From: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
To: buildroot@busybox.net
Subject: [Buildroot] [git commit branch/2017.02.x] xen: security bump to version 4.7.2
Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2017 17:50:51 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170425155154.AE2DC802AE@busybox.osuosl.org> (raw)
commit: https://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/?id=392b4a6670dfd103887de7f7565ce8e2ffb23d08
branch: https://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/?id=refs/heads/2017.02.x
The 4.7.2 release brings a number of bugfixes and improvements:
https://www.xenproject.org/downloads/xen-archives/xen-project-47-series/xen-472.html
Including fixes for the following security issues:
XSA-191: x86 null segments not always treated as unusable (CVE-2016-9386)
XSA-192: x86 task switch to VM86 mode mis-handled (CVE-2016-9382)
XSA-193: x86 segment base write emulation lacking canonical address checks
(CVE-2016-9385)
XSA-194: guest 32-bit ELF symbol table load leaking host data (CVE-2016-9384)
XSA-195: x86 64-bit bit test instruction emulation broken (CVE-2016-9383)
XSA-196: x86 software interrupt injection mis-handled
(CVE-2016-9377 CVE-2016-9378)
XSA-197: qemu incautious about shared ring processing (CVE-2016-9381)
XSA-198: delimiter injection vulnerabilities in pygrub
(CVE-2016-9379 CVE-2016-9380)
XSA-199: qemu ioport array overflow (CVE-2016-9637)
XSA-200: x86 CMPXCHG8B emulation fails to ignore operand size override
Files (CVE-2016-9932)
XSA-201: ARM guests may induce host asynchronous abort
(CVE-2016-9815 CVE-2016-9816 CVE-2016-9817 CVE-2016-9818)
XSA-202: x86 PV guests may be able to mask interrupts (CVE-2016-10024)
XSA-203: x86: missing NULL pointer check in VMFUNC emulation (CVE-2016-10025)
XSA-204: x86: Mishandling of SYSCALL singlestep during emulation
(CVE-2016-10013)
XSA-207: memory leak when destroying guest without PT devices
XSA-208: oob access in cirrus bitblt copy (CVE-2017-2615)
XSA-209: cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo does not check if memory region is safe
(CVE-2017-2620)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
---
package/xen/xen.hash | 2 +-
package/xen/xen.mk | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/package/xen/xen.hash b/package/xen/xen.hash
index c3df243..2143f46 100644
--- a/package/xen/xen.hash
+++ b/package/xen/xen.hash
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
# Locally computed
-sha256 e87f4b0575e78657ee23d31470a15ecf1ce8c3a92a771cda46bbcd4d0d671ffe xen-4.7.1.tar.gz
+sha256 61494a56d9251e2108080f95b0dc8e3d175f1ba4da34603fc07b91cfebf358d5 xen-4.7.2.tar.gz
diff --git a/package/xen/xen.mk b/package/xen/xen.mk
index 7d32e52..9ff1b40 100644
--- a/package/xen/xen.mk
+++ b/package/xen/xen.mk
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
#
################################################################################
-XEN_VERSION = 4.7.1
+XEN_VERSION = 4.7.2
XEN_SITE = http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/$(XEN_VERSION)
XEN_LICENSE = GPLv2
XEN_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING
reply other threads:[~2017-04-25 15:50 UTC|newest]
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