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From: "Pavel Machek" <pavel@denx.de>
To: cip-dev@lists.cip-project.org
Subject: Re: [cip-dev] New CVE entries this week
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 2021 11:00:08 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210805090007.GA10560@amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAODzB9rBLCkGEOCZN03W4kX2KwTk58Jkar3r3nHVAzKOGVktNA@mail.gmail.com>


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Hi!

> ** Updated CVEs

> CVE-2021-22543: v4.19 and v5.10 are fixed. v4.4 uses another way to
> get pfn. If v4.4 is vulnerable it needs to write its own patch.

4.4 is very different in that area, and KVM is not exactly our
focus. A lot of research would be needed. I guess we can simply ignore
this one.

> * CVE detail
> 
> CVE-2021-35477: unprivileged BPF program can obtain sensitive
> information from kernel memory via a speculative store bypass
> side-channel attack because the technique used by the BPF verifier to
> manage speculation is unreliable
> 
> CVE-2021-34556 and CVE-2021-35477 are fixed by the same commits.
> commit 2039f26f3aca fixes af86ca4e3088(introduced by v4.17-rc7) and
> f7cf25b2026d(introduced by v5.3-rc1).
> 
> Fixed status
> mainline: [f5e81d1117501546b7be050c5fbafa6efd2c722c,
> 2039f26f3aca5b0e419b98f65dd36481337b86ee]
> stable/5.10: [bea9e2fd180892eba2574711b05b794f1d0e7b73,
> 0e9280654aa482088ee6ef3deadef331f5ac5fb0]
> stable/5.13: [ddab060f996e17b38bb181c5fd11a83fd1bfa0df,
> 0b27bdf02c400684225ee5ee99970bcbf5082282]

Yes, speculation is huge problem, and getting BPF right with broken
CPUs will be hard. I'd hope CIP people are not using untrusted BTF
programs, and that we can ignore it.

> CVE-2021-3669: reading /proc/sysvipc/shm does not scale with large
> shared memory segment counts
> 
> According to redhat bugzilla, it said "Not reported upstream, patches
> are being worked on.  It is not considered high impact because of the
> requirements and need to have massive amount of shm (usually well
> above ulimits) ".
> 
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1986473#c10

DoS only, and only in unusual configuration. I believe we can ignore
this one.

> CVE-2021-37159: hso_free_net_device in drivers/net/usb/hso.c in the
> Linux kernel through 5.13.4 calls unregister_netdev without checking
> for the NETREG_REGISTERED state, leading to a use-after-free and a
> double free.
> 
> The mainline, 5.10, 5.13 are fixed.
> 
> Fixed status
> mainline: [a6ecfb39ba9d7316057cea823b196b734f6b18ca]
> stable/5.10: [115e4f5b64ae8d9dd933167cafe2070aaac45849]
> stable/5.13: [eeaa4b8d1e2e6f10362673d283a97dccc7275afa]

I guess we could try to rework the function in similar way 5.10 did,
but... we are not using HSO in our configs, and I have hard time
imagining how "attacker" would trigger it. So this is... just a
bug. I'd suggest ignoring.

Best regards,
								Pavel

-- 
DENX Software Engineering GmbH,      Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany

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  reply	other threads:[~2021-08-05  9:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-05  0:47 [cip-dev] New CVE entries this week 市川正美
2021-08-05  9:00 ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2021-08-06  0:46   ` 市川正美
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2023-07-26 23:15 Masami Ichikawa
2023-07-27  9:26 ` [cip-dev] " Pavel Machek
2023-07-27 11:30   ` Masami Ichikawa
2023-06-14 22:43 Masami Ichikawa
2023-06-15  8:41 ` [cip-dev] " Pavel Machek
2023-06-15 11:52   ` Masami Ichikawa
2022-11-09 23:02 Masami Ichikawa
2022-11-10  8:33 ` [cip-dev] " Pavel Machek
2022-10-20  0:48 Masami Ichikawa
2022-10-20  7:58 ` [cip-dev] " Pavel Machek
2022-10-20 13:10   ` Masami Ichikawa
2022-06-15 23:44 Masami Ichikawa
2022-06-16 12:04 ` [cip-dev] " Pavel Machek
2022-06-08 23:44 Masami Ichikawa
2022-06-09  9:41 ` [cip-dev] " Pavel Machek
2022-06-09 12:06   ` Masami Ichikawa
2022-02-17  0:09 Masami Ichikawa
2022-02-17 11:55 ` [cip-dev] " Pavel Machek
2021-08-26  1:09 Masami Ichikawa
2021-08-26 10:01 ` Pavel Machek
     [not found] ` <169ED2F66B4753DB.9667@lists.cip-project.org>
2021-08-26 11:51   ` Pavel Machek
2021-08-26 12:43     ` Masami Ichikawa
2021-08-19  0:12 市川正美
2021-08-19  7:10 ` Pavel Machek
2021-08-19  8:37   ` Masami Ichikawa
2021-08-19  8:55   ` Nobuhiro Iwamatsu
2021-08-12  0:33 市川正美
2021-08-12  5:43 ` Pavel Machek
2021-08-12  8:40   ` 市川正美
2021-07-29  1:18 市川正美
2021-07-29  7:47 ` Pavel Machek
2021-07-29  8:11   ` 市川正美
2021-07-29  8:58     ` Pavel Machek
2021-07-29  7:50 ` Nobuhiro Iwamatsu
2021-07-29  8:12   ` 市川正美
2021-07-22  2:02 市川正美
2021-07-15  1:00 市川正美
2021-07-08  0:21 市川正美
2021-07-11  8:32 ` Pavel Machek
2021-07-11 11:13   ` masashi.kudo
2021-06-18  8:03 Pavel Machek
2021-06-20 23:51 ` 市川正美
2021-06-10 17:05 Pavel Machek
2021-06-17  2:09 ` 市川正美
2021-06-17 11:04   ` Masami Ichikawa
2021-06-18  8:01   ` Pavel Machek
2021-06-17  2:45 ` 市川正美

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