From: "Luís Henriques" <lhenriques@suse.de>
To: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>,
Ceph Development <ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] ceph: add support for snapshot names encryption
Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2022 10:14:58 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87bky4j36l.fsf@brahms.olymp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5b53e812-d49b-45f0-1219-3dbc96febbc1@redhat.com> (Xiubo Li's message of "Thu, 17 Mar 2022 13:27:01 +0800")
Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> writes:
> Hi Luis,
>
> There has another issue you need to handle at the same time.
>
> Currently only the empty directory could be enabled the file encryption, such as
> for the following command:
>
> $ fscrypt encrypt mydir/
>
> But should we also make sure that the mydir/.snap/ is empty ?
>
> Here the 'empty' is not totally empty, which allows it should allow long snap
> names exist.
>
> Make sense ?
Right, actually I had came across that question in the past but completely
forgot about it.
Right now we simply check the dir stats to ensure a directory is empty.
We could add an extra check in ceph_crypt_empty_dir() to ensure that there
are no snapshots _above_ that directory (i.e. that there are no
"mydir/.snap/_name_xxxxx").
Unfortunately, I don't know enough of snapshots implementation details to
understand if it's a problem to consider a directory as being empty (in
the fscrypt context) when there are these '_name_xxx' directories. My
feeling is that this is not a problem but I really don't know.
Do you (or anyone) have any ideas/suggestions?
Cheers,
--
Luís
>
> - Xiubo
>
>
> On 3/16/22 12:19 AM, Luís Henriques wrote:
>> Hi!
>>
>> A couple of changes since v1:
>>
>> - Dropped the dentry->d_flags change in ceph_mkdir(). Thanks to Xiubo
>> suggestion, patch 0001 now skips calling ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context()
>> if we're handling a snapshot.
>>
>> - Added error handling to ceph_get_snapdir() in patch 0001 (Jeff had
>> already pointed that out but I forgot to include that change in previous
>> revision).
>>
>> - Rebased patch 0002 to the latest wip-fscrypt branch.
>>
>> - Added some documentation regarding snapshots naming restrictions.
>>
>> As before, in order to test this code the following PRs are required:
>>
>> mds: add protection from clients without fscrypt support #45073
>> mds: use the whole string as the snapshot long name #45192
>> mds: support alternate names for snapshots #45224
>> mds: limit the snapshot names to 240 characters #45312
>>
>> Luís Henriques (3):
>> ceph: add support for encrypted snapshot names
>> ceph: add support for handling encrypted snapshot names
>> ceph: update documentation regarding snapshot naming limitations
>>
>> Documentation/filesystems/ceph.rst | 10 ++
>> fs/ceph/crypto.c | 158 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>> fs/ceph/crypto.h | 11 +-
>> fs/ceph/inode.c | 31 +++++-
>> 4 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-17 10:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-15 16:19 [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] ceph: add support for snapshot names encryption Luís Henriques
2022-03-15 16:19 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] ceph: add support for encrypted snapshot names Luís Henriques
2022-03-16 0:07 ` Xiubo Li
2022-03-15 16:19 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] ceph: add support for handling " Luís Henriques
2022-03-16 0:47 ` Xiubo Li
2022-03-16 11:00 ` Luís Henriques
2022-03-15 16:19 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] ceph: update documentation regarding snapshot naming limitations Luís Henriques
2022-03-16 0:48 ` Xiubo Li
2022-03-17 5:27 ` [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] ceph: add support for snapshot names encryption Xiubo Li
2022-03-17 10:01 ` Jeff Layton
2022-03-17 10:52 ` Xiubo Li
2022-03-17 11:11 ` Luís Henriques
2022-03-17 11:28 ` Xiubo Li
2022-03-17 12:01 ` Jeff Layton
2022-03-17 12:31 ` Xiubo Li
2022-03-17 12:41 ` Jeff Layton
2022-03-17 12:44 ` Xiubo Li
2022-03-17 15:59 ` Luís Henriques
2022-03-17 10:14 ` Luís Henriques [this message]
2022-03-17 11:02 ` Xiubo Li
2022-03-17 11:22 ` Xiubo Li
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