From: "Gupta, Ayush" <a-gupta4@ti.com>
To: "cip-dev@lists.cip-project.org" <cip-dev@lists.cip-project.org>
Cc: "Raghavendra, Vignesh" <vigneshr@ti.com>,
"Adivi, Sai Sree Kartheek" <s-adivi@ti.com>,
"jan.kiszka@siemens.com" <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Subject: Secure Data Encryption on board without TPM support ( AM62P)
Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2025 18:03:42 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <82039e1a1c384350af46fe375650472c@ti.com> (raw)
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Dear CIP Development Team,
I am currently working on enabling encrypted storage for the TI's AM62P platform, which, as per current hardware capabilities, does not include TPM support.
To address this, I have implemented a working initramfs-crypt-hook-nontpm (link provided at the end) solution that removes TPM dependencies. It utilizes a keyfile embedded directly into the initramfs for unlocking encrypted partitions during boot. The initramfs itself is considered secure as it is protected by verified boot (Secure Boot is enabled on the platform).
I would like to know if this is an acceptable and secure approach from the CIP security perspective for boards without TPM support. Additionally, are there any recommended alternatives or best practices for strengthening this method in scenarios where TPM support is not available?
Looking forward to your guidance.
Patch for
initramfs-crypt-hook-nontpm
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook-nontpm * main * 22CSB0C01_AYUSH GUPTA / am62x-security-features * GitLab<https://gitlab.com/ag22csb0c01/am62x-security-features/-/tree/main/recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook-nontpm?ref_type=heads>
Best regards,
Ayush Gupta
Texas Instruments
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next reply other threads:[~2025-06-02 18:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-02 18:03 Gupta, Ayush [this message]
2025-06-02 18:37 ` [cip-dev] Secure Data Encryption on board without TPM support ( AM62P) Heinisch, Alexander
2025-06-03 11:16 ` Jan Kiszka
2025-06-05 11:38 ` Ayush Gupta
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