From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Sergey Matyukevich Date: Thu, 10 Jun 2021 01:03:56 +0300 Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH v2 01/28] boot/arm-trusted-firmware: option to disable stack protection In-Reply-To: <20210609234015.1de2583f@windsurf> References: <20210609200003.2866122-1-geomatsi@gmail.com> <20210609200003.2866122-2-geomatsi@gmail.com> <20210609234015.1de2583f@windsurf> Message-ID: List-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: buildroot@busybox.net Hello Thomas, > > +config BR2_TARGET_ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_DISABLE_SSP > > + bool "Disable stack protection" > > + help > > + Select this option to explicitly disable stack protection checks in GCC. > > + Such checks need to be disabled if ATF platform port does not implement > > + plat_get_stack_protector_canary() hook. > > It's a bit annoying that we have to tell TF-A about this. If TF-A > doesn't implement plat_get_stack_protector_canary() for a certain > platform, why does it try to enable SSP ? It feels like something that > should be fixed in TF-A. TF-A does not attempt to enable those protection checks. This is controlled by its ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR build flag, which default value is 'none'. This is Buildroot who tries to enable TF-A stack protection checks depending on BR2_SSP_* toolchain features only: see arm-trusted-firmware.mk. Regards, Sergey