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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Lorenzo Bianconi" <lorenzo.bianconi@oss.qualcomm.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v10 2/4] net: xdp: add xdp_buff_shrink_tail() helper
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2026 16:36:48 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-213209@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261112-stmmac-rx-mb-v10-2-d3d04b65c6bc@oss.qualcomm.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential
issue to consider:
- [High] net: xdp: bounds check split in bpf_xdp_adjust_tail() allows
  pointer wrap
--

commit fe8a696967ad3281fe5305e0444a8948ebb0b12e
Author: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@oss.qualcomm.com>

net: xdp: add xdp_buff_shrink_tail() helper

This commit moves the XDP tail-shrinking helpers from net/core/filter.c to
net/core/xdp.c and exports xdp_buff_shrink_tail() for driver use.

> diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
> index 9b8d5191c4ba2..5ea45dfce7a22 100644
> --- a/net/core/filter.c
> +++ b/net/core/filter.c
> @@ -4438,96 +4438,21 @@ static int bpf_xdp_frags_increase_tail(struct xdp_buff *xdp, int offset)

[ ... ]

>  BPF_CALL_2(bpf_xdp_adjust_tail, struct xdp_buff *, xdp, int, offset)
>  {
>  	void *data_hard_end = xdp_data_hard_end(xdp); /* use xdp->frame_sz */
>  	void *data_end = xdp->data_end + offset;
>  
> -	if (unlikely(xdp_buff_has_frags(xdp))) { /* non-linear xdp buff */
> -		if (offset < 0)
> -			return bpf_xdp_frags_shrink_tail(xdp, -offset);
> +	if (offset < 0)
> +		return xdp_buff_shrink_tail(xdp, -offset);
>  
> +	if (unlikely(xdp_buff_has_frags(xdp))) /* non-linear xdp buff */
>  		return bpf_xdp_frags_increase_tail(xdp, offset);
> -	}
>  
>  	/* Notice that xdp_data_hard_end have reserved some tailroom */
>  	if (unlikely(data_end > data_hard_end))
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
> -	if (unlikely(data_end < xdp->data + ETH_HLEN))
> -		return -EINVAL;
> -
>  	/* Clear memory area on grow, can contain uninit kernel memory */
>  	if (offset > 0)
>  		memset(xdp->data_end, 0, offset);

[ ... ]

> diff --git a/net/core/xdp.c b/net/core/xdp.c
> index 470bf90d93ef2..7c98dbc2a770c 100644
> --- a/net/core/xdp.c
> +++ b/net/core/xdp.c
> @@ -672,6 +672,97 @@ struct sk_buff *__xdp_build_skb_from_buff(const struct xdp_buff *xdp)

[ ... ]

> +int xdp_buff_shrink_tail(struct xdp_buff *xdp, int offset)
> +{
> +	void *data_end = xdp->data_end - offset;
> +
> +	if (unlikely(offset < 0))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (unlikely(xdp_buff_has_frags(xdp))) /* non-linear xdp buff */
> +		return xdp_frags_shrink_tail(xdp, offset);
> +
> +	if (unlikely(data_end < xdp->data + ETH_HLEN))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	xdp->data_end = data_end;
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}

[Severity: High]
Can splitting the upper and lower bounds checks between bpf_xdp_adjust_tail()
and xdp_buff_shrink_tail() allow pointer wraparound on linear buffers?

Previously, bpf_xdp_adjust_tail() checked both data_end > data_hard_end and
data_end < xdp->data + ETH_HLEN on xdp->data_end + offset, which prevented
pointer arithmetic overflow or underflow from passing validation.

With the checks split:

1. In bpf_xdp_adjust_tail(), offset >= 0 now only checks
   data_end > data_hard_end. On 32-bit architectures, a large positive offset
   (e.g. 0x40000000) wraps xdp->data_end + offset past 0 to an address below
   data_hard_end, bypassing the check and passing offset to
   memset(xdp->data_end, 0, offset) for an out-of-bounds kernel memory write.
   It also allows frames initially shorter than ETH_HLEN (such as L3 packets
   on tun devices in generic XDP) to remain shorter than ETH_HLEN when
   offset >= 0.

2. In xdp_buff_shrink_tail(), linear buffers only check
   data_end < xdp->data + ETH_HLEN on xdp->data_end - offset. When
   (uintptr_t)xdp->data_end < 0x80000000 (for example on s390x where
   PAGE_OFFSET is 0, or 32-bit kernels with VMSPLIT_1G / VMSPLIT_2G_OPT), a
   positive offset larger than xdp->data_end underflows data_end to a high
   address above xdp->data + ETH_HLEN, setting xdp->data_end past
   data_hard_end and exposing out-of-bounds memory to BPF packet accesses.

Checking offset against the integer buffer bounds (such as
offset > (int)(xdp->data_end - xdp->data) - ETH_HLEN in
xdp_buff_shrink_tail(), and keeping the ETH_HLEN and tailroom checks in
bpf_xdp_adjust_tail() overflow-safe) would avoid both wraparounds.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261112-stmmac-rx-mb-v10-0-d3d04b65c6bc@oss.qualcomm.com?part=2

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-13 16:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-12 16:34 [PATCH net-next v10 0/4] net: stmmac: introduce XDP rx multi-buff support Lorenzo Bianconi
2026-11-12 16:34 ` [PATCH net-next v10 1/4] net: xdp: add __xdp_build_skb_from_buff() helper Lorenzo Bianconi
2026-11-12 16:34 ` [PATCH net-next v10 2/4] net: xdp: add xdp_buff_shrink_tail() helper Lorenzo Bianconi
2026-11-13 16:36   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-12 16:34 ` [PATCH net-next v10 3/4] net: xdp: add __xdp_return_buff() helper Lorenzo Bianconi
2026-11-12 16:34 ` [PATCH net-next v10 4/4] net: stmmac: rework stmmac_rx to support XDP rx multi-buff Lorenzo Bianconi

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