Re: [Buildroot] [PATCH v1] package/libopenssl: security bump to version 1.1.1t

[Thomas Petazzoni via buildroot <buildroot@buildroot.org>]

On Wed,  8 Feb 2023 17:25:34 +0100
Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net> wrote:

> Changelog (for details see [1] and [2]):
> 
>  Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
> 
>   *) Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName.
> 
>      There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing
>      inside an X.509 GeneralName. X.400 addresses were parsed as an ASN1_STRING
>      but subsequently interpreted by GENERAL_NAME_cmp as an ASN1_TYPE. This
>      vulnerability may allow an attacker who can provide a certificate chain and
>      CRL (neither of which need have a valid signature) to pass arbitrary
>      pointers to a memcmp call, creating a possible read primitive, subject to
>      some constraints. Refer to the advisory for more information. Thanks to
>      David Benjamin for discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0286)
> 
>      This issue has been fixed by changing the public header file definition of
>      GENERAL_NAME so that x400Address reflects the implementation. It was not
>      possible for any existing application to successfully use the existing
>      definition; however, if any application references the x400Address field
>      (e.g. in dead code), note that the type of this field has changed. There is
>      no ABI change.
>      [Hugo Landau]
> 
>   *) Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF.
> 
>      The public API function BIO_new_NDEF is a helper function used for
>      streaming ASN.1 data via a BIO. It is primarily used internally to OpenSSL
>      to support the SMIME, CMS and PKCS7 streaming capabilities, but may also
>      be called directly by end user applications.
> 
>      The function receives a BIO from the caller, prepends a new BIO_f_asn1
>      filter BIO onto the front of it to form a BIO chain, and then returns
>      the new head of the BIO chain to the caller. Under certain conditions,
>      for example if a CMS recipient public key is invalid, the new filter BIO
>      is freed and the function returns a NULL result indicating a failure.
>      However, in this case, the BIO chain is not properly cleaned up and the
>      BIO passed by the caller still retains internal pointers to the previously
>      freed filter BIO. If the caller then goes on to call BIO_pop() on the BIO
>      then a use-after-free will occur. This will most likely result in a crash.
>      (CVE-2023-0215)
>      [Viktor Dukhovni, Matt Caswell]
> 
>   *) Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex.
> 
>      The function PEM_read_bio_ex() reads a PEM file from a BIO and parses and
>      decodes the "name" (e.g. "CERTIFICATE"), any header data and the payload
>      data. If the function succeeds then the "name_out", "header" and "data"
>      arguments are populated with pointers to buffers containing the relevant
>      decoded data. The caller is responsible for freeing those buffers. It is
>      possible to construct a PEM file that results in 0 bytes of payload data.
>      In this case PEM_read_bio_ex() will return a failure code but will populate
>      the header argument with a pointer to a buffer that has already been freed.
>      If the caller also frees this buffer then a double free will occur. This
>      will most likely lead to a crash.
> 
>      The functions PEM_read_bio() and PEM_read() are simple wrappers around
>      PEM_read_bio_ex() and therefore these functions are also directly affected.
> 
>      These functions are also called indirectly by a number of other OpenSSL
>      functions including PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() and
>      SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file() which are also vulnerable. Some OpenSSL
>      internal uses of these functions are not vulnerable because the caller does
>      not free the header argument if PEM_read_bio_ex() returns a failure code.
>      (CVE-2022-4450)
>      [Kurt Roeckx, Matt Caswell]
> 
>   *) Fixed Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption.
> 
>      A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
>      implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
>      a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
>      decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
>      of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding
>      modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
>      (CVE-2022-4304)
>      [Dmitry Belyavsky, Hubert Kario]
> 
>  Changes between 1.1.1r and 1.1.1s [1 Nov 2022]
> 
>   *) Fixed a regression introduced in 1.1.1r version not refreshing the
>      certificate data to be signed before signing the certificate.
>      [Gibeom Gwon]
> 
>  Changes between 1.1.1q and 1.1.1r [11 Oct 2022]
> 
>   *) Fixed the linux-mips64 Configure target which was missing the
>      SIXTY_FOUR_BIT bn_ops flag. This was causing heap corruption on that
>      platform.
>      [Adam Joseph]
> 
>   *) Fixed a strict aliasing problem in bn_nist. Clang-14 optimisation was
>      causing incorrect results in some cases as a result.
>      [Paul Dale]
> 
>   *) Fixed SSL_pending() and SSL_has_pending() with DTLS which were failing to
>      report correct results in some cases
>      [Matt Caswell]
> 
>   *) Fixed a regression introduced in 1.1.1o for re-signing certificates with
>      different key sizes
>      [Todd Short]
> 
>   *) Added the loongarch64 target
>      [Shi Pujin]
> 
>   *) Fixed a DRBG seed propagation thread safety issue
>      [Bernd Edlinger]
> 
>   *) Fixed a memory leak in tls13_generate_secret
>      [Bernd Edlinger]
> 
>   *) Fixed reported performance degradation on aarch64. Restored the
>      implementation prior to commit 2621751 ("aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl: avoid
>      32-bit lane assignment in CTR mode") for 64bit targets only, since it is
>      reportedly 2-17% slower and the silicon errata only affects 32bit targets.
>      The new algorithm is still used for 32 bit targets.
>      [Bernd Edlinger]
> 
>   *) Added a missing header for memcmp that caused compilation failure on some
>      platforms
>      [Gregor Jasny]
> 
> [1] https://www.openssl.org/news/cl111.txt
> [2] https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html
> 
> Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
> ---
>  package/libopenssl/libopenssl.hash | 4 ++--
>  package/libopenssl/libopenssl.mk   | 2 +-
>  2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

Applied to master, thanks.

Thomas
-- 
Thomas Petazzoni, CTO, Bootlin
Embedded Linux and Kernel engineering
https://bootlin.com
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