
> On 6/4/25 3:41 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> Add a test for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP comparison with a non-0 constant. A
> >> BPF program with this code must not pass verification in unpriv.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
> >> ---
> >>   .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c       | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> >>   1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
> >> index 28200f068ce5..c4a48b57e167 100644
> >> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
> >> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
> >> @@ -634,6 +634,23 @@ l0_%=:     r0 = 0;                                         \
> >>          : __clobber_all);
> >>   }
> >>
> >> +SEC("socket")
> >> +__description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with const")
> >> +__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison prohibited")
> >> +__retval(0)
> >> +__naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_const(void)
> >> +{
> >> +       asm volatile ("                                 \
> >> +       r1 = 0;                                         \
> >> +       r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;                         \
> >> +       if r1 == 0xdeadbeef goto l0_%=;         \
> >
> > I bet this doesn't fit into imm32 either.
> > It should fit into _signed_ imm32.
>
> Apparently it's fine both for gcc and clang:
> https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/15454151804

Both compilers are buggy then.

> I guess the value from inline asm is just put into IMM bytes as
> is. llvm-objdump is exactly the same, although the value is pretty
> printed as negative:
>
> 0000000000000320 <cmp_map_pointer_with_const>:
>       100:       b7 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = 0x0
>       101:       18 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = 0x0 ll
>       103:       15 01 00 00 ef be ad de if r1 == -0x21524111 goto +0x0

It's 64-bit 0xFFFFffffdeadbeef
Not the same as 0xdeadbeef

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 2/3] selftests/bpf: add cmp_map_pointer_with_const test

[Ihor Solodrai]

On 6/5/25 9:08 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 8:04 PM Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev> wrote:
>>
>> On 6/4/25 3:41 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Add a test for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP comparison with a non-0 constant. A
>>>> BPF program with this code must not pass verification in unpriv.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>    .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c       | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>>>>    1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
>>>> index 28200f068ce5..c4a48b57e167 100644
>>>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
>>>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
>>>> @@ -634,6 +634,23 @@ l0_%=:     r0 = 0;                                         \
>>>>           : __clobber_all);
>>>>    }
>>>>
>>>> +SEC("socket")
>>>> +__description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with const")
>>>> +__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison prohibited")
>>>> +__retval(0)
>>>> +__naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_const(void)
>>>> +{
>>>> +       asm volatile ("                                 \
>>>> +       r1 = 0;                                         \
>>>> +       r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;                         \
>>>> +       if r1 == 0xdeadbeef goto l0_%=;         \
>>>
>>> I bet this doesn't fit into imm32 either.
>>> It should fit into _signed_ imm32.
>>
>> Apparently it's fine both for gcc and clang:
>> https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/15454151804
> 
> Both compilers are buggy then.
> 
>> I guess the value from inline asm is just put into IMM bytes as
>> is. llvm-objdump is exactly the same, although the value is pretty
>> printed as negative:
>>
>> 0000000000000320 <cmp_map_pointer_with_const>:
>>        100:       b7 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = 0x0
>>        101:       18 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = 0x0 ll
>>        103:       15 01 00 00 ef be ad de if r1 == -0x21524111 goto +0x0
> 
> It's 64-bit 0xFFFFffffdeadbeef
> Not the same as 0xdeadbeef

I am not sure what the issue is, would appreciate an explanation.

Inline asm contains a 32bit literal (without a sign). Compiler takes
this literal as is and puts it into imm field of the instruction,
which is also 32bit. The instruction is valid and this value _means_
signed integer, in particular for the verifier.

Are you saying that compiler should check the sign of the literal and
verify it's in signed 32bit range? In other words if you want
0xdeadbeef bytes in the imm, you must write -0x21524111 in the asm?

AFAIU it'd be different from C then, because you can write:

    int k = 0xdeadbeef;
    printf("%d\n", k); // prints -559038737

and it's fine.

Looking at Yonghong's llvm pr [1], it will not error for 0xdeadbeef
because it's less than UINT_MAX:

     if (MO.isImm()) {
         int64_t Imm = MO.getImm();
         if (MI.getOpcode() != BPF::LD_imm64 && (Imm < INT_MIN || Imm > 
UINT_MAX))
           Ctx.reportError(MI.getLoc(),
                           "immediate out of range, shall fit in 32 bits");
         return static_cast<unsigned>(Imm);
       }

[1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/142989

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 2/3] selftests/bpf: add cmp_map_pointer_with_const test

[Yonghong Song]

On 6/5/25 10:17 AM, Ihor Solodrai wrote:
> On 6/5/25 9:08 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>> On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 8:04 PM Ihor Solodrai 
>> <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 6/4/25 3:41 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>>> On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Add a test for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP comparison with a non-0 constant. A
>>>>> BPF program with this code must not pass verification in unpriv.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>>    .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c       | 17 
>>>>> +++++++++++++++++
>>>>>    1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c 
>>>>> b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
>>>>> index 28200f068ce5..c4a48b57e167 100644
>>>>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
>>>>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
>>>>> @@ -634,6 +634,23 @@ l0_%=:     r0 = 
>>>>> 0;                                         \
>>>>>           : __clobber_all);
>>>>>    }
>>>>>
>>>>> +SEC("socket")
>>>>> +__description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with const")
>>>>> +__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison 
>>>>> prohibited")
>>>>> +__retval(0)
>>>>> +__naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_const(void)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +       asm volatile ("                                 \
>>>>> +       r1 = 0;                                         \
>>>>> +       r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;                         \
>>>>> +       if r1 == 0xdeadbeef goto l0_%=;         \
>>>>
>>>> I bet this doesn't fit into imm32 either.
>>>> It should fit into _signed_ imm32.
>>>
>>> Apparently it's fine both for gcc and clang:
>>> https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/15454151804
>>
>> Both compilers are buggy then.
>>
>>> I guess the value from inline asm is just put into IMM bytes as
>>> is. llvm-objdump is exactly the same, although the value is pretty
>>> printed as negative:
>>>
>>> 0000000000000320 <cmp_map_pointer_with_const>:
>>>        100:       b7 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = 0x0
>>>        101:       18 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 
>>> = 0x0 ll
>>>        103:       15 01 00 00 ef be ad de if r1 == -0x21524111 goto 
>>> +0x0
>>
>> It's 64-bit 0xFFFFffffdeadbeef
>> Not the same as 0xdeadbeef
>
> I am not sure what the issue is, would appreciate an explanation.
>
> Inline asm contains a 32bit literal (without a sign). Compiler takes
> this literal as is and puts it into imm field of the instruction,
> which is also 32bit. The instruction is valid and this value _means_
> signed integer, in particular for the verifier.
>
> Are you saying that compiler should check the sign of the literal and
> verify it's in signed 32bit range? In other words if you want
> 0xdeadbeef bytes in the imm, you must write -0x21524111 in the asm?
>
> AFAIU it'd be different from C then, because you can write:
>
>    int k = 0xdeadbeef;
>    printf("%d\n", k); // prints -559038737
>
> and it's fine.
>
> Looking at Yonghong's llvm pr [1], it will not error for 0xdeadbeef
> because it's less than UINT_MAX:
>
>     if (MO.isImm()) {
>         int64_t Imm = MO.getImm();
>         if (MI.getOpcode() != BPF::LD_imm64 && (Imm < INT_MIN || Imm > 
> UINT_MAX))
>           Ctx.reportError(MI.getLoc(),
>                           "immediate out of range, shall fit in 32 
> bits");
>         return static_cast<unsigned>(Imm);
>       }
>
> [1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/142989
>
>
If we have C code like
   if (var == 0xdeadbeef) { ... }

The compiler will actually convert 'var == imm' to 'rX == rY' and
rY will have content of 0xdeadbeef. This will happen during IR lowering
from middle end to machine instructions.

The tricky thing is inline asm. I am debating myself whether we
should align with GCC or not to allow 'rX == 0xdeadbeef' in inline asm.
in llvm the inline asm code is processed at MC level (after all 
optimizations).
Ultimately I aligned with GCC for compatibility. My first response to this
thread is to only allow in range or INT_MIN and INT_MAX.

So the question is that we treat inline asm as the pure encoding
or it should have other semantics.

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 2/3] selftests/bpf: add cmp_map_pointer_with_const test

[Alexei Starovoitov]

On Thu, Jun 5, 2025 at 10:42 AM Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 6/5/25 10:17 AM, Ihor Solodrai wrote:
> > On 6/5/25 9:08 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> >> On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 8:04 PM Ihor Solodrai
> >> <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On 6/4/25 3:41 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> >>>> On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Add a test for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP comparison with a non-0 constant. A
> >>>>> BPF program with this code must not pass verification in unpriv.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
> >>>>> ---
> >>>>>    .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c       | 17
> >>>>> +++++++++++++++++
> >>>>>    1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
> >>>>>
> >>>>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
> >>>>> b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
> >>>>> index 28200f068ce5..c4a48b57e167 100644
> >>>>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
> >>>>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
> >>>>> @@ -634,6 +634,23 @@ l0_%=:     r0 =
> >>>>> 0;                                         \
> >>>>>           : __clobber_all);
> >>>>>    }
> >>>>>
> >>>>> +SEC("socket")
> >>>>> +__description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with const")
> >>>>> +__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison
> >>>>> prohibited")
> >>>>> +__retval(0)
> >>>>> +__naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_const(void)
> >>>>> +{
> >>>>> +       asm volatile ("                                 \
> >>>>> +       r1 = 0;                                         \
> >>>>> +       r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;                         \
> >>>>> +       if r1 == 0xdeadbeef goto l0_%=;         \
> >>>>
> >>>> I bet this doesn't fit into imm32 either.
> >>>> It should fit into _signed_ imm32.
> >>>
> >>> Apparently it's fine both for gcc and clang:
> >>> https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/15454151804
> >>
> >> Both compilers are buggy then.
> >>
> >>> I guess the value from inline asm is just put into IMM bytes as
> >>> is. llvm-objdump is exactly the same, although the value is pretty
> >>> printed as negative:
> >>>
> >>> 0000000000000320 <cmp_map_pointer_with_const>:
> >>>        100:       b7 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = 0x0
> >>>        101:       18 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1
> >>> = 0x0 ll
> >>>        103:       15 01 00 00 ef be ad de if r1 == -0x21524111 goto
> >>> +0x0
> >>
> >> It's 64-bit 0xFFFFffffdeadbeef
> >> Not the same as 0xdeadbeef
> >
> > I am not sure what the issue is, would appreciate an explanation.
> >
> > Inline asm contains a 32bit literal (without a sign). Compiler takes
> > this literal as is and puts it into imm field of the instruction,
> > which is also 32bit. The instruction is valid and this value _means_
> > signed integer, in particular for the verifier.

Not quite. It's signed imm32 in _runtime_.

> >
> > Are you saying that compiler should check the sign of the literal and
> > verify it's in signed 32bit range? In other words if you want
> > 0xdeadbeef bytes in the imm, you must write -0x21524111 in the asm?
> >
> > AFAIU it'd be different from C then, because you can write:
> >
> >    int k = 0xdeadbeef;
> >    printf("%d\n", k); // prints -559038737
> >
> > and it's fine.
> >
> > Looking at Yonghong's llvm pr [1], it will not error for 0xdeadbeef
> > because it's less than UINT_MAX:
> >
> >     if (MO.isImm()) {
> >         int64_t Imm = MO.getImm();
> >         if (MI.getOpcode() != BPF::LD_imm64 && (Imm < INT_MIN || Imm >
> > UINT_MAX))
> >           Ctx.reportError(MI.getLoc(),
> >                           "immediate out of range, shall fit in 32
> > bits");
> >         return static_cast<unsigned>(Imm);
> >       }
> >
> > [1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/142989
> >
> >
> If we have C code like
>    if (var == 0xdeadbeef) { ... }
>
> The compiler will actually convert 'var == imm' to 'rX == rY' and
> rY will have content of 0xdeadbeef. This will happen during IR lowering
> from middle end to machine instructions.

... and the compiler will use ld_imm64 insn to store 0xdeadbeef in rY.

>
> The tricky thing is inline asm. I am debating myself whether we
> should align with GCC or not to allow 'rX == 0xdeadbeef' in inline asm.
> in llvm the inline asm code is processed at MC level (after all
> optimizations).
> Ultimately I aligned with GCC for compatibility. My first response to this
> thread is to only allow in range or INT_MIN and INT_MAX.
>
> So the question is that we treat inline asm as the pure encoding
> or it should have other semantics.

I think both compilers should error (or warn) when imm32 doesn't fit
into int_min/max, because the asm code for
if r1 == 0xdeadbeef goto l0_%=;
will not do what the author expects.

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 2/3] selftests/bpf: add cmp_map_pointer_with_const test

[Yonghong Song]

On 6/5/25 11:11 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 5, 2025 at 10:42 AM Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6/5/25 10:17 AM, Ihor Solodrai wrote:
>>> On 6/5/25 9:08 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>>> On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 8:04 PM Ihor Solodrai
>>>> <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev> wrote:
>>>>> On 6/4/25 3:41 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>>>>> On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> Add a test for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP comparison with a non-0 constant. A
>>>>>>> BPF program with this code must not pass verification in unpriv.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>     .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c       | 17
>>>>>>> +++++++++++++++++
>>>>>>>     1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
>>>>>>> b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
>>>>>>> index 28200f068ce5..c4a48b57e167 100644
>>>>>>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
>>>>>>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
>>>>>>> @@ -634,6 +634,23 @@ l0_%=:     r0 =
>>>>>>> 0;                                         \
>>>>>>>            : __clobber_all);
>>>>>>>     }
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> +SEC("socket")
>>>>>>> +__description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with const")
>>>>>>> +__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison
>>>>>>> prohibited")
>>>>>>> +__retval(0)
>>>>>>> +__naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_const(void)
>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>> +       asm volatile ("                                 \
>>>>>>> +       r1 = 0;                                         \
>>>>>>> +       r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;                         \
>>>>>>> +       if r1 == 0xdeadbeef goto l0_%=;         \
>>>>>> I bet this doesn't fit into imm32 either.
>>>>>> It should fit into _signed_ imm32.
>>>>> Apparently it's fine both for gcc and clang:
>>>>> https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/15454151804
>>>> Both compilers are buggy then.
>>>>
>>>>> I guess the value from inline asm is just put into IMM bytes as
>>>>> is. llvm-objdump is exactly the same, although the value is pretty
>>>>> printed as negative:
>>>>>
>>>>> 0000000000000320 <cmp_map_pointer_with_const>:
>>>>>         100:       b7 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = 0x0
>>>>>         101:       18 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1
>>>>> = 0x0 ll
>>>>>         103:       15 01 00 00 ef be ad de if r1 == -0x21524111 goto
>>>>> +0x0
>>>> It's 64-bit 0xFFFFffffdeadbeef
>>>> Not the same as 0xdeadbeef
>>> I am not sure what the issue is, would appreciate an explanation.
>>>
>>> Inline asm contains a 32bit literal (without a sign). Compiler takes
>>> this literal as is and puts it into imm field of the instruction,
>>> which is also 32bit. The instruction is valid and this value _means_
>>> signed integer, in particular for the verifier.
> Not quite. It's signed imm32 in _runtime_.
>
>>> Are you saying that compiler should check the sign of the literal and
>>> verify it's in signed 32bit range? In other words if you want
>>> 0xdeadbeef bytes in the imm, you must write -0x21524111 in the asm?
>>>
>>> AFAIU it'd be different from C then, because you can write:
>>>
>>>     int k = 0xdeadbeef;
>>>     printf("%d\n", k); // prints -559038737
>>>
>>> and it's fine.
>>>
>>> Looking at Yonghong's llvm pr [1], it will not error for 0xdeadbeef
>>> because it's less than UINT_MAX:
>>>
>>>      if (MO.isImm()) {
>>>          int64_t Imm = MO.getImm();
>>>          if (MI.getOpcode() != BPF::LD_imm64 && (Imm < INT_MIN || Imm >
>>> UINT_MAX))
>>>            Ctx.reportError(MI.getLoc(),
>>>                            "immediate out of range, shall fit in 32
>>> bits");
>>>          return static_cast<unsigned>(Imm);
>>>        }
>>>
>>> [1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/142989
>>>
>>>
>> If we have C code like
>>     if (var == 0xdeadbeef) { ... }
>>
>> The compiler will actually convert 'var == imm' to 'rX == rY' and
>> rY will have content of 0xdeadbeef. This will happen during IR lowering
>> from middle end to machine instructions.
> ... and the compiler will use ld_imm64 insn to store 0xdeadbeef in rY.
>
>> The tricky thing is inline asm. I am debating myself whether we
>> should align with GCC or not to allow 'rX == 0xdeadbeef' in inline asm.
>> in llvm the inline asm code is processed at MC level (after all
>> optimizations).
>> Ultimately I aligned with GCC for compatibility. My first response to this
>> thread is to only allow in range or INT_MIN and INT_MAX.
>>
>> So the question is that we treat inline asm as the pure encoding
>> or it should have other semantics.
> I think both compilers should error (or warn) when imm32 doesn't fit
> into int_min/max, because the asm code for
> if r1 == 0xdeadbeef goto l0_%=;
> will not do what the author expects.

if we intend to use 'int' range instead then we will have more cases like below.
For example,

store with imm:
    int foo(long *a, long *b) {
       *a = 0xabababab;
       *b = 0x76543210;
       return 0;
    }

In this example, using an inline asm to do
    *(u64 *)(r1 + 0) = 0xabababab
will not be what user expected to get.

The same issue for conditional like 'long a; if (a > 0xabababab) ...', or
alu64 operations like 'long a; if (a & 0xabababab) ...'.

I can expand checking in llvm for the these patterns.

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 2/3] selftests/bpf: add cmp_map_pointer_with_const test

[Andrii Nakryiko]

On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> wrote:
>
> Add a test for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP comparison with a non-0 constant. A
> BPF program with this code must not pass verification in unpriv.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
> ---
>  .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c       | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
> index 28200f068ce5..c4a48b57e167 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
> @@ -634,6 +634,23 @@ l0_%=:     r0 = 0;                                         \
>         : __clobber_all);
>  }
>
> +SEC("socket")
> +__description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with const")
> +__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison prohibited")
> +__retval(0)
> +__naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_const(void)
> +{
> +       asm volatile ("                                 \
> +       r1 = 0;                                         \

Does this assignment serve any purpose?

> +       r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;                         \
> +       if r1 == 0xdeadbeef goto l0_%=;         \
> +l0_%=: r0 = 0;                                         \
> +       exit;                                           \
> +"      :
> +       : __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
> +       : __clobber_all);
> +}
> +
>  SEC("socket")
>  __description("unpriv: write into frame pointer")
>  __failure __msg("frame pointer is read only")
> --
> 2.47.1
>

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 2/3] selftests/bpf: add cmp_map_pointer_with_const test

[Ihor Solodrai]

On 6/5/25 9:20 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> wrote:
>>
>> Add a test for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP comparison with a non-0 constant. A
>> BPF program with this code must not pass verification in unpriv.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
>> ---
>>   .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c       | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>>   1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
>> index 28200f068ce5..c4a48b57e167 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
>> @@ -634,6 +634,23 @@ l0_%=:     r0 = 0;                                         \
>>          : __clobber_all);
>>   }
>>
>> +SEC("socket")
>> +__description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with const")
>> +__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison prohibited")
>> +__retval(0)
>> +__naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_const(void)
>> +{
>> +       asm volatile ("                                 \
>> +       r1 = 0;                                         \
> 
> Does this assignment serve any purpose?

I don't think so. This was copypasted from
cmp_map_pointer_with_zero. I'll try removing in both.

> 
>> +       r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;                         \
>> +       if r1 == 0xdeadbeef goto l0_%=;         \
>> +l0_%=: r0 = 0;                                         \
>> +       exit;                                           \
>> +"      :
>> +       : __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
>> +       : __clobber_all);
>> +}
>> +
>>   SEC("socket")
>>   __description("unpriv: write into frame pointer")
>>   __failure __msg("frame pointer is read only")
>> --
>> 2.47.1
>>

[PATCH bpf-next v3 3/3] selftests/bpf: add test cases with CONST_PTR_TO_MAP null checks

[Ihor Solodrai]

A test requires the following to happen:
  * CONST_PTR_TO_MAP value is put on the stack
  * then this value is checked for null
  * the code in the null branch fails verification

I was able to achieve this by using a stack allocated array of maps,
populated with values from a global map. This is the first test case:
map_ptr_is_never_null.

The second test case (map_ptr_is_never_null_rb) involves an array of
ringbufs and attempts to recreate a common coding pattern [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzZNU0gX_sQ8k8JaLe1e+Veth3Rk=4x7MDhv=hQxvO8EDw@mail.gmail.com/

Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
---
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
index 7d088ba99ea5..1dd5c6902c53 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
@@ -139,4 +139,81 @@ __naked void on_the_inner_map_pointer(void)
 	: __clobber_all);
 }
 
+SEC("socket")
+int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx)
+{
+	struct bpf_map *maps[2] = { 0 };
+	struct bpf_map *map = NULL;
+	int __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = 0;
+
+	for (key = 0; key < 2; key++) {
+		map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key);
+		if (map)
+			maps[key] = map;
+		else
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* After the loop every element of maps is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP so
+	 * the invalid branch should not be explored by the verifier.
+	 */
+	if (!maps[0])
+		asm volatile ("r10 = 0;");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct {
+	__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS);
+	__uint(max_entries, 1);
+	__type(key, int);
+	__type(value, int);
+	__array(values, struct {
+		__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF);
+		__uint(max_entries, 4096);
+	});
+} rb_in_map SEC(".maps");
+
+struct rb_ctx {
+	void *rb;
+	struct bpf_dynptr dptr;
+};
+
+static __always_inline struct rb_ctx __rb_event_reserve(__u32 sz)
+{
+	struct rb_ctx rb_ctx = {};
+	void *rb;
+	__u32 cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id();
+	__u32 rb_slot = cpu & 1;
+
+	rb = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&rb_in_map, &rb_slot);
+	if (!rb)
+		return rb_ctx;
+
+	rb_ctx.rb = rb;
+	bpf_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr(rb, sz, 0, &rb_ctx.dptr);
+
+	return rb_ctx;
+}
+
+static __noinline void __rb_event_submit(struct rb_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	if (!ctx->rb)
+		return;
+
+	/* If the verifier (incorrectly) concludes that ctx->rb can be
+	 * NULL at this point, we'll get "BPF_EXIT instruction in main
+	 * prog would lead to reference leak" error
+	 */
+	bpf_ringbuf_submit_dynptr(&ctx->dptr, 0);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+int map_ptr_is_never_null_rb(void *ctx)
+{
+	struct rb_ctx event_ctx = __rb_event_reserve(256);
+	__rb_event_submit(&event_ctx);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
2.47.1

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 3/3] selftests/bpf: add test cases with CONST_PTR_TO_MAP null checks

[Andrii Nakryiko]

On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> wrote:
>
> A test requires the following to happen:
>   * CONST_PTR_TO_MAP value is put on the stack
>   * then this value is checked for null
>   * the code in the null branch fails verification
>
> I was able to achieve this by using a stack allocated array of maps,
> populated with values from a global map. This is the first test case:
> map_ptr_is_never_null.
>
> The second test case (map_ptr_is_never_null_rb) involves an array of
> ringbufs and attempts to recreate a common coding pattern [1].
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzZNU0gX_sQ8k8JaLe1e+Veth3Rk=4x7MDhv=hQxvO8EDw@mail.gmail.com/
>
> Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
> ---
>  .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 77 insertions(+)
>

LGTM overall

Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>

> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
> index 7d088ba99ea5..1dd5c6902c53 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
> @@ -139,4 +139,81 @@ __naked void on_the_inner_map_pointer(void)
>         : __clobber_all);
>  }
>
> +SEC("socket")
> +int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx)
> +{
> +       struct bpf_map *maps[2] = { 0 };
> +       struct bpf_map *map = NULL;
> +       int __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = 0;

aligned(8) makes any difference?

