Backport the fix for CVE-2026-660= 33.

The OpenSSL AES-GCM cipher path lacks runtime bounds checks around the
input block size. A malformed packet can therefore lead to an
out-of-bounds read or write.

Use Debian's libssh2 1.11.1 backport of the upstream fix.

Signed-off-by: Stefan M=C3=BCller <stefan.mueller@rey-technology.com>=
---
Backport to: 2025.02.x
---
...08-openssl-fix-AES-GCM-bounds-checks.patch | 44 +++= 3;++++++++++++++= 3;
package/libssh2/libssh2.mk       &= nbsp;            |&n= bsp; 3 ++
2 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 package/libssh2/0008-openssl-fix-AES-GCM-bounds-ch= ecks.patch

diff --git a/package/libssh2/0008-openssl-fix-AES-GCM-bounds-checks.patch b= /package/libssh2/0008-openssl-fix-AES-GCM-bounds-checks.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fdb78a1695
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/libssh2/0008-openssl-fix-AES-GCM-bounds-checks.pa= tch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From a2ed82d40964bbc0d64cd717aa0a5a892117d2e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001=
+From: Viktor Szakats <commit@vsz.me>
+Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2026 10:32:04 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] openssl: fix potential OOB read/write with AES-GCM in=
+ `ssh2_cipher_crypt()`
+
+By applying two bounds checks to non-debug builds.
+
+Reported-by: Vladimir Eli Tokarev
+Fixes GHSA-c4f7-cvfc-33j7
+Follow-up to 3c953c05d67eb1ebcfd3316f279f12c4b1d600b4 #797
+
+Closes #2401
+Forwarded: not-needed
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-66033
+Upstream: https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/commi= t/a2ed82d40964bbc0d64cd717aa0a5a892117d2e6
+Signed-off-by: Stefan M=C3=BCller <stefan.mueller@rey-technology.co= m>
+---
+ src/openssl.c | 10 ++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/openssl.c
++++ b/src/openssl.c
+@@ -1042,13 +1042,15 @@
+     const int aadlen =3D (is_aesgcm && IS= _FIRST(firstlast)) ? 4 : 0;
+     /* size of AT, if present */
+     const int authenticationtag =3D IS_LAST(first= last) ? authlen : 0;
+-    /* length to encrypt */
+-    const int cryptlen =3D (unsigned int)blocksize - a= adlen - authenticationtag;
++    unsigned int cryptlen; /* length to encrypt */=
+
+     (void)algo;
+
+-    assert(blocksize <=3D sizeof(buf));
+-    assert(cryptlen >=3D 0);
++    if(blocksize > sizeof(buf) ||
++       blocksize < (size_t)(aadl= en + authenticationtag))
++        return 1;
++
++    cryptlen =3D (unsigned int)blocksize - aadlen = - authenticationtag;
+
+ #if LIBSSH2_AES_GCM
+     /* First block */
diff --git a/package/libssh2/libssh2.mk b/package/libssh2/libssh2.mk
index 583ed56c1c..a3c0b6a67f 100644
--- a/package/libssh2/libssh2.mk
+++ b/package/libssh2/libssh2.mk
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ LIBSSH2_IGNORE_CVES +=3D CVE-2025-15661
# 0007-sftp-prevent-dangling-pointer-after-free.patch
LIBSSH2_IGNORE_CVES +=3D CVE-2026-66032

+# 0008-openssl-fix-AES-GCM-bounds-checks.patch
+LIBSSH2_IGNORE_CVES +=3D CVE-2026-66033
+
ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_LIBSSH2_MBEDTLS),y)
LIBSSH2_DEPENDENCIES +=3D mbedtls
LIBSSH2_CONF_OPTS +=3D --with-libmbedcrypto-prefix=3D$(STAGING_DI= R)/usr \
--
2.25.1