From: Pavel Machek <pavel@nabladev.com>
To: pavel@nabladev.com
Cc: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>,
Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <nobuhiro.iwamatsu.x90@mail.toshiba>,
Ulrich Hecht <uli@fpond.eu>,
Masami Ichikawa <masami.ichikawa@miraclelinux.com>,
cip-dev <cip-dev@lists.cip-project.org>
Subject: Re: [cip-dev] CVE-2026-64560
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2026 23:44:54 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <amvF1nVER--og1Wz@duo.ucw.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <18C72D766E036C67.1779571@lists.cip-project.org>
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Hi!
> > this looks like it does not need special drivers and is not that easy
> > to mitigate (CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS=n...):
> >
> > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git/commit/?id=081d2ff9592751aa400828237f17c108e4e1f513
> >
> > Early releases?
>
> No cool name, no logo, and no website? Aint doing no release for that!
>
> So... this is crasher, and you need local access for it. In my eyes,
> it is below "Dirty Cow" in severity.
So .. apparently Sasha or his robots believe this may be exploitable:
I:H -`collect_timerqueue()` writes into freed memory
(`ctmr->firing`, `ctmr->handling`, rbtree rebalancing, list
insertion) and the `do_cpu_nanosleep()` variant does so into a
live, attacker-groomed kernel stack frame, followed by
`cpu_timer_fire()` dereferencing attacker-controlled
`it_process`/`it_signal` — a control-flow-hijack-capable write
primitive.
So far, I don't see distributions acting the way they did on "Dirty
Cow":
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-64560
(Note the auto-generated, useless description).
So the other two one-patch releases are. Not good, but not "Dirty Cow"
level of dangerous, either, AFAICT.
Linux 6.12.99
commit 41fb1f3c8a712eba4b1eae0a9023e80007a71413
Author: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Date: Tue Sep 24 21:10:23 2024 +0100
mm: refactor mm_access() to not return NULL
[ Upstream commit cd3f8467afd470ccab0de2fbc7c76664af4a0bac ]
mm_access() can return NULL if the mm is not found, but this is handled
the same as an error in all callers, with some translating this into an
-ESRCH error.
....
Linux 6.12.98
commit 913e7b4459d6eef807bb8088b39b890ed6a74ee3
Author: Yun Zhou <yun.zhou@windriver.com>
Date: Sat Jul 25 10:40:29 2026 +0800
ext4: fix fd leak in EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT cross-sb validation
The backport of upstream commit c143957520c6 ("ext4: validate donor
file superblock early in EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT") uses a bare 'return -EXDEV'
which is safe upstream because the fd is managed via CLASS(fd) with
automatic cleanup (commit 8152f8201088 ("fdget(), more trivial
conversions")).
However, on 6.12.y the ioctl still uses the traditional fdget/fdput
pattern, so the bare return bypasses fdput(donor) at the mext_out label,
leaking the file reference.
Best regards,
Pavel
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-30 21:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-30 20:33 CVE-2026-64560 Jan Kiszka
2026-07-30 21:09 ` CVE-2026-64560 Pavel Machek
[not found] ` <18C72D766E036C67.1779571@lists.cip-project.org>
2026-07-30 21:44 ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2026-07-31 5:12 ` [cip-dev] CVE-2026-64560 Jan Kiszka
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