> +
> +       for (key = 0; key < 2; key++) {
> +               map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key);
> +               if (map)
> +                       maps[key] = map;
> +               else
> +                       return 0;
> +       }
> +
> +       /* After the loop every element of maps is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP so
> +        * the invalid branch should not be explored by the verifier.
> +        */
> +       if (!maps[0])
> +               asm volatile ("r10 = 0;");
> +
> +       return 0;
> +}
> +
> +struct {
> +       __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS);
> +       __uint(max_entries, 1);
> +       __type(key, int);
> +       __type(value, int);
> +       __array(values, struct {
> +               __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF);
> +               __uint(max_entries, 4096);

nit: use 64 * 1024 just in case, for arches where page size is 64KB

> +       });
> +} rb_in_map SEC(".maps");
> +
> +struct rb_ctx {
> +       void *rb;
> +       struct bpf_dynptr dptr;
> +};
> +
> +static __always_inline struct rb_ctx __rb_event_reserve(__u32 sz)
> +{
> +       struct rb_ctx rb_ctx = {};
> +       void *rb;
> +       __u32 cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id();
> +       __u32 rb_slot = cpu & 1;
> +
> +       rb = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&rb_in_map, &rb_slot);
> +       if (!rb)
> +               return rb_ctx;
> +
> +       rb_ctx.rb = rb;
> +       bpf_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr(rb, sz, 0, &rb_ctx.dptr);
> +
> +       return rb_ctx;
> +}
> +
> +static __noinline void __rb_event_submit(struct rb_ctx *ctx)
> +{
> +       if (!ctx->rb)
> +               return;
> +
> +       /* If the verifier (incorrectly) concludes that ctx->rb can be
> +        * NULL at this point, we'll get "BPF_EXIT instruction in main
> +        * prog would lead to reference leak" error
> +        */
> +       bpf_ringbuf_submit_dynptr(&ctx->dptr, 0);
> +}
> +
> +SEC("socket")
> +int map_ptr_is_never_null_rb(void *ctx)
> +{
> +       struct rb_ctx event_ctx = __rb_event_reserve(256);
> +       __rb_event_submit(&event_ctx);
> +       return 0;
> +}
> +
>  char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
> --
> 2.47.1
>

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 3/3] selftests/bpf: add test cases with CONST_PTR_TO_MAP null checks

[Ihor Solodrai]

On 6/5/25 9:24 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> wrote:
>>
>> A test requires the following to happen:
>>    * CONST_PTR_TO_MAP value is put on the stack
>>    * then this value is checked for null
>>    * the code in the null branch fails verification
>>
>> I was able to achieve this by using a stack allocated array of maps,
>> populated with values from a global map. This is the first test case:
>> map_ptr_is_never_null.
>>
>> The second test case (map_ptr_is_never_null_rb) involves an array of
>> ringbufs and attempts to recreate a common coding pattern [1].
>>
>> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzZNU0gX_sQ8k8JaLe1e+Veth3Rk=4x7MDhv=hQxvO8EDw@mail.gmail.com/
>>
>> Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
>> ---
>>   .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++
>>   1 file changed, 77 insertions(+)
>>
> 
> LGTM overall
> 
> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
> 
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
>> index 7d088ba99ea5..1dd5c6902c53 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
>> @@ -139,4 +139,81 @@ __naked void on_the_inner_map_pointer(void)
>>          : __clobber_all);
>>   }
>>
>> +SEC("socket")
>> +int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx)
>> +{
>> +       struct bpf_map *maps[2] = { 0 };
>> +       struct bpf_map *map = NULL;
>> +       int __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = 0;
> 
> aligned(8) makes any difference?

Yes. If not aligned (explicitly or by accident), verification fails
with "math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is
not allowed" at maps[key]. See the log below.


VERIFIER LOG:
=============
arg#0 reference type('UNKNOWN ') size cannot be determined: -22
0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
; int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx) @ verifier_map_in_map.c:143
0: (b7) r1 = 0                        ; R1_w=0
; struct bpf_map *maps[2] = { 0 }; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:145
1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1         ; R1_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=0
2: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r1        ; R1_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-16_w=0
3: (b4) w1 = 0                        ; R1_w=0
; for (key = 0; key < 2; key++) { @ verifier_map_in_map.c:150
4: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -20) = r1        ; R1_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-24=0000????
5: (bf) r2 = r10                      ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
6: (07) r2 += -20                     ; R2_w=fp-20
; map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key); @ verifier_map_in_map.c:151
7: (18) r1 = 0xff48115640934800       ; 
R1_w=map_ptr(map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
9: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1    ; 
R0_w=map_value_or_null(id=1,map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
; if (map) @ verifier_map_in_map.c:152
10: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+16      ; R0_w=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=4)
; maps[key] = map; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:153
11: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r10 -20)       ; R1_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-24=0000????
12: (67) r1 <<= 32                    ; R1_w=0
13: (c7) r1 s>>= 32                   ; R1_w=0
14: (bf) r2 = r1                      ; R1_w=0 R2_w=0
15: (67) r2 <<= 3                     ; R2_w=0
16: (bf) r3 = r10                     ; R3_w=fp0 R10=fp0
17: (07) r3 += -16                    ; R3_w=fp-16
18: (0f) r3 += r2                     ; R2_w=0 R3_w=fp-16
19: (7b) *(u64 *)(r3 +0) = r0         ; R0_w=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=4) 
R3_w=fp-16 fp-16_w=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=4)
; for (key = 0; key < 2; key++) { @ verifier_map_in_map.c:150
20: (bc) w2 = w1                      ; R1_w=0 R2_w=0
21: (04) w2 += 1                      ; R2_w=1
22: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -20) = r2       ; R2=1 R10=fp0 fp-24=mmmm????
23: (c6) if w1 s< 0x1 goto pc-19      ; R1=0
5: (bf) r2 = r10                      ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
6: (07) r2 += -20                     ; R2_w=fp-20
; map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key); @ verifier_map_in_map.c:151
7: (18) r1 = 0xff48115640934800       ; 
R1_w=map_ptr(map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
9: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1    ; 
R0_w=map_value_or_null(id=2,map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
; if (map) @ verifier_map_in_map.c:152
10: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+16      ; R0_w=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=4)
; maps[key] = map; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:153
11: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r10 -20)       ; 
R1_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=0xffffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 
R10=fp0 fp-24=mmmm????
12: (67) r1 <<= 32                    ; 
R1_w=scalar(smax=0x7fffffff00000000,umax=0xffffffff00000000,smin32=0,smax32=umax32=0,var_off=(0x0; 
0xffffffff00000000))
13: (c7) r1 s>>= 32                   ; 
R1_w=scalar(smin=0xffffffff80000000,smax=0x7fffffff)
14: (bf) r2 = r1                      ; 
R1_w=scalar(id=3,smin=0xffffffff80000000,smax=0x7fffffff) 
R2_w=scalar(id=3,smin=0xffffffff80000000,smax=0x7fffffff)
15: (67) r2 <<= 3                     ; 
R2_w=scalar(smax=0x7ffffffffffffff8,umax=0xfffffffffffffff8,smax32=0x7ffffff8,umax32=0xfffffff8,var_off=(0x0; 
0xfffffffffffffff8))
16: (bf) r3 = r10                     ; R3_w=fp0 R10=fp0
17: (07) r3 += -16                    ; R3_w=fp-16
18: (0f) r3 += r2
math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed
processed 36 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 1 
peak_states 1 mark_read 1
=============


> 
>> +
>> +       for (key = 0; key < 2; key++) {
>> +               map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key);
>> +               if (map)
>> +                       maps[key] = map;
>> +               else
>> +                       return 0;
>> +       }
>> +
>> +       /* After the loop every element of maps is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP so
>> +        * the invalid branch should not be explored by the verifier.
>> +        */
>> +       if (!maps[0])
>> +               asm volatile ("r10 = 0;");
>> +
>> +       return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +struct {
>> +       __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS);
>> +       __uint(max_entries, 1);
>> +       __type(key, int);
>> +       __type(value, int);
>> +       __array(values, struct {
>> +               __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF);
>> +               __uint(max_entries, 4096);
> 
> nit: use 64 * 1024 just in case, for arches where page size is 64KB

ok

> 
>> +       });
>> +} rb_in_map SEC(".maps");
>> +
>> +struct rb_ctx {
>> +       void *rb;
>> +       struct bpf_dynptr dptr;
>> +};
>> +
>> +static __always_inline struct rb_ctx __rb_event_reserve(__u32 sz)
>> +{
>> +       struct rb_ctx rb_ctx = {};
>> +       void *rb;
>> +       __u32 cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id();
>> +       __u32 rb_slot = cpu & 1;
>> +
>> +       rb = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&rb_in_map, &rb_slot);
>> +       if (!rb)
>> +               return rb_ctx;
>> +
>> +       rb_ctx.rb = rb;
>> +       bpf_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr(rb, sz, 0, &rb_ctx.dptr);
>> +
>> +       return rb_ctx;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static __noinline void __rb_event_submit(struct rb_ctx *ctx)
>> +{
>> +       if (!ctx->rb)
>> +               return;
>> +
>> +       /* If the verifier (incorrectly) concludes that ctx->rb can be
>> +        * NULL at this point, we'll get "BPF_EXIT instruction in main
>> +        * prog would lead to reference leak" error
>> +        */
>> +       bpf_ringbuf_submit_dynptr(&ctx->dptr, 0);
>> +}
>> +
>> +SEC("socket")
>> +int map_ptr_is_never_null_rb(void *ctx)
>> +{
>> +       struct rb_ctx event_ctx = __rb_event_reserve(256);
>> +       __rb_event_submit(&event_ctx);
>> +       return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>>   char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
>> --
>> 2.47.1
>>

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 3/3] selftests/bpf: add test cases with CONST_PTR_TO_MAP null checks

[Alexei Starovoitov]

On Thu, Jun 5, 2025 at 9:42 AM Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev> wrote:
>
> On 6/5/25 9:24 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> A test requires the following to happen:
> >>    * CONST_PTR_TO_MAP value is put on the stack
> >>    * then this value is checked for null
> >>    * the code in the null branch fails verification
> >>
> >> I was able to achieve this by using a stack allocated array of maps,
> >> populated with values from a global map. This is the first test case:
> >> map_ptr_is_never_null.
> >>
> >> The second test case (map_ptr_is_never_null_rb) involves an array of
> >> ringbufs and attempts to recreate a common coding pattern [1].
> >>
> >> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzZNU0gX_sQ8k8JaLe1e+Veth3Rk=4x7MDhv=hQxvO8EDw@mail.gmail.com/
> >>
> >> Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
> >> Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
> >> ---
> >>   .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++
> >>   1 file changed, 77 insertions(+)
> >>
> >
> > LGTM overall
> >
> > Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
> >
> >> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
> >> index 7d088ba99ea5..1dd5c6902c53 100644
> >> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
> >> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
> >> @@ -139,4 +139,81 @@ __naked void on_the_inner_map_pointer(void)
> >>          : __clobber_all);
> >>   }
> >>
> >> +SEC("socket")
> >> +int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx)
> >> +{
> >> +       struct bpf_map *maps[2] = { 0 };
> >> +       struct bpf_map *map = NULL;
> >> +       int __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = 0;
> >
> > aligned(8) makes any difference?
>
> Yes. If not aligned (explicitly or by accident), verification fails
> with "math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is
> not allowed" at maps[key]. See the log below.

It's not clear to me why "aligned" changes code gen,
but let's not rely on it.
Try 'unsigned int key' instead.
Also note that &key part pessimizes the code.
Do for (...; i < 2; i++) {u32 key = i; &key }
instead.

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 3/3] selftests/bpf: add test cases with CONST_PTR_TO_MAP null checks

[Ihor Solodrai]

On 6/5/25 10:00 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 5, 2025 at 9:42 AM Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev> wrote:
>>
>> On 6/5/25 9:24 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> [...]
>>>>
>>>> +SEC("socket")
>>>> +int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx)
>>>> +{
>>>> +       struct bpf_map *maps[2] = { 0 };
>>>> +       struct bpf_map *map = NULL;
>>>> +       int __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = 0;
>>>
>>> aligned(8) makes any difference?
>>
>> Yes. If not aligned (explicitly or by accident), verification fails
>> with "math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is
>> not allowed" at maps[key]. See the log below.
> 
> It's not clear to me why "aligned" changes code gen,
> but let's not rely on it.
> Try 'unsigned int key' instead.
> Also note that &key part pessimizes the code.
> Do for (...; i < 2; i++) {u32 key = i; &key }
> instead.

I've tried changing the test like this:

@@ -144,12 +144,12 @@ int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx)
  {
         struct bpf_map *maps[2] = { 0 };
         struct bpf_map *map = NULL;
-       int __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = 0;

-       for (key = 0; key < 2; key++) {
+       for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+               __u32 key = i;
                 map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key);
                 if (map)
-                       maps[key] = map;
+                       maps[i] = map;
                 else
                         return 0;
         }

This version passes verification independent of the first patch being
applied, which kinda defeats the purpose of the test. Verifier log
below:

     0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
     ; int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx) @ verifier_map_in_map.c:143
     0: (b4) w1 = 0                        ; R1_w=0
     ; __u32 key = i; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:149
     1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1
     mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 1 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1
     mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 0: (b4) w1 = 0
     2: R1_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-8=0000????
     2: (bf) r2 = r10                      ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
     3: (07) r2 += -4                      ; R2_w=fp-4
     ; map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key); @ 
verifier_map_in_map.c:150
     4: (18) r1 = 0xff302cd6802e0a00       ; 
R1_w=map_ptr(map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
     6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1    ; 
R0_w=map_value_or_null(id=1,map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
     ; if (map) @ verifier_map_in_map.c:151
     7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7        ; R0_w=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=4)
     8: (b4) w1 = 1                        ; R1_w=1
     ; __u32 key = i; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:149
     9: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1         ; R1_w=1 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmm????
     10: (bf) r2 = r10                     ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
     11: (07) r2 += -4                     ; R2_w=fp-4
     ; map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key); @ 
verifier_map_in_map.c:150
     12: (18) r1 = 0xff302cd6802e0a00      ; 
R1_w=map_ptr(map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
     14: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1   ; 
R0=map_value_or_null(id=2,map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
     ; } @ verifier_map_in_map.c:164
     15: (b4) w0 = 0                       ; R0_w=0
     16: (95) exit


If map[i] is changed back to map[key] like this:

	for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
		__u32 key = i;
		map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key);
		if (map)
			maps[key] = map; /* change here */
		else
			return 0;
	}

Verification fails with "invalid unbounded variable-offset write to 
stack R2"

     VERIFIER LOG:
     =============
     arg#0 reference type('UNKNOWN ') size cannot be determined: -22
     0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
     ; int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx) @ verifier_map_in_map.c:143
     0: (b7) r1 = 0                        ; R1_w=0
     ; struct bpf_map *maps[2] = { 0 }; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:145
     1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1         ; R1_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=0
     2: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r1        ; R1_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-16_w=0
     3: (b4) w1 = 0                        ; R1_w=0
     ; __u32 key = i; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:149
     4: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -20) = r1        ; R1_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-24=0000????
     5: (bf) r2 = r10                      ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
     6: (07) r2 += -20                     ; R2_w=fp-20
     ; map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key); @ 
verifier_map_in_map.c:150
     7: (18) r1 = 0xff1f1a9b829ae400       ; 
R1_w=map_ptr(map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
     9: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1    ; 
R0_w=map_value_or_null(id=1,map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
     ; if (map) @ verifier_map_in_map.c:151
     10: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+24      ; R0_w=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=4)
     ; maps[key] = map; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:152
     11: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r10 -20)       ; R1_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-24=0000????
     12: (67) r1 <<= 3                     ; R1_w=0
     13: (bf) r2 = r10                     ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
     14: (07) r2 += -16                    ; R2_w=fp-16
     15: (0f) r2 += r1                     ; R1_w=0 R2_w=fp-16
     16: (7b) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = r0         ; R0_w=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=4) 
R2_w=fp-16 fp-16_w=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=4)
     17: (b4) w1 = 1                       ; R1_w=1
     ; __u32 key = i; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:149
     18: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -20) = r1       ; R1_w=1 R10=fp0 fp-24=mmmm????
     19: (bf) r2 = r10                     ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
     20: (07) r2 += -20                    ; R2_w=fp-20
     ; map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key); @ 
verifier_map_in_map.c:150
     21: (18) r1 = 0xff1f1a9b829ae400      ; 
R1_w=map_ptr(map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
     23: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1   ; 
R0=map_value_or_null(id=2,map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
     ; if (map) @ verifier_map_in_map.c:151
     24: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+10      ; R0=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=4)
     ; maps[key] = map; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:152
     25: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r10 -20)       ; 
R1_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=0xffffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 
R10=fp0 fp-24=mmmm????
     26: (67) r1 <<= 3                     ; 
R1_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=0x7fffffff8,smax32=0x7ffffff8,umax32=0xfffffff8,var_off=(0x0; 
0x7fffffff8))
     27: (bf) r2 = r10                     ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
     28: (07) r2 += -16                    ; R2_w=fp-16
     29: (0f) r2 += r1                     ; 
R1_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=0x7fffffff8,smax32=0x7ffffff8,umax32=0xfffffff8,var_off=(0x0; 
0x7fffffff8)) 
R2_w=fp(off=-16,smin=0,smax=umax=0x7fffffff8,smax32=0x7ffffff8,umax32=0xfffffff8,var_off=(0x0; 
0x7fffffff8))
     30: (7b) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = r0
     invalid unbounded variable-offset write to stack R2

... which can be "fixed" by aligning the local key variable

     __u32 __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = i;

but that puts us back to square one.

