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From: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
To: buildroot@buildroot.org
Subject: Re: [Buildroot] [git commit] package/go: security bump to version 1.9.10
Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 15:51:45 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87h6ranocu.fsf@48ers.dk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230606195922.1BAED86D16@busybox.osuosl.org> (Peter Korsgaard's message of "Tue, 6 Jun 2023 21:56:00 +0200")

>>>>> "Peter" == Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> writes:

 > commit: https://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/?id=620ce32227b0722c9c68c5d0cd42d8600a18ca6b
 > branch: https://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

 > Fixes the following security issues:

 > - cmd/go: cgo code injection

 >   The go command may generate unexpected code at build time when using cgo.
 >   This may result in unexpected behavior when running a go program which
 >   uses cgo.

 >   This may occur when running an untrusted module which contains directories
 >   with newline characters in their names.  Modules which are retrieved using
 >   the go command, i.e.  via "go get", are not affected (modules retrieved
 >   using GOPATH-mode, i.e.  GO111MODULE=off, may be affected).

 >   Thanks to Juho Nurminen of Mattermost for reporting this issue.

 >   This is CVE-2023-29402 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/60167.

 > - runtime: unexpected behavior of setuid/setgid binaries

 >   The Go runtime didn't act any differently when a binary had the
 >   setuid/setgid bit set.  On Unix platforms, if a setuid/setgid binary was
 >   executed with standard I/O file descriptors closed, opening any files
 >   could result in unexpected content being read/written with elevated
 >   prilieges.  Similarly if a setuid/setgid program was terminated, either
 >   via panic or signal, it could leak the contents of its registers.

 >   Thanks to Vincent Dehors from Synacktiv for reporting this issue.

 >   This is CVE-2023-29403 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/60272.

 > - cmd/go: improper sanitization of LDFLAGS

 >   The go command may execute arbitrary code at build time when using cgo.
 >   This may occur when running "go get" on a malicious module, or when
 >   running any other command which builds untrusted code.  This is can by
 >   triggered by linker flags, specified via a "#cgo LDFLAGS" directive.

 >   Thanks to Juho Nurminen of Mattermost for reporting this issue.

 >   This is CVE-2023-29404 and CVE-2023-29405 and Go issues
 >   https://go.dev/issue/60305 and https://go.dev/issue/60306.

 > Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>

Committed to 2023.02.x, thanks.

-- 
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
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      reply	other threads:[~2023-06-14 13:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-06-06 19:56 [Buildroot] [git commit] package/go: security bump to version 1.9.10 Peter Korsgaard
2023-06-14 13:51 ` Peter Korsgaard [this message]

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