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From: Karoly Kasza <kaszak@gmail.com>
To: buildroot@busybox.net
Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH 2/2] openvmtools: add patch to defend from lsb path walking attack
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2015 23:14:36 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1424902476-24448-2-git-send-email-kaszak@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1424902476-24448-1-git-send-email-kaszak@gmail.com>

Add patch to defend lsb from path walking attack.
Originally from Debian.

Signed-off-by: Karoly Kasza <kaszak@gmail.com>
---
 package/openvmtools/0009-lsb.patch |  106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 106 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 package/openvmtools/0009-lsb.patch

diff --git a/package/openvmtools/0009-lsb.patch b/package/openvmtools/0009-lsb.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..54c3232
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/openvmtools/0009-lsb.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+Upsteam Debian patch to defend openvmtools against path walking.
+
+Original description:
+
+From 3a9f2297a82b9c109e894b5f8ea17753e68830ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "VMware, Inc" <>
+Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 20:39:34 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Harden HostinfoOSData against $PATH attacks.
+
+We are doing a popen("lsb_release... ") when attempting to
+determine host details in hostinfoPosix.c. Using popen means that
+$PATH is walked when looking for the lsb_release binary, and that
+may give an attacker the ability to run a malicious version of
+lsb_release.
+
+This change does two things,
+
+a) Hard code the path to lsb_release. I've searched around
+   the web and I believe the path is always "/usr/bin/lsb_release"
+   so let's not leave this up to chance.
+
+b) Stop running HostinfoGetCmdOutput with elevated privileges. Drop
+   to non-root when possible. If someone sneaks in a new call to
+   HostinfoGetCmdOutput and doesn't use a full path, then we will
+   hopefully avoid a firedrill. I'm only applying this to Linux
+   because the Fusion build barfed when I tried to compile with
+   without the vmx86_linux.
+
+I think either (a) or (b) would be enough but I'm doing both,
+because each individually is correct. Also note that in the blog
+post by Tavis Ormandy calls out doing (a) as not enough,
+   http://blog.cmpxchg8b.com/2013/08/security-debianisms.html
+His example uses a bash feature that allows functions to be
+exported. I haven't been able to get that to work on my Ubuntu
+machine.
+
+To test I'm manually run Linux WS and Fusion and verified that
+the logs look correct.
+
+Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
+
+Signed-off-by: Karoly Kasza <kaszak@gmail.com>
+
+---
+ open-vm-tools/lib/misc/hostinfoPosix.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/misc/hostinfoPosix.c
++++ b/lib/misc/hostinfoPosix.c
+@@ -800,17 +800,27 @@ out:
+ static char *
+ HostinfoGetCmdOutput(const char *cmd)  // IN:
+ {
++   Bool isSuperUser = FALSE;
+    DynBuf db;
+    FILE *stream;
+    char *out = NULL;
+ 
++   /*
++    * Attempt to lower privs, because we use popen and an attacker
++    * may control $PATH.
++    */
++   if (vmx86_linux && Id_IsSuperUser()) {
++      Id_EndSuperUser(getuid());
++      isSuperUser = TRUE;
++   }
++
+    DynBuf_Init(&db);
+ 
+    stream = Posix_Popen(cmd, "r");
+    if (stream == NULL) {
+       Warning("Unable to get output of command \"%s\"\n", cmd);
+ 
+-      return NULL;
++      goto exit;
+    }
+ 
+    for (;;) {
+@@ -844,11 +854,16 @@ HostinfoGetCmdOutput(const char *cmd)  /
+    if (DynBuf_Get(&db)) {
+       out = (char *) DynBuf_AllocGet(&db);
+    }
+- closeIt:
+-   DynBuf_Destroy(&db);
+ 
++ closeIt:
+    pclose(stream);
+ 
++ exit:
++   DynBuf_Destroy(&db);
++
++   if (isSuperUser) {
++      Id_BeginSuperUser();
++   }
+    return out;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -967,7 +982,7 @@ HostinfoOSData(void)
+        * Try to get OS detailed information from the lsb_release command.
+        */
+ 
+-      lsbOutput = HostinfoGetCmdOutput("lsb_release -sd 2>/dev/null");
++      lsbOutput = HostinfoGetCmdOutput("/usr/bin/lsb_release -sd 2>/dev/null");
+       if (!lsbOutput) {
+          int i;
+ 
-- 
1.7.10.4

  reply	other threads:[~2015-02-25 22:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-02-25 22:14 [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/2] openvmtools: add patch to use KVERS instead of shell exec Karoly Kasza
2015-02-25 22:14 ` Karoly Kasza [this message]
2015-03-08 21:24   ` [Buildroot] [PATCH 2/2] openvmtools: add patch to defend from lsb path walking attack Romain Naour
2015-03-08 21:39 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/2] openvmtools: add patch to use KVERS instead of shell exec Romain Naour

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