It appears that alignment becomes a problem if the variable is used as
array index and also it's address is passed to a helper.

And if different vars are used for array access and map lookup, then
map_ptr nullness issue doesn't reproduce.

Any suggestions?

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 3/3] selftests/bpf: add test cases with CONST_PTR_TO_MAP null checks

[Alexei Starovoitov]

On Thu, Jun 5, 2025 at 4:40 PM Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev> wrote:
>
> On 6/5/25 10:00 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 5, 2025 at 9:42 AM Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 6/5/25 9:24 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> >>> On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> [...]
> >>>>
> >>>> +SEC("socket")
> >>>> +int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx)
> >>>> +{
> >>>> +       struct bpf_map *maps[2] = { 0 };
> >>>> +       struct bpf_map *map = NULL;
> >>>> +       int __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = 0;
> >>>
> >>> aligned(8) makes any difference?
> >>
> >> Yes. If not aligned (explicitly or by accident), verification fails
> >> with "math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is
> >> not allowed" at maps[key]. See the log below.
> >
> > It's not clear to me why "aligned" changes code gen,
> > but let's not rely on it.
> > Try 'unsigned int key' instead.
> > Also note that &key part pessimizes the code.
> > Do for (...; i < 2; i++) {u32 key = i; &key }
> > instead.
>
> I've tried changing the test like this:
>
> @@ -144,12 +144,12 @@ int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx)
>   {
>          struct bpf_map *maps[2] = { 0 };
>          struct bpf_map *map = NULL;
> -       int __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = 0;
>
> -       for (key = 0; key < 2; key++) {
> +       for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
> +               __u32 key = i;
>                  map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key);
>                  if (map)
> -                       maps[key] = map;
> +                       maps[i] = map;
>                  else
>                          return 0;
>          }
>
> This version passes verification independent of the first patch being
> applied, which kinda defeats the purpose of the test. Verifier log
> below:
>
>      0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
>      ; int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx) @ verifier_map_in_map.c:143
>      0: (b4) w1 = 0                        ; R1_w=0
>      ; __u32 key = i; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:149
>      1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1
>      mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 1 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1
>      mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 0: (b4) w1 = 0
>      2: R1_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-8=0000????
>      2: (bf) r2 = r10                      ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
>      3: (07) r2 += -4                      ; R2_w=fp-4
>      ; map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key); @
> verifier_map_in_map.c:150
>      4: (18) r1 = 0xff302cd6802e0a00       ;
> R1_w=map_ptr(map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
>      6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1    ;
> R0_w=map_value_or_null(id=1,map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
>      ; if (map) @ verifier_map_in_map.c:151
>      7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7        ; R0_w=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=4)
>      8: (b4) w1 = 1                        ; R1_w=1
>      ; __u32 key = i; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:149
>      9: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1         ; R1_w=1 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmm????
>      10: (bf) r2 = r10                     ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
>      11: (07) r2 += -4                     ; R2_w=fp-4
>      ; map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key); @
> verifier_map_in_map.c:150
>      12: (18) r1 = 0xff302cd6802e0a00      ;
> R1_w=map_ptr(map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
>      14: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1   ;
> R0=map_value_or_null(id=2,map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
>      ; } @ verifier_map_in_map.c:164
>      15: (b4) w0 = 0                       ; R0_w=0
>      16: (95) exit

because the compiler removed 'if (!maps[0])' check?
Make maps volatile then.

It's not clear to me what the point of the 'for' loop is.
Just one bpf_map_lookup_elem() from map_in_map should do ?

>
> If map[i] is changed back to map[key] like this:
>
>         for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
>                 __u32 key = i;
>                 map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key);
>                 if (map)
>                         maps[key] = map; /* change here */
>                 else
>                         return 0;
>         }
>
> Verification fails with "invalid unbounded variable-offset write to
> stack R2"

as it should, because both the compiler and the verifier
see that 'key' is unbounded in maps[key] access.

>      __u32 __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = i;
>
> but that puts us back to square one.
>
> It appears that alignment becomes a problem if the variable is used as
> array index and also it's address is passed to a helper.

I bet this alignment "workaround" is fragile.
A different version of clang or gcc-bpf will change layout.

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 3/3] selftests/bpf: add test cases with CONST_PTR_TO_MAP null checks

[Ihor Solodrai]

On 6/5/25 5:25 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 5, 2025 at 4:40 PM Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev> wrote:
>>
>> On 6/5/25 10:00 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jun 5, 2025 at 9:42 AM Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 6/5/25 9:24 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> +SEC("socket")
>>>>>> +int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx)
>>>>>> +{
>>>>>> +       struct bpf_map *maps[2] = { 0 };
>>>>>> +       struct bpf_map *map = NULL;
>>>>>> +       int __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = 0;
>>>>>
>>>>> aligned(8) makes any difference?
>>>>
>>>> Yes. If not aligned (explicitly or by accident), verification fails
>>>> with "math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is
>>>> not allowed" at maps[key]. See the log below.
>>>
>>> It's not clear to me why "aligned" changes code gen,
>>> but let's not rely on it.
>>> Try 'unsigned int key' instead.
>>> Also note that &key part pessimizes the code.
>>> Do for (...; i < 2; i++) {u32 key = i; &key }
>>> instead.
>>
>> I've tried changing the test like this:
>>
>> @@ -144,12 +144,12 @@ int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx)
>>    {
>>           struct bpf_map *maps[2] = { 0 };
>>           struct bpf_map *map = NULL;
>> -       int __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = 0;
>>
>> -       for (key = 0; key < 2; key++) {
>> +       for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
>> +               __u32 key = i;
>>                   map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key);
>>                   if (map)
>> -                       maps[key] = map;
>> +                       maps[i] = map;
>>                   else
>>                           return 0;
>>           }
>>
>> This version passes verification independent of the first patch being
>> applied, which kinda defeats the purpose of the test. Verifier log
>> below:
>>
>>       0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
>>       ; int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx) @ verifier_map_in_map.c:143
>>       0: (b4) w1 = 0                        ; R1_w=0
>>       ; __u32 key = i; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:149
>>       1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1
>>       mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 1 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1
>>       mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 0: (b4) w1 = 0
>>       2: R1_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-8=0000????
>>       2: (bf) r2 = r10                      ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
>>       3: (07) r2 += -4                      ; R2_w=fp-4
>>       ; map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key); @
>> verifier_map_in_map.c:150
>>       4: (18) r1 = 0xff302cd6802e0a00       ;
>> R1_w=map_ptr(map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
>>       6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1    ;
>> R0_w=map_value_or_null(id=1,map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
>>       ; if (map) @ verifier_map_in_map.c:151
>>       7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7        ; R0_w=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=4)
>>       8: (b4) w1 = 1                        ; R1_w=1
>>       ; __u32 key = i; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:149
>>       9: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1         ; R1_w=1 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmm????
>>       10: (bf) r2 = r10                     ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
>>       11: (07) r2 += -4                     ; R2_w=fp-4
>>       ; map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key); @
>> verifier_map_in_map.c:150
>>       12: (18) r1 = 0xff302cd6802e0a00      ;
>> R1_w=map_ptr(map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
>>       14: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1   ;
>> R0=map_value_or_null(id=2,map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
>>       ; } @ verifier_map_in_map.c:164
>>       15: (b4) w0 = 0                       ; R0_w=0
>>       16: (95) exit
> 
> because the compiler removed 'if (!maps[0])' check?
> Make maps volatile then.

Making maps and/or map volatile didn't help.

> 
> It's not clear to me what the point of the 'for' loop is.
> Just one bpf_map_lookup_elem() from map_in_map should do ?

No. Using an array and loop was my attempt to put map_ptr on the
stack. But apparently this was not the reason it happened in the v1 of
the test.

> 
>>
>> If map[i] is changed back to map[key] like this:
>>
>>          for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
>>                  __u32 key = i;
>>                  map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key);
>>                  if (map)
>>                          maps[key] = map; /* change here */
>>                  else
>>                          return 0;
>>          }
>>
>> Verification fails with "invalid unbounded variable-offset write to
>> stack R2"
> 
> as it should, because both the compiler and the verifier
> see that 'key' is unbounded in maps[key] access.
> 
>>       __u32 __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = i;
>>
>> but that puts us back to square one.
>>
>> It appears that alignment becomes a problem if the variable is used as
>> array index and also it's address is passed to a helper.
> 
> I bet this alignment "workaround" is fragile.
> A different version of clang or gcc-bpf will change layout.

