BPF List
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Aleksa Sarai" <aleksa@amutable.com>,
	"Alexander Mikhalitsyn" <alex@amutable.com>,
	"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Giuseppe Scrivano" <giuseppe@scrivano.org>,
	"Hugh Dickins" <hughd@google.com>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
	"Jeff Layton" <jlayton@kernel.org>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Josef Bacik" <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>, "KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	"Lennart Poettering" <lennart@poettering.net>,
	"Neal Gompa" <neal@gompa.dev>, "Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <sergeh@kernel.org>,
	"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Zygmunt Krynicki" <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v6 17/26] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_USERLAND in clone3()
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 01:43:45 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-227629@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261122011809.2667684-18-jarkko@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential
issues to consider:
- [High] userland: missing namespace owner permission check in
  userland_prepare_fork()
- [Medium] userland: missing namespace_install LSM check in
  userland_prepare_fork()
--

commit 705db8da85300ec68db1d2ce6e9711aa2f376bb1
Author: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

fork: Support CLONE_INTO_USERLAND in clone3()

This commit adds CLONE_INTO_USERLAND and struct clone_args.userland to
allow clone3() to spawn a child process directly into an initialized
userland's namespaces and root mount.

> diff --git a/kernel/userland.c b/kernel/userland.c
> index 739f6b98c1035..283b90869d2c6 100644
> --- a/kernel/userland.c
> +++ b/kernel/userland.c
> @@ -541,3 +542,135 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userland_open, unsigned int, flags)
>  
>  	return fd;
>  }
> +

[ ... ]

> +int userland_prepare_fork(struct kernel_clone_args *args)
> +{
> +	struct file *file __free(fput) = fget(args->userland_fd);
> +	struct path root __free(path_put) = {};
> +	struct pid_namespace *pid_ns;
> +	bool bootstrapping = false;
> +	struct userland *userland;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (!file)
> +		return -EBADF;
> +	if (!userland_is_file(file))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	userland = file->private_data;
> +	if (!ns_capable(userland->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
> +	    !ns_capable(userland->user_ns, CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
> +		return -EPERM;

[Severity: Medium]
Should userland_prepare_fork() also invoke security_namespace_install() or
a matching LSM check for the target namespaces in userland->user_ns and
userland->ns?

Landlock enforces LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE via its
namespace_install hook when entering pre-opened namespaces with setns(),
and commit "security: Add userland LSM hooks" later in this series does
not wire Landlock up to security_userland_clone().  Without an LSM check
on those namespaces, a Landlock-sandboxed task holding a pre-opened
userland fd can use clone3(CLONE_INTO_USERLAND) to enter namespaces that
its Landlock domain denies.

> +	if (current_chrooted() && !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
> +		return -EPERM;
> +
> +	pid_ns = userland->ns->pid_ns_for_children;
> +	if (!pidns_is_ancestor(pid_ns, task_active_pid_ns(current)))
> +		return -EXDEV;

[Severity: High]
Does userland_prepare_fork() need to verify that current either already
belongs to each namespace in userland->ns or holds CAP_SYS_ADMIN in that
namespace's owning user namespace?

In userland_share_nsfd(), a cgroup, IPC, UTS, network, or time namespace
owned by a more privileged user namespace (such as init_user_ns) can be
attached to userland->ns without CAP_SYS_ADMIN in ns->ops->owner(ns) as
long as the caller is currently in that namespace:

kernel/userland.c:userland_share_nsfd() {
    ...
	if (!ns_capable(c->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
		return -EPERM;
	if (!is_current_namespace(ns) &&
	    !ns_capable(ns->ops->owner(ns), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
		return -EPERM;
    ...
}

Because userland_prepare_fork() only checks capabilities against
userland->user_ns and current_user_ns() before copy_namespaces() installs
userland->ns on the child, a process that shares a parent or host
namespace into a userland and later isolates itself with unshare() (for
example, unshare(CLONE_NEWNET)) can call clone3(CLONE_INTO_USERLAND) to
spawn a child back into the unisolated namespace without holding
CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its owning user namespace.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261122011809.2667684-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=17

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-22  1:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-22  1:17 [RFC PATCH v6 00/26] userland: Userland containers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 01/26] userns: Factor out idmap validation and commit helpers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:57   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 02/26] userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 03/26] arch: Wire up " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 04/26] mount: Add mnt_ns_get_root() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 05/26] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 06/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 07/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 08/26] userns: Factor out install_user_ns_cred() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 09/26] nsproxy: Expose create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 10/26] userland: Add core infrastructure Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 11/26] userland: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 12/26] userland: Add userland_open() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 13/26] userland: Add USERLAND_GET_NSFD ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 14/26] userland: Add USERLAND_SHARE_NSFD ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 15/26] exit: Support P_USERLAND in waitid() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 16/26] signal: Support userland fds in pidfd_send_signal() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 17/26] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_USERLAND in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:43   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 18/26] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_USERLAND in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:45   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 19/26] proc: Implement ->set_userland() fs_context operation Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 20/26] ipc/mqueue: " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 21/26] security: Add userland LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 22/26] bpf: Register " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 23/26] arch: Wire up userland_open() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 24/26] docs: Document userland uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:56   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 25/26] selftests/userland: Add userland test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:39   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 26/26] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for USERLAND Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:58 ` [RFC PATCH v6 00/26] userland: Userland containers Jarkko Sakkinen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=sashiko-outbox-227629@kernel.org \
    --to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
    --cc=aleksa@amutable.com \
    --cc=alex@amutable.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=giuseppe@scrivano.org \
    --cc=hughd@google.com \
    --cc=jack@suse.cz \
    --cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
    --cc=jlayton@kernel.org \
    --cc=josef@toxicpanda.com \
    --cc=kees@kernel.org \
    --cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
    --cc=lennart@poettering.net \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=neal@gompa.dev \
    --cc=oleg@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com \
    --cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=sergeh@kernel.org \
    --cc=skhan@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    --cc=zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox