From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Peter Korsgaard Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 09:27:52 +0100 Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/1] package/cryptsetup: security bump to version 2.3.4 In-Reply-To: <20201025143912.1273561-1-fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com> (Fabrice Fontaine's message of "Sun, 25 Oct 2020 15:39:12 +0100") References: <20201025143912.1273561-1-fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com> Message-ID: <877dr8f793.fsf@dell.be.48ers.dk> List-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: buildroot@busybox.net >>>>> "Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine writes: > Fix CVE-2020-14382: A vulnerability was found in upstream release > cryptsetup-2.2.0 where, there's a bug in LUKS2 format validation code, > that is effectively invoked on every device/image presenting itself as > LUKS2 container. The bug is in segments validation code in file > 'lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c' in function > hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj) > where the code does not check for possible overflow on memory allocation > used for intervals array (see statement "intervals = malloc(first_backup > * sizeof(*intervals));"). Due to the bug, library can be *tricked* to > expect such allocation was successful but for far less memory then > originally expected. Later it may read data FROM image crafted by an > attacker and actually write such data BEYOND allocated memory. > https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/v2.3.4-ReleaseNotes > Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine Committed to 2020.08.x, thanks. For 2020.02.x I will instead backport the fixes. -- Bye, Peter Korsgaard