From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Yann E. MORIN Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 22:01:37 +0200 Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH v2, 1/1] package/libexif: security bump to version 0.6.22 In-Reply-To: <20200519180216.3001842-1-fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com> References: <20200519180216.3001842-1-fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20200519200137.GJ27030@scaer> List-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: buildroot@busybox.net Fabrice, All, On 2020-05-19 20:02 +0200, Fabrice Fontaine spake thusly: > - Switch site to github > - Drop patches (already in version) > - Fix the following CVEs: > - CVE-2020-13114: Time consumption DoS when parsing canon array > markers > - CVE-2020-13113: Potential use of uninitialized memory > - CVE-2020-13112: Various buffer overread fixes due to integer > overflows in maker notes > - CVE-2020-0093: read overflow > - CVE-2020-12767: fixed division by zero > > https://github.com/libexif/libexif/releases/tag/libexif-0_6_22-release > > Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine Applied to master, thanks. Regards, Yann E. MORIN. > --- > Changes v1 -> v2: > - Use official tarball > > ...ll-buffer-overreads-during-decoding-.patch | 65 ---------- > ...otes-make-sure-the-makernote-contain.patch | 41 ------ > ...ecursion-depth-in-exif_data_load_dat.patch | 30 ----- > ...ursion-detection-in-exif_data_load_d.patch | 120 ------------------ > package/libexif/0005-fix-CVE-2019-9278.patch | 90 ------------- > package/libexif/Config.in | 2 +- > package/libexif/libexif.hash | 2 +- > package/libexif/libexif.mk | 16 +-- > 8 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 360 deletions(-) > delete mode 100644 package/libexif/0001-fixes-some-not-all-buffer-overreads-during-decoding-.patch > delete mode 100644 package/libexif/0002-On-saving-makernotes-make-sure-the-makernote-contain.patch > delete mode 100644 package/libexif/0003-Reduce-maximum-recursion-depth-in-exif_data_load_dat.patch > delete mode 100644 package/libexif/0004-Improve-deep-recursion-detection-in-exif_data_load_d.patch > delete mode 100644 package/libexif/0005-fix-CVE-2019-9278.patch > > diff --git a/package/libexif/0001-fixes-some-not-all-buffer-overreads-during-decoding-.patch b/package/libexif/0001-fixes-some-not-all-buffer-overreads-during-decoding-.patch > deleted file mode 100644 > index c98ed748c5..0000000000 > --- a/package/libexif/0001-fixes-some-not-all-buffer-overreads-during-decoding-.patch > +++ /dev/null > @@ -1,65 +0,0 @@ > -From 41bd04234b104312f54d25822f68738ba8d7133d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > -From: Marcus Meissner > -Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:44:44 +0200 > -Subject: [PATCH] fixes some (not all) buffer overreads during decoding pentax > - makernote entries. > - > -This should fix: > -https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/125/ CVE-2016-6328 > - > -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard > ---- > - libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- > - 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > - > -diff --git a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c > -index d03d159..ea0429a 100644 > ---- a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c > -+++ b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c > -@@ -425,24 +425,34 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry, > - case EXIF_FORMAT_SHORT: > - { > - const unsigned char *data = entry->data; > -- size_t k, len = strlen(val); > -+ size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft; > -+ > -+ sizeleft = entry->size; > - for(k=0; kcomponents; k++) { > -+ if (sizeleft < 2) > -+ break; > - vs = exif_get_short (data, entry->order); > - snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%i ", vs); > - len = strlen(val); > - data += 2; > -+ sizeleft -= 2; > - } > - } > - break; > - case EXIF_FORMAT_LONG: > - { > - const unsigned char *data = entry->data; > -- size_t k, len = strlen(val); > -+ size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft; > -+ > -+ sizeleft = entry->size; > - for(k=0; kcomponents; k++) { > -+ if (sizeleft < 4) > -+ break; > - vl = exif_get_long (data, entry->order); > - snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%li", (long int) vl); > - len = strlen(val); > - data += 4; > -+ sizeleft -= 4; > - } > - } > - break; > -@@ -455,5 +465,5 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry, > - break; > - } > - > -- return (val); > -+ return val; > - } > --- > -2.20.1 > - > diff --git a/package/libexif/0002-On-saving-makernotes-make-sure-the-makernote-contain.patch b/package/libexif/0002-On-saving-makernotes-make-sure-the-makernote-contain.patch > deleted file mode 100644 > index 84c92593bc..0000000000 > --- a/package/libexif/0002-On-saving-makernotes-make-sure-the-makernote-contain.patch > +++ /dev/null > @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ > -From c39acd1692023b26290778a02a9232c873f9d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > -From: Marcus Meissner > -Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:38:56 +0200 > -Subject: [PATCH] On saving makernotes, make sure the makernote container tags > - has a type with 1 byte components. > - > -Fixes (at least): > - https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/130 > - https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/129 > - > -CVE-2017-7544: libexif through 0.6.21 is vulnerable to out-of-bounds heap > -read vulnerability in exif_data_save_data_entry function in > -libexif/exif-data.c caused by improper length computation of the allocated > -data of an ExifMnote entry which can cause denial-of-service or possibly > -information disclosure. > - > -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard > ---- > - libexif/exif-data.c | 6 ++++++ > - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) > - > -diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c > -index 67df4db..91f4c33 100644 > ---- a/libexif/exif-data.c > -+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c > -@@ -255,6 +255,12 @@ exif_data_save_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *e, > - exif_mnote_data_set_offset (data->priv->md, *ds - 6); > - exif_mnote_data_save (data->priv->md, &e->data, &e->size); > - e->components = e->size; > -+ if (exif_format_get_size (e->format) != 1) { > -+ /* e->format is taken from input code, > -+ * but we need to make sure it is a 1 byte > -+ * entity due to the multiplication below. */ > -+ e->format = EXIF_FORMAT_UNDEFINED; > -+ } > - } > - } > - > --- > -2.20.1 > - > diff --git a/package/libexif/0003-Reduce-maximum-recursion-depth-in-exif_data_load_dat.patch b/package/libexif/0003-Reduce-maximum-recursion-depth-in-exif_data_load_dat.patch > deleted file mode 100644 > index e662d6bfc9..0000000000 > --- a/package/libexif/0003-Reduce-maximum-recursion-depth-in-exif_data_load_dat.patch > +++ /dev/null > @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ > -From 5d28011c40ec86cf52cffad541093d37c263898a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > -From: Dan Fandrich > -Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 18:05:19 +0200 > -Subject: [PATCH] Reduce maximum recursion depth in exif_data_load_data_content > - > -This only needs to be a small, single digit integer for normal files, > -and reducing the maximum closer to this reduces the time and space > -needed to detect pathological cases. > - > -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard > ---- > - libexif/exif-data.c | 2 +- > - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > - > -diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c > -index 91f4c33..04cdda2 100644 > ---- a/libexif/exif-data.c > -+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c > -@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd, > - if ((((int)ifd) < 0) || ( ((int)ifd) >= EXIF_IFD_COUNT)) > - return; > - > -- if (recursion_depth > 30) { > -+ if (recursion_depth > 12) { > - exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, "ExifData", > - "Deep recursion detected!"); > - return; > --- > -2.20.1 > - > diff --git a/package/libexif/0004-Improve-deep-recursion-detection-in-exif_data_load_d.patch b/package/libexif/0004-Improve-deep-recursion-detection-in-exif_data_load_d.patch > deleted file mode 100644 > index ff991541fe..0000000000 > --- a/package/libexif/0004-Improve-deep-recursion-detection-in-exif_data_load_d.patch > +++ /dev/null > @@ -1,120 +0,0 @@ > -From 6aa11df549114ebda520dde4cdaea2f9357b2c89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > -From: Dan Fandrich > -Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2018 16:01:45 +0200 > -Subject: [PATCH] Improve deep recursion detection in > - exif_data_load_data_content. > - > -The existing detection was still vulnerable to pathological cases > -causing DoS by wasting CPU. The new algorithm takes the number of tags > -into account to make it harder to abuse by cases using shallow recursion > -but with a very large number of tags. This improves on commit 5d28011c > -which wasn't sufficient to counter this kind of case. > - > -The limitation in the previous fix was discovered by Laurent Delosieres, > -Secunia Research at Flexera (Secunia Advisory SA84652) and is assigned > -the identifier CVE-2018-20030. > - > -[Peter: drop NEWS change] > -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard > ---- > - libexif/exif-data.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- > - 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > - > -diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c > -index e35403d..a6f9c94 100644 > ---- a/libexif/exif-data.c > -+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c > -@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ > - #include > - #include > - > -+#include > - #include > - #include > - #include > -@@ -350,6 +351,20 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) { \ > - break; \ > - } > - > -+/*! Calculate the recursion cost added by one level of IFD loading. > -+ * > -+ * The work performed is related to the cost in the exponential relation > -+ * work=1.1**cost > -+ */ > -+static unsigned int > -+level_cost(unsigned int n) > -+{ > -+ static const double log_1_1 = 0.09531017980432493; > -+ > -+ /* Adding 0.1 protects against the case where n==1 */ > -+ return ceil(log(n + 0.1)/log_1_1); > -+} > -+ > - /*! Load data for an IFD. > - * > - * \param[in,out] data #ExifData > -@@ -357,13 +372,13 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) { \ > - * \param[in] d pointer to buffer containing raw IFD data > - * \param[in] ds size of raw data in buffer at \c d > - * \param[in] offset offset into buffer at \c d at which IFD starts > -- * \param[in] recursion_depth number of times this function has been > -- * recursively called without returning > -+ * \param[in] recursion_cost factor indicating how expensive this recursive > -+ * call could be > - */ > - static void > - exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd, > - const unsigned char *d, > -- unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_depth) > -+ unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_cost) > - { > - ExifLong o, thumbnail_offset = 0, thumbnail_length = 0; > - ExifShort n; > -@@ -378,9 +393,20 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd, > - if ((((int)ifd) < 0) || ( ((int)ifd) >= EXIF_IFD_COUNT)) > - return; > - > -- if (recursion_depth > 12) { > -+ if (recursion_cost > 170) { > -+ /* > -+ * recursion_cost is a logarithmic-scale indicator of how expensive this > -+ * recursive call might end up being. It is an indicator of the depth of > -+ * recursion as well as the potential for worst-case future recursive > -+ * calls. Since it's difficult to tell ahead of time how often recursion > -+ * will occur, this assumes the worst by assuming every tag could end up > -+ * causing recursion. > -+ * The value of 170 was chosen to limit typical EXIF structures to a > -+ * recursive depth of about 6, but pathological ones (those with very > -+ * many tags) to only 2. > -+ */ > - exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, "ExifData", > -- "Deep recursion detected!"); > -+ "Deep/expensive recursion detected!"); > - return; > - } > - > -@@ -422,15 +448,18 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd, > - switch (tag) { > - case EXIF_TAG_EXIF_IFD_POINTER: > - CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_EXIF); > -- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1); > -+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o, > -+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n)); > - break; > - case EXIF_TAG_GPS_INFO_IFD_POINTER: > - CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_GPS); > -- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1); > -+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o, > -+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n)); > - break; > - case EXIF_TAG_INTEROPERABILITY_IFD_POINTER: > - CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY); > -- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1); > -+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o, > -+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n)); > - break; > - case EXIF_TAG_JPEG_INTERCHANGE_FORMAT: > - thumbnail_offset = o; > --- > -2.20.1 > - > diff --git a/package/libexif/0005-fix-CVE-2019-9278.patch b/package/libexif/0005-fix-CVE-2019-9278.patch > deleted file mode 100644 > index f708b2ae54..0000000000 > --- a/package/libexif/0005-fix-CVE-2019-9278.patch > +++ /dev/null > @@ -1,90 +0,0 @@ > -From 75aa73267fdb1e0ebfbc00369e7312bac43d0566 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > -From: Marcus Meissner > -Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2020 09:29:42 +0100 > -Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2019-9278 > - > -avoid the use of unsafe integer overflow checking constructs (unsigned integer operations cannot overflow, so "u1 + u2 > u1" can be optimized away) > - > -check for the actual sizes, which should also handle the overflows > -document other places google patched, but do not seem relevant due to other restrictions > - > -fixes https://github.com/libexif/libexif/issues/26 > - > -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard > ---- > - libexif/exif-data.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++---------- > - 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) > - > -diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c > -index a6f9c94..6332cd1 100644 > ---- a/libexif/exif-data.c > -+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c > -@@ -192,9 +192,15 @@ exif_data_load_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *entry, > - doff = offset + 8; > - > - /* Sanity checks */ > -- if ((doff + s < doff) || (doff + s < s) || (doff + s > size)) { > -+ if (doff >= size) { > - exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", > -- "Tag data past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size); > -+ "Tag starts past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff, size); > -+ return 0; > -+ } > -+ > -+ if (s > size - doff) { > -+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", > -+ "Tag data goes past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size); > - return 0; > - } > - > -@@ -315,13 +321,14 @@ exif_data_load_data_thumbnail (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d, > - unsigned int ds, ExifLong o, ExifLong s) > - { > - /* Sanity checks */ > -- if ((o + s < o) || (o + s < s) || (o + s > ds) || (o > ds)) { > -- exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", > -- "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u) or size (%u).", > -- o, s); > -+ if (o >= ds) { > -+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u).", o); > -+ return; > -+ } > -+ if (s > ds - o) { > -+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail size (%u), max would be %u.", s, ds-o); > - return; > - } > -- > - if (data->data) > - exif_mem_free (data->priv->mem, data->data); > - if (!(data->data = exif_data_alloc (data, s))) { > -@@ -947,7 +954,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig, > - exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", > - "IFD 0 at %i.", (int) offset); > - > -- /* Sanity check the offset, being careful about overflow */ > -+ /* ds is restricted to 16 bit above, so offset is restricted too, and offset+8 should not overflow. */ > - if (offset > ds || offset + 6 + 2 > ds) > - return; > - > -@@ -956,6 +963,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig, > - > - /* IFD 1 offset */ > - n = exif_get_short (d + 6 + offset, data->priv->order); > -+ /* offset < 2<<16, n is 16 bit@most, so this op will not overflow */ > - if (offset + 6 + 2 + 12 * n + 4 > ds) > - return; > - > -@@ -964,8 +972,8 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig, > - exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", > - "IFD 1 at %i.", (int) offset); > - > -- /* Sanity check. */ > -- if (offset > ds || offset + 6 > ds) { > -+ /* Sanity check. ds is ensured to be above 6 above, offset is 16bit */ > -+ if (offset > ds - 6) { > - exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, > - "ExifData", "Bogus offset of IFD1."); > - } else { > --- > -2.20.1 > - > diff --git a/package/libexif/Config.in b/package/libexif/Config.in > index 8a38b477b8..8064c2e9f9 100644 > --- a/package/libexif/Config.in > +++ b/package/libexif/Config.in > @@ -6,4 +6,4 @@ config BR2_PACKAGE_LIBEXIF > image. The EXIF library allows you to parse an EXIF file > and read the data from those tags. > > - http://libexif.sf.net > + https://libexif.github.io > diff --git a/package/libexif/libexif.hash b/package/libexif/libexif.hash > index aa9fcc8d89..1a2157b3f5 100644 > --- a/package/libexif/libexif.hash > +++ b/package/libexif/libexif.hash > @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ > # Locally computed: > -sha256 16cdaeb62eb3e6dfab2435f7d7bccd2f37438d21c5218ec4e58efa9157d4d41a libexif-0.6.21.tar.bz2 > +sha256 5048f1c8fc509cc636c2f97f4b40c293338b6041a5652082d5ee2cf54b530c56 libexif-0.6.22.tar.xz > sha256 36b6d3fa47916943fd5fec313c584784946047ec1337a78b440e5992cb595f89 COPYING > diff --git a/package/libexif/libexif.mk b/package/libexif/libexif.mk > index 643d9ed893..c945c275a7 100644 > --- a/package/libexif/libexif.mk > +++ b/package/libexif/libexif.mk > @@ -4,21 +4,13 @@ > # > ################################################################################ > > -LIBEXIF_VERSION = 0.6.21 > -LIBEXIF_SOURCE = libexif-$(LIBEXIF_VERSION).tar.bz2 > -LIBEXIF_SITE = http://downloads.sourceforge.net/project/libexif/libexif/$(LIBEXIF_VERSION) > +LIBEXIF_VERSION = 0.6.22 > +LIBEXIF_SOURCE = libexif-$(LIBEXIF_VERSION).tar.xz > +LIBEXIF_SITE = \ > + https://github.com/libexif/libexif/releases/download/libexif-$(subst .,_,$(LIBEXIF_VERSION))-release > LIBEXIF_INSTALL_STAGING = YES > LIBEXIF_DEPENDENCIES = host-pkgconf > LIBEXIF_LICENSE = LGPL-2.1+ > LIBEXIF_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING > > -# 0001-fixes-some-not-all-buffer-overreads-during-decoding-.patch > -LIBEXIF_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2016-6328 > -# 0002-On-saving-makernotes-make-sure-the-makernote-contain.patch > -LIBEXIF_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2017-7544 > -# 0004-Improve-deep-recursion-detection-in-exif_data_load_d.patch > -LIBEXIF_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-20030 > -# 0005-fix-CVE-2019-9278.patch > -LIBEXIF_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-9278 > - > $(eval $(autotools-package)) > -- > 2.26.2 > > _______________________________________________ > buildroot mailing list > buildroot at busybox.net > http://lists.busybox.net/mailman/listinfo/buildroot -- .-----------------.--------------------.------------------.--------------------. | Yann E. MORIN | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: | | +33 662 376 056 | Software Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN | ___ | | +33 561 099 427 `------------.-------: X AGAINST | \e/ There is no | | http://ymorin.is-a-geek.org/ | _/*\_ | / \ HTML MAIL | v conspiracy. | '------------------------------^-------^------------------^--------------------'