From: Thomas Perale via buildroot <buildroot@buildroot.org>
To: buildroot@buildroot.org
Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/imagemagick: security bump to v7.1.2-15
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2026 09:10:01 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260225081001.37745-1-thomas.perale@mind.be> (raw)
For more information on the version bump, see:
- https://github.com/ImageMagick/Website/blob/main/ChangeLog.md
- https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/compare/7.1.2-12...7.1.2-15
Fixes the following vulnerabilities:
- CVE-2026-22770:
The BilateralBlurImage method will allocate a set of double buffers
inside AcquireBilateralTLS. But, in versions prior to 7.1.2-13, the
last element in the set is not properly initialized. This will
result in a release of an invalid pointer inside DestroyBilateralTLS
when the memory allocation fails.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-22770
- CVE-2026-23874:
Versions prior to 7.1.2-13 have a stack overflow via infinite
recursion in MSL (Magick Scripting Language) `<write>` command when
writing to MSL format.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-23874
- CVE-2026-23876:
Prior to versions 7.1.2-13 and 6.9.13-38, a heap buffer overflow
vulnerability in the XBM image decoder (ReadXBMImage) allows an
attacker to write controlled data past the allocated heap buffer
when processing a maliciously crafted image file. Any operation that
reads or identifies an image can trigger the overflow, making it
exploitable via common image upload and processing pipelines.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-23876
- CVE-2026-24481:
Prior to versions 7.1.2-15 and 6.9.13-40, a heap information
disclosure vulnerability exists in ImageMagick's PSD (Adobe
Photoshop) format handler. When processing a maliciously crafted PSD
file containing ZIP-compressed layer data that decompresses to less
than the expected size, uninitialized heap memory is leaked into the
output image.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-24481
- CVE-2026-25638:
Prior to versions 7.1.2-15 and 6.9.13-40, memory leak exists in
`coders/msl.c`. In the `WriteMSLImage` function of the `msl.c` file,
resources are allocated. But the function returns early without
releasing these allocated resources.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-25638
- CVE-2026-25794:
`WriteUHDRImage` in `coders/uhdr.c` uses `int` arithmetic to compute
the pixel buffer size. Prior to version 7.1.2-15, when image
dimensions are large, the multiplication overflows 32-bit `int`,
causing an undersized heap allocation followed by an out-of-bounds
write. This can crash the process or potentially lead to an out of
bounds heap write.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-25794
- CVE-2026-25795:
Prior to versions 7.1.2-15 and 6.9.13-40, in `ReadSFWImage()`
(`coders/sfw.c`), when temporary file creation fails, `read_info` is
destroyed before its `filename` member is accessed, causing a NULL
pointer dereference and crash.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-25795
- CVE-2026-25796:
Prior to versions 7.1.2-15 and 6.9.13-40, in `ReadSTEGANOImage()`
(`coders/stegano.c`), the `watermark` Image object is not freed on
three early-return paths, resulting in a definite memory leak
(~13.5KB+ per invocation) that can be exploited for denial of
service.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-25796
- CVE-2026-25798:
Prior to versions 7.1.2-15 and 6.9.13-40, a NULL pointer dereference
in ClonePixelCacheRepository allows a remote attacker to crash any
application linked against ImageMagick by supplying a crafted image
file, resulting in denial of service.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-25798
- CVE-2026-25799:
Prior to versions 7.1.2-15 and 6.9.13-40, a logic error in YUV
sampling factor validation allows an invalid sampling factor to
bypass checks and trigger a division-by-zero during image loading,
resulting in a reliable denial-of-service.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-25799
- CVE-2026-25897:
Prior to versions 7.1.2-15 and 6.9.13-40, an Integer Overflow
vulnerability exists in the sun decoder. On 32-bit systems/builds, a
carefully crafted image can lead to an out of bounds heap write.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-25897
- CVE-2026-25989:
Prior to versions 7.1.2-15 and 6.9.13-40, a crafted SVG file can
cause a denial of service. An off-by-one boundary check (`>` instead
of `>=`) that allows bypass the guard and reach an undefined
`(size_t)` cast.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-25989
- CVE-2026-26066:
Prior to versions 7.1.2-15 and 6.9.13-40, a crafted profile contain
invalid IPTC data may cause an infinite loop when writing it with
`IPTCTEXT`.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-26066
- CVE-2026-26283:
Prior to versions 7.1.2-15 and 6.9.13-40, a `continue` statement in
the JPEG extent binary search loop in the jpeg encoder causes an
infinite loop when writing persistently fails. An attacker can
trigger a 100% CPU consumption and process hang (Denial of Service)
with a crafted image.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-26283
- CVE-2026-26284:
Prior to versions 7.1.2-15 and 6.9.13-40, ImageMagick lacks proper
boundary checking when processing Huffman- coded data from PCD
(Photo CD) files. The decoder contains an function that has an
incorrect initialization that could cause an out of bounds read.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-26284
- CVE-2026-26983:
Prior to versions 7.1.2-15 and 6.9.13-40, the MSL interpreter
crashes when processing a invalid `<map>` element that causes it to
use an image after it has been freed.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-26983
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
---
package/imagemagick/imagemagick.hash | 4 ++--
package/imagemagick/imagemagick.mk | 2 +-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/package/imagemagick/imagemagick.hash b/package/imagemagick/imagemagick.hash
index eead3a9f97..90383c4d17 100644
--- a/package/imagemagick/imagemagick.hash
+++ b/package/imagemagick/imagemagick.hash
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
# Locally computed
-sha256 521fa7a8c0f664a3f5cf7437cbcc219f12bd6d5fe0c1fb014f212fa145076e60 imagemagick-7.1.2-12.tar.gz
-sha256 a556c5292c87c9a6ac795c80669b0c3660f9f729de8c476bf2b10f83ab1b34ec LICENSE
+sha256 bf646e7fffdf50b7d886eec6bbe51c3ced1c4d68fbabfcc534e014575359fe7f imagemagick-7.1.2-15.tar.gz
+sha256 131447ad0099069beaa32acf1700716eea294a5bdf936d8211d7026b1849e5d4 LICENSE
diff --git a/package/imagemagick/imagemagick.mk b/package/imagemagick/imagemagick.mk
index 0d5eb2aa34..5a03fbfd8f 100644
--- a/package/imagemagick/imagemagick.mk
+++ b/package/imagemagick/imagemagick.mk
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
#
################################################################################
-IMAGEMAGICK_VERSION = 7.1.2-12
+IMAGEMAGICK_VERSION = 7.1.2-15
IMAGEMAGICK_SITE = $(call github,ImageMagick,ImageMagick,$(IMAGEMAGICK_VERSION))
IMAGEMAGICK_LICENSE = Apache-2.0
IMAGEMAGICK_LICENSE_FILES = LICENSE
--
2.53.0
_______________________________________________
buildroot mailing list
buildroot@buildroot.org
https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
next reply other threads:[~2026-02-25 8:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-25 8:10 Thomas Perale via buildroot [this message]
2026-02-25 20:55 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/imagemagick: security bump to v7.1.2-15 Julien Olivain via buildroot
2026-03-06 19:53 ` Thomas Perale via buildroot
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260225081001.37745-1-thomas.perale@mind.be \
--to=buildroot@buildroot.org \
--cc=thomas.perale@mind.be \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox