* [PATCH] cgroups: censor kernel pointer in debug files
@ 2017-02-25 9:56 Kees Cook
2017-03-06 20:16 ` Tejun Heo
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2017-02-25 9:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tejun Heo
Cc: Li Zefan, Johannes Weiner, cgroups, linux-kernel,
kernel-hardening
As found in grsecurity, this avoids exposing a kernel pointer through
the cgroup debug entries.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
kernel/cgroup.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c
index 53bbca7c4859..b794bcadefa4 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup.c
@@ -6589,7 +6589,7 @@ static int cgroup_css_links_read(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
struct task_struct *task;
int count = 0;
- seq_printf(seq, "css_set %p\n", cset);
+ seq_printf(seq, "css_set %pK\n", cset);
list_for_each_entry(task, &cset->tasks, cg_list) {
if (count++ > MAX_TASKS_SHOWN_PER_CSS)
--
2.7.4
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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2017-03-06 20:16 ` Tejun Heo
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