From: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
To: buildroot@busybox.net
Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH 2017.02.x] musl: add upstream security fix for CVE-2017-15650
Date: Sat, 21 Oct 2017 11:25:15 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171021092515.5812-1-peter@korsgaard.com> (raw)
From the upstream announcement:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/10/19/5
Felix Wilhelm has discovered a flaw in the dns response parsing for
musl libc 1.1.16 that leads to overflow of a stack-based buffer.
Earlier versions are also affected.
When an application makes a request via getaddrinfo for both IPv4 and
IPv6 results (AF_UNSPEC), an attacker who controls or can spoof the
nameservers configured in resolv.conf can reply to both the A and AAAA
queries with A results. Since A records are smaller than AAAA records,
it's possible to fit more addresses than the precomputed bound, and a
buffer overflow occurs.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
---
...ing-callback-enforce-MAXADDRS-to-preclude.patch | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 package/musl/0002-in-dns-parsing-callback-enforce-MAXADDRS-to-preclude.patch
diff --git a/package/musl/0002-in-dns-parsing-callback-enforce-MAXADDRS-to-preclude.patch b/package/musl/0002-in-dns-parsing-callback-enforce-MAXADDRS-to-preclude.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c6b5ef26b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/musl/0002-in-dns-parsing-callback-enforce-MAXADDRS-to-preclude.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 45ca5d3fcb6f874bf5ba55d0e9651cef68515395 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx>
+Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2017 14:50:03 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] in dns parsing callback, enforce MAXADDRS to preclude
+ overflow
+
+MAXADDRS was chosen not to need enforcement, but the logic used to
+compute it assumes the answers received match the RR types of the
+queries. specifically, it assumes that only one replu contains A
+record answers. if the replies to both the A and the AAAA query have
+their answer sections filled with A records, MAXADDRS can be exceeded
+and clobber the stack of the calling function.
+
+this bug was found and reported by Felix Wilhelm.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
+---
+ src/network/lookup_name.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/network/lookup_name.c b/src/network/lookup_name.c
+index 066be4d5..209c20f0 100644
+--- a/src/network/lookup_name.c
++++ b/src/network/lookup_name.c
+@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ static int dns_parse_callback(void *c, int rr, const void *data, int len, const
+ {
+ char tmp[256];
+ struct dpc_ctx *ctx = c;
++ if (ctx->cnt >= MAXADDRS) return -1;
+ switch (rr) {
+ case RR_A:
+ if (len != 4) return -1;
+--
+2.11.0
+
--
2.11.0
next reply other threads:[~2017-10-21 9:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-21 9:25 Peter Korsgaard [this message]
2017-10-21 16:29 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH 2017.02.x] musl: add upstream security fix for CVE-2017-15650 Peter Korsgaard
2017-10-25 7:41 ` Peter Korsgaard
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20171021092515.5812-1-peter@korsgaard.com \
--to=peter@korsgaard.com \
--cc=buildroot@busybox.net \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox