From: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
To: buildroot@buildroot.org
Subject: Re: [Buildroot] [git commit] package/go: security bump to version 1.9.10
Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 15:51:45 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87h6ranocu.fsf@48ers.dk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230606195922.1BAED86D16@busybox.osuosl.org> (Peter Korsgaard's message of "Tue, 6 Jun 2023 21:56:00 +0200")
>>>>> "Peter" == Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> writes:
> commit: https://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/?id=620ce32227b0722c9c68c5d0cd42d8600a18ca6b
> branch: https://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/?id=refs/heads/master
> Fixes the following security issues:
> - cmd/go: cgo code injection
> The go command may generate unexpected code at build time when using cgo.
> This may result in unexpected behavior when running a go program which
> uses cgo.
> This may occur when running an untrusted module which contains directories
> with newline characters in their names. Modules which are retrieved using
> the go command, i.e. via "go get", are not affected (modules retrieved
> using GOPATH-mode, i.e. GO111MODULE=off, may be affected).
> Thanks to Juho Nurminen of Mattermost for reporting this issue.
> This is CVE-2023-29402 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/60167.
> - runtime: unexpected behavior of setuid/setgid binaries
> The Go runtime didn't act any differently when a binary had the
> setuid/setgid bit set. On Unix platforms, if a setuid/setgid binary was
> executed with standard I/O file descriptors closed, opening any files
> could result in unexpected content being read/written with elevated
> prilieges. Similarly if a setuid/setgid program was terminated, either
> via panic or signal, it could leak the contents of its registers.
> Thanks to Vincent Dehors from Synacktiv for reporting this issue.
> This is CVE-2023-29403 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/60272.
> - cmd/go: improper sanitization of LDFLAGS
> The go command may execute arbitrary code at build time when using cgo.
> This may occur when running "go get" on a malicious module, or when
> running any other command which builds untrusted code. This is can by
> triggered by linker flags, specified via a "#cgo LDFLAGS" directive.
> Thanks to Juho Nurminen of Mattermost for reporting this issue.
> This is CVE-2023-29404 and CVE-2023-29405 and Go issues
> https://go.dev/issue/60305 and https://go.dev/issue/60306.
> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Committed to 2023.02.x, thanks.
--
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-14 13:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-06 19:56 [Buildroot] [git commit] package/go: security bump to version 1.9.10 Peter Korsgaard
2023-06-14 13:51 ` Peter Korsgaard [this message]
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