From: Julien Olivain via buildroot <buildroot@buildroot.org>
To: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Cc: buildroot@buildroot.org, Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>,
Christian Stewart <christian@aperture.us>
Subject: Re: [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/go: security bump to version 1.26.6
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2026 19:50:51 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aca3155e78202eda49481db4b7722667@free.fr> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260817153641.736799-1-peter@korsgaard.com>
On 17/08/2026 17:36, Peter Korsgaard wrote:
> Fixes the following security issues:
>
> - x/mod/sumdb/tlog: fix transparency log tile verification bypass
>
> A malicious GOPROXY was previously capable of forging up to two
> sumdb
> tiles that allow for a requested module to bypass the GOSUMDB check
> and
> persist attacker-controlled module content to a local Go module
> cache.
>
> This attack allows for a malicious GOPROXY to serve malicious module
> content that cannot be detected by evaluating the transparency log.
>
> All tiles are now correctly verified against their parents.
>
> In order to determine if you have been affected:
>
> rm -r go.sum go.work.sum vendor/ && go mod tidy
>
> Thanks to Filippo Valsorda (Geomys) for reporting this issue.
>
> This is CVE-2026-56865 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/80744.
>
> - x/mod/sumdb: ignore unrelated, unauthenticated hashes in Lookup
>
> A malicious GOSUMDB was capable of serving arbitrary module content
> not
> contained within the transparency log.
>
> This attack allows for a coordinating GOPROXY and GOSUMDB to serve a
> client malicious module content that cannot be detected by
> evaluating
> the transparency log.
>
> In order to determine if you have been affected:
>
> rm -r go.sum go.work.sum vendor/ && go mod tidy
>
> Thanks to mundur for reporting this issue.
>
> This is CVE-2026-56864 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/80745.
>
> - encoding/xml: add recursion depth guard during decode
>
> Previously, DecodeElement would reset the depth counter causing it
> to
> never fire; this could lead to stack exhaustion.
>
> This is CVE-2026-56859 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/80481.
>
> - net/http: apply ReadHeaderTimeout when doing unencrypted HTTP/2
> check
>
> When a server is configured to support unencrypted HTTP/2, it reads
> a few
> bytes from each new connection to see if they contain the HTTP/2
> client
> preface. Previously, this was being done with no timeout applied.
> ReadHeaderTimeout is now applied for this.
>
> This is CVE-2026-56853 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/80205.
>
> - net/url: avoid quadratic complexity in resolvePath
>
> Previously, resolving relative paths containing parent directory
> (..)
> segments performed string conversions and buffer rewrites on each
> step,
> resulting in quadratic time complexity and high memory allocation
> overhead.
>
> Now, path resolution operates on a byte buffer using index-based
> backtracking for .. segments, eliminating the quadratic time
> complexity
> and significantly reducing memory allocations.
>
> This is CVE-2026-56860 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/80494.
>
> - golang.org/x/net/dns/dnsmessage: panic when parsing invalid SVCB
> record
>
> Parsing an invalid SVCB or HTTPS RR can panic when the size of a
> parameter value overflows the message buffer.
>
> Thanks to Mundur (https://github.com/M0nd0R) for reporting this
> issue.
>
> This is CVE-2026-46600 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/79795.
>
> - crypto/tls: limit handshake messages we are willing to accept
> post-handshake
>
> Previously, we always counted handshake messages, such as KeyUpdate,
> as
> state-advancing, regardless of whether a handshake has been
> completed or
> not. As a result, a malicious client can keep sending KeyUpdate
> messages
> to force the server to keep performing key derivation operations
> indefinitely.
>
> Thanks to Qi Deng of Aurascape.ai for reporting this issue.
>
> This is CVE-2026-56862 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/80528.
>
> - html/template: fix Javascript regexp context tracking
>
> Previously, pathological inputs could close an unescaped / early,
> allowing for attack-controlled data to inject arbitrary content,
> potentially leading to XSS.
>
> Thanks to Ali Sherif for reporting this issue.
>
> This is CVE-2026-56858 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/80435.
>
> - x/net/idna: failure to reject ASCII-only Punycode-encoded labels
>
> The ToASCII and ToUnicode functions incorrectly accepted
> Punycode-encoded
> labels that decode to an ASCII-only label. For example,
> ToUnicode("xn--example-.com") incorrectly returned the name
> "example.com"
> rather than an error.
>
> The idna package implements the processing algorithm from UTS 46.
> Older
> versions of UTS 46 included a specification bug which permitted
> multiple
> ASCII labels to decode to the same Unicode label. UTS 46 revision
> 33
> fixed the specification bug. The idna package now implements the
> updated
> specification.
>
> This behavior can lead to privilege escalation in programs using the
> idna
> package. For example, a program which performs privilege checks on
> the
> ASCII hostname may reject "example.com" but permit
> "xn--example-.com".
> If that program subsequently converts the ASCII hostname to Unicode,
> it
> will inadvertently permits access to the Unicode name "example.com".
>
> Thanks to KC1zs4 (https://github.com/KC1zs4) for reporting this
> issue.
>
> This is CVE-2026-39821 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/78760.
>
> - encoding/asn1: enforce maximum recursion depth
>
> Enforce a recursion limit in Unmarshal to prevent stack exhaustion
> when
> parsing deeply-nested, recursive structures.
>
> Thanks to Marwan Atia (marwansamir688@gmail.com) for reporting this
> issue.
>
> This is CVE-2026-33818 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/80405.
>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Applied to master, thanks.
_______________________________________________
buildroot mailing list
buildroot@buildroot.org
https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-17 17:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-17 15:36 [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/go: security bump to version 1.26.6 Peter Korsgaard
2026-08-17 17:50 ` Julien Olivain via buildroot [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=aca3155e78202eda49481db4b7722667@free.fr \
--to=buildroot@buildroot.org \
--cc=christian@aperture.us \
--cc=ju.o@free.fr \
--cc=peter@korsgaard.com \
--cc=thomas.perale@mind.be \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox