From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Aleksa Sarai" <aleksa@amutable.com>,
"Alexander Mikhalitsyn" <alex@amutable.com>,
"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
"Giuseppe Scrivano" <giuseppe@scrivano.org>,
"Hugh Dickins" <hughd@google.com>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
"Jeff Layton" <jlayton@kernel.org>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Josef Bacik" <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>, "KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
"Lennart Poettering" <lennart@poettering.net>,
"Neal Gompa" <neal@gompa.dev>, "Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
"Serge Hallyn" <sergeh@kernel.org>,
"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Zygmunt Krynicki" <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v7 17/26] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_USERLAND in clone3()
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 20:01:29 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-228304@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261122193539.3334213-18-jarkko@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential
issues to consider:
- [High] userland: missing namespace owner permission check in
userland_prepare_fork()
- [Medium] fork: missing ancestor PID namespace liveness check in
copy_process()
- [Medium] userland: missing Landlock namespace-use check in
userland_prepare_fork()
--
commit ae368fbd705dc27859acdfc3d94bc11f009bc3b0
Author: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
fork: Support CLONE_INTO_USERLAND in clone3()
This patch adds CLONE_INTO_USERLAND and struct clone_args.userland to
allow clone3() to spawn a child process directly into an initialized
userland's namespaces and root mount.
[ ... ]
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index d87ab7cbad5e9..d8fc18a9af220 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -2510,6 +2526,11 @@ __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
> goto bad_fork_core_free;
> }
>
> + if (unlikely(args->userland_bootstrapping && !is_child_reaper(pid))) {
> + retval = -EBUSY;
> + goto bad_fork_core_free;
> + }
> +
> /* Let kill terminate clone/fork in the middle */
> if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
> retval = -EINTR;
[Severity: Medium]
Can copy_process() attach a child into a dying ancestor PID namespace when
cloning into a nested userland?
Immediately above this check, copy_process() only tests PIDNS_ADDING on
the leaf ns_of_pid(pid). When current is in an outer PID namespace A and
spawns into a nested userland C whose parent PID namespace is B, B can
enter zap_pid_ns_processes() after alloc_pid() succeeds:
CPU0 (in pid_ns A) CPU1 (init of pid_ns B)
copy_process()
alloc_pid(C)
zap_pid_ns_processes(B)
disable_pid_allocation(B)
read_lock(&tasklist_lock)
/* sends SIGKILL to tasks in B */
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock)
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock)
!(C->pid_allocated & PIDNS_ADDING)
-> false (C still has PIDNS_ADDING)
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID) <-- attached into dying B after SIGKILL
Because current is in A, fatal_signal_pending(current) does not trigger,
and if C is bootstrapping it has no tasks in B->idr to trigger C's
teardown. The new child (with SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE if PID 1 in C) then runs
inside dying namespace B, blocking B's child_reaper in
zap_pid_ns_processes() until the child exits.
[ ... ]
> diff --git a/kernel/userland.c b/kernel/userland.c
> index f449e2ff91522..2375442733b66 100644
> --- a/kernel/userland.c
> +++ b/kernel/userland.c
[ ... ]
> +int userland_prepare_fork(struct kernel_clone_args *args)
> +{
> + struct file *file __free(fput) = fget(args->userland_fd);
> + struct path root __free(path_put) = {};
> + struct pid_namespace *pid_ns;
> + bool bootstrapping = false;
> + struct userland *userland;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!file)
> + return -EBADF;
> + if (!userland_is_file(file))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + userland = file->private_data;
> + if (!ns_capable(userland->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
> + !ns_capable(userland->user_ns, CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
> + return -EPERM;
> + if (current_chrooted() && !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
> + return -EPERM;
[Severity: High]
Does userland_prepare_fork() allow a process to join shared namespaces in
userland->ns without being a member of those namespaces or holding
CAP_SYS_ADMIN in their owning user namespaces?
userland_share_nsfd() allows binding a cgroup, IPC, UTS, network, or time
namespace owned by a more privileged user namespace (such as init_user_ns)
into userland->ns without CAP_SYS_ADMIN in ns->ops->owner(ns) whenever
is_current_namespace(ns) is true at ioctl time:
kernel/userland.c:userland_share_nsfd() {
...
if (!ns_capable(c->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (!is_current_namespace(ns) &&
!ns_capable(ns->ops->owner(ns), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
...
}
If the caller (or another process holding the userland fd) later enters a
separate network, IPC, UTS, cgroup, or time namespace,
clone3(CLONE_INTO_USERLAND) only checks capabilities in userland->user_ns
and installs userland->ns directly in copy_namespaces(), letting the
caller escape its namespace isolation into the previously bound namespace.
[Severity: Medium]
Does spawning into a userland also bypass Landlock's
LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE check?
Landlock mediates entering existing namespaces through the
namespace_install LSM hook (called from validate_ns() during setns()), and
does not implement a userland_clone hook in commit "security: Add userland
LSM hooks". Because userland_prepare_fork(), copy_creds(), and
copy_namespaces() install userland->user_ns and userland->ns without
calling security_namespace_install(), a Landlock-sandboxed task holding a
pre-opened userland fd can enter its namespaces even when
LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE denies them.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261122193539.3334213-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=17
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-22 20:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-22 19:35 [RFC PATCH v7 00/26] userland: Userland containers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 01/26] userns: Factor out idmap validation and commit helpers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 02/26] userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 03/26] arch: Wire up " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 04/26] mount: Add mnt_ns_get_root() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 05/26] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 06/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:02 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 07/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 08/26] userns: Factor out install_user_ns_cred() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 09/26] nsproxy: Expose create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 10/26] userland: Add core infrastructure Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 11/26] userland: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:09 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 12/26] userland: Add userland_open() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 13/26] userland: Add USERLAND_GET_NSFD ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 14/26] userland: Add USERLAND_SHARE_NSFD ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 15/26] exit: Support P_USERLAND in waitid() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 16/26] signal: Support userland fds in pidfd_send_signal() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 17/26] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_USERLAND in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:01 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 18/26] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_USERLAND in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:58 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 19/26] proc: Implement ->set_userland() fs_context operation Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 20/26] ipc/mqueue: " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 21/26] security: Add userland LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 22/26] bpf: Register " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 23/26] arch: Wire up userland_open() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 24/26] docs: Document userland uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:09 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 25/26] selftests/userland: Add userland test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:52 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 26/26] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for USERLAND Jarkko Sakkinen
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