From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794929429; b=IKOFwLoD5HFoqr+sOC4WoBH+XpMaEOQqTGRHthFzjK69P3lHZviB+g5muK45nf4G1JXc i8e+2z/nxyG8bR+zYSh/ttuck9RqeM2+7cgTOQgPjngSeuKxDnbT0/ZI7qS+4EY3Wv0Bu WIl8v8NsYq3zrmINRXzc0XTya7MsGAJ+HwEktPQq3G6/uenVH6xHtGxMybg3vYRe89f10 RRSVVrRjlZyS5IxBBuzo5LHh7Hy/kRFZxtHTCVJcw/89q9LaCjrIY3nDRL923tXd2QWbB T/HtChUy/Zl90viz86f30FFjHppFw48HriPpvRYvQT8UfoyF5waX4soMvsRMvZ2hkpQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794929429; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Message-ID:From:Subject:Reply-To:To:Cc: In-Reply-To:References:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Date; bh=eUiV82wATUSPCwlSD1XXk58SR4YDh94KILPEirK1hsA=; b=eWSeKt0YEX9eK4apJh+l1OhsSb2EKtK0TBESHsGiAqiVhVm1R9/3+TA9hJ7hkXF5kzLh D3Hyc4aYHDOOxxSLbh3t04YdtRWBkFlC6lyugmu+WKsWEAyZ2rHXNv8rXx6pRVfaBVyHQ B2HXqNe+QLZ5Z20zYpR5O7ZreGEW3rtheMh5sMcmAJDGN+o9RKm5QdrFmyun3KtLzmGEG g0nZjIt/IQbGwRiVh5qXkCiXBkr6sol3uwQGFyYz+U3n/e9mwL5JGOB/KKt3LYUkRsIrU Ryadz3EmMsg1ICJ2dWgDAFp9o1nQ0EKsmXN6lGPByKR3gEfgysVcY3YZsZTuoHnoC2Q== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=nSpkObxc; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2CCB3606A332; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 15:30:29 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=nSpkObxc Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 90BA51F000C5; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 15:30:28 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1794929429; bh=eUiV82wATUSPCwlSD1XXk58SR4YDh94KILPEirK1hsA=; h=From:Subject:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=nSpkObxcWQrpakWFJdfq1J245xxBtUofjbRiKt5zGDGQPNFKxsYdsHTTv9JmoFv3v PYLYYxNv8MHKHzjkFAi4aTBWDqI6TBQuz/2FUSu0s8MX7XHkzRcDi2JCGO4p57IxlM TequOgPHspmxigOocZ5MVdOeAs5aWeYUA3fdblBVMEj6au3IpFke5ZuluOckCLholH +XNz0pANMqNzs2KzkEvsEq7w2EHFokRhFenu6QO4BLYhrkn71kaqf+AtXTC/C4fdJZ eygtPWc+R7J1GA10XVHx9XaGz1Bu7CYGdrZDxfegKiLYyYq6ms97AGfo3uNMdTS+OO riB50vlvyiOvw== Message-ID: From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH -next -v4 09/17] LSM: rename inode_getattr to path_getattr and pass struct file Reply-To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev To: "Cai Xinchen" Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, dsterba@suse.cz, "Chuck Lever" , "Jeff Layton" , "Anna Schumaker" In-Reply-To: <20261117150542.1169451-10-caixinchen1@huawei.com> References: <20261117150542.1169451-1-caixinchen1@huawei.com> <20261117150542.1169451-10-caixinchen1@huawei.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 15:30:28 +0000 X-Mailing-List: bpf@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue to consider: - [Medium] bpf: missing vfs_getattr_file() in btf_allowlist_d_path breaks stat tracing -- commit 0fd5e45352f3174f9865b405ef695f6fda94ab43 Author: Cai Xinchen LSM: rename inode_getattr to path_getattr and pass struct file This commit renames the inode_getattr LSM hook and security_inode_getattr() to path_getattr and security_path_getattr(), adds a struct file parameter, and introduces vfs_getattr_file() for callers that hold an open file. > diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c > index 3107400454982..7006e1830269d 100644 > --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c > +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c > @@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_d_path, const struct path *, path, cha= r *, buf, u32, sz) > BTF_SET_START(btf_allowlist_d_path) > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY > BTF_ID(func, security_file_permission) > -BTF_ID(func, security_inode_getattr) > +BTF_ID(func, security_path_getattr) > BTF_ID(func, security_file_open) > #endif > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH [Severity: Medium] Should vfs_getattr_file also be added to btf_allowlist_d_path alongside vfs_getattr? vfs_fstat() and vfs_statx_path() now call vfs_getattr_file() directly instead of vfs_getattr(), so fentry/vfs_getattr and fexit/vfs_getattr programs no longer fire on stat-family syscalls. Without BTF_ID(func, vfs_getattr_file) in btf_allowlist_d_path, bpf_d_path_allowed() rejects tracing programs that attach to vfs_getattr_file() and call bpf_d_path(), and on kernels with CONFIG_SECURITY disabled no allowlisted function remains on those syscall paths. --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117150542.1169= 451-1-caixinchen1@huawei.com?part=3D9