I agree, it's fragile.

After I fought compiler/verifier for a while I gave up and wrote a
test in asm:

     SEC("socket")
     __description("map_ptr is never null")
     __success
     __naked void map_ptr_is_never_null(void)
     {
     	asm volatile ("					\
     	r1 = 0;						\
     	*(u32*)(r10 - 4) = r1;				\
     	r2 = r10;					\
     	r2 += -4;					\
     	r1 = %[map_in_map] ll;				\
     	call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];			\
     	if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=;				\
     	exit;						\
     l0_%=:	*(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r0;				\
     	r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16);				\
     	if r1 == 0 goto l1_%=;				\
     	exit;						\
     l1_%=:	r10 = 42;					\
     	exit;						\
     "	:
     	: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
     	  __imm_addr(map_in_map)
     	: __clobber_all);
     }

What must happen to reproduce the situation is: map_ptr gets on a
stack, and then loaded and compared to 0.

It looks like I accidentally forced map_ptr on the stack by using
`key` both for map lookup and array access, which triggers those
alignment problems. Without that I wasn't able to figure out simple C
code that would produce bpf with map_ptr on the stack (besides the
other test, with rbs).

I guess I should've written an asm test right away.

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 3/3] selftests/bpf: add test cases with CONST_PTR_TO_MAP null checks

[Alexei Starovoitov]

On Fri, Jun 6, 2025 at 4:38 PM Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev> wrote:
>
> On 6/5/25 5:25 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 5, 2025 at 4:40 PM Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 6/5/25 10:00 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> >>> On Thu, Jun 5, 2025 at 9:42 AM Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> On 6/5/25 9:24 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> >>>>> On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> [...]
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> +SEC("socket")
> >>>>>> +int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx)
> >>>>>> +{
> >>>>>> +       struct bpf_map *maps[2] = { 0 };
> >>>>>> +       struct bpf_map *map = NULL;
> >>>>>> +       int __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = 0;
> >>>>>
> >>>>> aligned(8) makes any difference?
> >>>>
> >>>> Yes. If not aligned (explicitly or by accident), verification fails
> >>>> with "math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is
> >>>> not allowed" at maps[key]. See the log below.
> >>>
> >>> It's not clear to me why "aligned" changes code gen,
> >>> but let's not rely on it.
> >>> Try 'unsigned int key' instead.
> >>> Also note that &key part pessimizes the code.
> >>> Do for (...; i < 2; i++) {u32 key = i; &key }
> >>> instead.
> >>
> >> I've tried changing the test like this:
> >>
> >> @@ -144,12 +144,12 @@ int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx)
> >>    {
> >>           struct bpf_map *maps[2] = { 0 };
> >>           struct bpf_map *map = NULL;
> >> -       int __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = 0;
> >>
> >> -       for (key = 0; key < 2; key++) {
> >> +       for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
> >> +               __u32 key = i;
> >>                   map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key);
> >>                   if (map)
> >> -                       maps[key] = map;
> >> +                       maps[i] = map;
> >>                   else
> >>                           return 0;
> >>           }
> >>
> >> This version passes verification independent of the first patch being
> >> applied, which kinda defeats the purpose of the test. Verifier log
> >> below:
> >>
> >>       0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
> >>       ; int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx) @ verifier_map_in_map.c:143
> >>       0: (b4) w1 = 0                        ; R1_w=0
> >>       ; __u32 key = i; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:149
> >>       1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1
> >>       mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 1 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1
> >>       mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 0: (b4) w1 = 0
> >>       2: R1_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-8=0000????
> >>       2: (bf) r2 = r10                      ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
> >>       3: (07) r2 += -4                      ; R2_w=fp-4
> >>       ; map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key); @
> >> verifier_map_in_map.c:150
> >>       4: (18) r1 = 0xff302cd6802e0a00       ;
> >> R1_w=map_ptr(map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
> >>       6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1    ;
> >> R0_w=map_value_or_null(id=1,map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
> >>       ; if (map) @ verifier_map_in_map.c:151
> >>       7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7        ; R0_w=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=4)
> >>       8: (b4) w1 = 1                        ; R1_w=1
> >>       ; __u32 key = i; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:149
> >>       9: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1         ; R1_w=1 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmm????
> >>       10: (bf) r2 = r10                     ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
> >>       11: (07) r2 += -4                     ; R2_w=fp-4
> >>       ; map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key); @
> >> verifier_map_in_map.c:150
> >>       12: (18) r1 = 0xff302cd6802e0a00      ;
> >> R1_w=map_ptr(map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
> >>       14: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1   ;
> >> R0=map_value_or_null(id=2,map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
> >>       ; } @ verifier_map_in_map.c:164
> >>       15: (b4) w0 = 0                       ; R0_w=0
> >>       16: (95) exit
> >
> > because the compiler removed 'if (!maps[0])' check?
> > Make maps volatile then.
>
> Making maps and/or map volatile didn't help.
>
> >
> > It's not clear to me what the point of the 'for' loop is.
> > Just one bpf_map_lookup_elem() from map_in_map should do ?
>
> No. Using an array and loop was my attempt to put map_ptr on the
> stack. But apparently this was not the reason it happened in the v1 of
> the test.
>
> >
> >>
> >> If map[i] is changed back to map[key] like this:
> >>
> >>          for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
> >>                  __u32 key = i;
> >>                  map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key);
> >>                  if (map)
> >>                          maps[key] = map; /* change here */
> >>                  else
> >>                          return 0;
> >>          }
> >>
> >> Verification fails with "invalid unbounded variable-offset write to
> >> stack R2"
> >
> > as it should, because both the compiler and the verifier
> > see that 'key' is unbounded in maps[key] access.
> >
> >>       __u32 __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = i;
> >>
> >> but that puts us back to square one.
> >>
> >> It appears that alignment becomes a problem if the variable is used as
> >> array index and also it's address is passed to a helper.
> >
> > I bet this alignment "workaround" is fragile.
> > A different version of clang or gcc-bpf will change layout.
>
> I agree, it's fragile.
>
> After I fought compiler/verifier for a while I gave up and wrote a
> test in asm:
>
>      SEC("socket")
>      __description("map_ptr is never null")
>      __success
>      __naked void map_ptr_is_never_null(void)
>      {
>         asm volatile ("                                 \
>         r1 = 0;                                         \
>         *(u32*)(r10 - 4) = r1;                          \
>         r2 = r10;                                       \
>         r2 += -4;                                       \
>         r1 = %[map_in_map] ll;                          \
>         call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];                    \
>         if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=;                          \
>         exit;                                           \
>      l0_%=:     *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r0;                         \
>         r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16);                         \
>         if r1 == 0 goto l1_%=;                          \
>         exit;                                           \
>      l1_%=:     r10 = 42;                                       \
>         exit;                                           \
>      "  :
>         : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
>           __imm_addr(map_in_map)
>         : __clobber_all);
>      }
>
> What must happen to reproduce the situation is: map_ptr gets on a
> stack, and then loaded and compared to 0.
>
> It looks like I accidentally forced map_ptr on the stack by using
> `key` both for map lookup and array access, which triggers those
> alignment problems. Without that I wasn't able to figure out simple C
> code that would produce bpf with map_ptr on the stack (besides the
> other test, with rbs).
>
> I guess I should've written an asm test right away.

Yeah. For this kind of sequence asm is the right answer.
It's not clear to me why you want to spill/fill it.
CONST_PTR_TO_MAP is already in is_spillable_regtype()
before this patch.
The test needs to validate that reg_not_null() is working.
So just:

        r1 = %[map_in_map] ll;
        call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];
        if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=;
        exit;
l0_%=: r10 = 42;
       exit;

would do the job without spill/fill.

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 3/3] selftests/bpf: add test cases with CONST_PTR_TO_MAP null checks

[Alexei Starovoitov]

On Fri, Jun 6, 2025 at 4:52 PM Alexei Starovoitov
<alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jun 6, 2025 at 4:38 PM Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev> wrote:
> >
> > On 6/5/25 5:25 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jun 5, 2025 at 4:40 PM Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> On 6/5/25 10:00 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > >>> On Thu, Jun 5, 2025 at 9:42 AM Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev> wrote:
> > >>>>
> > >>>> On 6/5/25 9:24 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> > >>>>> On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> wrote:
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> [...]
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> +SEC("socket")
> > >>>>>> +int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx)
> > >>>>>> +{
> > >>>>>> +       struct bpf_map *maps[2] = { 0 };
> > >>>>>> +       struct bpf_map *map = NULL;
> > >>>>>> +       int __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = 0;
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> aligned(8) makes any difference?
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Yes. If not aligned (explicitly or by accident), verification fails
> > >>>> with "math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is
> > >>>> not allowed" at maps[key]. See the log below.
> > >>>
> > >>> It's not clear to me why "aligned" changes code gen,
> > >>> but let's not rely on it.
> > >>> Try 'unsigned int key' instead.
> > >>> Also note that &key part pessimizes the code.
> > >>> Do for (...; i < 2; i++) {u32 key = i; &key }
> > >>> instead.
> > >>
> > >> I've tried changing the test like this:
> > >>
> > >> @@ -144,12 +144,12 @@ int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx)
> > >>    {
> > >>           struct bpf_map *maps[2] = { 0 };
> > >>           struct bpf_map *map = NULL;
> > >> -       int __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = 0;
> > >>
> > >> -       for (key = 0; key < 2; key++) {
> > >> +       for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
> > >> +               __u32 key = i;
> > >>                   map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key);
> > >>                   if (map)
> > >> -                       maps[key] = map;
> > >> +                       maps[i] = map;
> > >>                   else
> > >>                           return 0;
> > >>           }
> > >>
> > >> This version passes verification independent of the first patch being
> > >> applied, which kinda defeats the purpose of the test. Verifier log
> > >> below:
> > >>
> > >>       0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
> > >>       ; int map_ptr_is_never_null(void *ctx) @ verifier_map_in_map.c:143
> > >>       0: (b4) w1 = 0                        ; R1_w=0
> > >>       ; __u32 key = i; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:149
> > >>       1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1
> > >>       mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 1 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1
> > >>       mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 0: (b4) w1 = 0
> > >>       2: R1_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-8=0000????
> > >>       2: (bf) r2 = r10                      ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
> > >>       3: (07) r2 += -4                      ; R2_w=fp-4
> > >>       ; map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key); @
> > >> verifier_map_in_map.c:150
> > >>       4: (18) r1 = 0xff302cd6802e0a00       ;
> > >> R1_w=map_ptr(map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
> > >>       6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1    ;
> > >> R0_w=map_value_or_null(id=1,map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
> > >>       ; if (map) @ verifier_map_in_map.c:151
> > >>       7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7        ; R0_w=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=4)
> > >>       8: (b4) w1 = 1                        ; R1_w=1
> > >>       ; __u32 key = i; @ verifier_map_in_map.c:149
> > >>       9: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1         ; R1_w=1 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmm????
> > >>       10: (bf) r2 = r10                     ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
> > >>       11: (07) r2 += -4                     ; R2_w=fp-4
> > >>       ; map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key); @
> > >> verifier_map_in_map.c:150
> > >>       12: (18) r1 = 0xff302cd6802e0a00      ;
> > >> R1_w=map_ptr(map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
> > >>       14: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1   ;
> > >> R0=map_value_or_null(id=2,map=map_in_map,ks=4,vs=4)
> > >>       ; } @ verifier_map_in_map.c:164
> > >>       15: (b4) w0 = 0                       ; R0_w=0
> > >>       16: (95) exit
> > >
> > > because the compiler removed 'if (!maps[0])' check?
> > > Make maps volatile then.
> >
> > Making maps and/or map volatile didn't help.
> >
> > >
> > > It's not clear to me what the point of the 'for' loop is.
> > > Just one bpf_map_lookup_elem() from map_in_map should do ?
> >
> > No. Using an array and loop was my attempt to put map_ptr on the
> > stack. But apparently this was not the reason it happened in the v1 of
> > the test.
> >
> > >
> > >>
> > >> If map[i] is changed back to map[key] like this:
> > >>
> > >>          for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
> > >>                  __u32 key = i;
> > >>                  map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map_in_map, &key);
> > >>                  if (map)
> > >>                          maps[key] = map; /* change here */
> > >>                  else
> > >>                          return 0;
> > >>          }
> > >>
> > >> Verification fails with "invalid unbounded variable-offset write to
> > >> stack R2"
> > >
> > > as it should, because both the compiler and the verifier
> > > see that 'key' is unbounded in maps[key] access.
> > >
> > >>       __u32 __attribute__((aligned(8))) key = i;
> > >>
> > >> but that puts us back to square one.
> > >>
> > >> It appears that alignment becomes a problem if the variable is used as
> > >> array index and also it's address is passed to a helper.
> > >
> > > I bet this alignment "workaround" is fragile.
> > > A different version of clang or gcc-bpf will change layout.
> >
> > I agree, it's fragile.
> >
> > After I fought compiler/verifier for a while I gave up and wrote a
> > test in asm:
> >
> >      SEC("socket")
> >      __description("map_ptr is never null")
> >      __success
> >      __naked void map_ptr_is_never_null(void)
> >      {
> >         asm volatile ("                                 \
> >         r1 = 0;                                         \
> >         *(u32*)(r10 - 4) = r1;                          \
> >         r2 = r10;                                       \
> >         r2 += -4;                                       \
> >         r1 = %[map_in_map] ll;                          \
> >         call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];                    \
> >         if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=;                          \
> >         exit;                                           \
> >      l0_%=:     *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r0;                         \
> >         r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16);                         \
> >         if r1 == 0 goto l1_%=;                          \
> >         exit;                                           \
> >      l1_%=:     r10 = 42;                                       \
> >         exit;                                           \
> >      "  :
> >         : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
> >           __imm_addr(map_in_map)
> >         : __clobber_all);
> >      }
> >
> > What must happen to reproduce the situation is: map_ptr gets on a
> > stack, and then loaded and compared to 0.
> >
> > It looks like I accidentally forced map_ptr on the stack by using
> > `key` both for map lookup and array access, which triggers those
> > alignment problems. Without that I wasn't able to figure out simple C
> > code that would produce bpf with map_ptr on the stack (besides the
> > other test, with rbs).
> >
> > I guess I should've written an asm test right away.
>
> Yeah. For this kind of sequence asm is the right answer.
> It's not clear to me why you want to spill/fill it.
> CONST_PTR_TO_MAP is already in is_spillable_regtype()
> before this patch.
> The test needs to validate that reg_not_null() is working.
> So just:
>
>         r1 = %[map_in_map] ll;
>         call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];
>         if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=;
>         exit;
> l0_%=: r10 = 42;
>        exit;
>
> would do the job without spill/fill.

braino. I meant two if r0 checks back to back.
Like:
         r1 = %[map_in_map] ll;
         call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];
         if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=;
         if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=;
         r10 = 42;
l0_%=:   exit;

kinda obvious looking at asm that the verifier should be
smart to understand that the 2nd if is always taken.
But the smartness is only added in patch 1.

Another test is probably worth it too:
         r1 = %[map_in_map] ll;
         if r1 != 0 goto l0_%=;
         r10 = 42;
l0_%=:   exit;

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 1/3] bpf: make reg_not_null() true for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP

[Andrii Nakryiko]

On Wed, Jun 4, 2025 at 3:28 PM Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> wrote:
>
> When reg->type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, it can not be null. However the
> verifier explores the branches under rX == 0 in check_cond_jmp_op()
> even if reg->type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, because it was not checked for
> in reg_not_null().
>
> Fix this by adding CONST_PTR_TO_MAP to the set of types that are
> considered non nullable in reg_not_null().
>
> An old "unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero" selftest fails with this
> change, because now early out correctly triggers in
> check_cond_jmp_op(), making the verification to pass.
>
> In practice verifier may allow pointer to null comparison in unpriv,
> since in many cases the relevant branch and comparison op are removed
> as dead code. So change the expected test result to __success_unpriv.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
> ---
>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c                               | 3 ++-
>  tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c | 2 +-
>  2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>

LGTM, thanks!

Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>

> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index a7d6e0c5928b..0c100e430744 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -405,7 +405,8 @@ static bool reg_not_null(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
>                 type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
>                 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON ||
>                 (type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && is_trusted_reg(reg)) ||
> -               type == PTR_TO_MEM;
> +               type == PTR_TO_MEM ||
> +               type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
>  }
>
>  static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
> index a4a5e2071604..28200f068ce5 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
> @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ __naked void pass_pointer_to_tail_call(void)
>
>  SEC("socket")
>  __description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero")
> -__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison")
> +__success __success_unpriv
>  __retval(0)
>  __naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_zero(void)
>  {
> --
> 2.47.1
>