From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
To: Claudius Heine <ch@denx.de>,
cip-dev@lists.cip-project.org,
Quirin Gylstorff <quirin.gylstorff@siemens.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] initramfs-crypt-hook: implement 'noencrypt' option
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2025 16:11:33 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c98de579-e33f-486f-b964-4f4a0aebd1d5@siemens.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250304130743.2812183-3-ch@denx.de>
On 04.03.25 14:07, Claudius Heine wrote:
> In case encryption needs to be enabled via an update, while still
> allowing the update fall back to work. One update step where encryption
> is supported, but no reencryption is taking place if the device is not
> encrypted.
>
> For this the `noencrypt` hook is implemented, which requires some
> restructure/reordering of the `local-top-complete` script.
>
> Signed-off-by: Claudius Heine <ch@denx.de>
> ---
> doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md | 22 ++++++++++++++++-
> .../files/local-top-complete | 24 +++++++++++++++----
> 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md b/doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md
> index 3f7e89f..a97425c 100644
> --- a/doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md
> +++ b/doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md
> @@ -42,11 +42,12 @@ The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the following variables which can be overwri
> ### CRYPT_PARTITIONS
>
> The variable `CRYPT_PARTITIONS` contains the information which partition shall be encrypted where to mount it.
> -Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt or format>`.
> +Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt | format | noencrypt>`.
> - The `partition-idenitifer` is used to identify the partition on the disk, it can contain a partition label, partition UUID or absolute path to the partition device, e.g. `/dev/sda`.
> - The `mountpoint` is used mount the decrypted partition in the root file system
> - `reencrypt` uses `cryptsetup reencrypt` to encrypt the exiting content of the partition. This reduces the partition by 32MB and the file system by a similar amount
> - `format` creates a empty LUKS partition and creates a file system defined with the shell command given in `CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD`
> +- `noencrypt` will not try to encrypt the partition, if it isn't encrypted already, but will open it if it is. See the section [Encrypting the shared partition via an update](#### Encrypting the shared partition via an update) for more information
"...encrypt the partition if it isn't..." (not sure about the second
comma as non-native speaker, though)
>
> #### Encrypted root file system
>
> @@ -58,6 +59,25 @@ The mountpoint is empty as the root partition is mounted by a seperate initramf
> Both partitions are encrypted during first boot. The initramfs hook opens `${ABROOTFS_PART_UUID_A}` and `${ABROOTFS_PART_UUID_B}`
> during boot.
>
> +#### Encrypting the shared partition via an update
> +
> +With the following requirements, special handling is necessary:
> +
> +- A/B update scheme is used
> +- Both slots have a shared volume, that needs to be encrypted as well
> +- The system in field is currently unencrypted and encryption should be added via an update
> +- When the update failed, the fallback system needs to deal with an encrypted data partition
> +
> +If this case the fallback system needs to support an encrypted shared data partition, but would not encrypt it themselves. For this the `noencrypt` flag can be used.
"In this case"? Sounds strange.
"themselves" - where is the plural coming from?
> +
> +The data partition in the fallback system will have the `noencrypt` flag set, while the update system will set the flag to `reencrypt`, this will handle the following case, for example
> +
> +- Un-encrypted system on slot A is running, shared data partition has set `noencrypt` flag and is not encrypted
> +- Update for enabling encryption is applied to slot B, where the shared data partition has the `reencrypt` flag
> +- System reboots to slot B, encrypting the shared data partition
> +- Update fails at a later point and is not blessed, system reboots into the fallback system on slot A
> +- Fallback system now needs to be able to use the shared data partition
Where do you describe the "format-if-empty" usage of patch 3? Seems that
is an important element as well.
> +
> ### CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD
>
> The variable `CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD` contains the command to create a new file system on a newly
> diff --git a/recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete b/recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete
> index cf49e63..1ef784d 100644
> --- a/recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete
> +++ b/recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete
> @@ -240,18 +240,32 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do
> if [ ! -e "$part_device" ]; then
> panic "Could not find device mapped to '$partition' cannot be encrypted!"
> fi
> - decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name"
> - # check if we are trying to mount root
> - if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then
> - echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf
> - fi
>
> + # If partition is already encrypted, decrypt and continue with next partition:
> + decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name"
> if /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksDump --batch-mode "$part_device" \
> | grep -q "luks2"; then
> open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device"
> +
> + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition:
> + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then
> + echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf
> + fi
> +
> continue
> fi
>
> + # If partition should not be encrypted, continue with next partition:
> + if [ "$partition_format" = "noencrypt" ]
> + then
> + continue
> + fi
> +
> + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition:
> + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then
> + echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf
> + fi
> +
> # service watchdog in the background during lengthy re-encryption
> if [ -z "$watchdog_pid" ]; then
> service_watchdog &
Jan
--
Siemens AG, Foundational Technologies
Linux Expert Center
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-04 15:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-04 13:07 [PATCH v3 0/4] initramfs-crypt-hook patch Claudius Heine
2025-03-04 13:07 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] initramfs-crypt-hook: make sure that mount path exists Claudius Heine
2025-03-04 13:07 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] initramfs-crypt-hook: implement 'noencrypt' option Claudius Heine
2025-03-04 15:11 ` Jan Kiszka [this message]
2025-03-05 8:21 ` Claudius Heine
2025-03-05 8:27 ` Jan Kiszka
2025-03-05 8:39 ` Claudius Heine
2025-03-04 13:07 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] initramfs-crypt-hook: add 'format-if-empty' feature Claudius Heine
2025-03-04 15:03 ` Jan Kiszka
2025-03-04 13:07 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] initramfs-crypt-hook: add re-encryption recovery Claudius Heine
2025-03-04 14:52 ` Jan Kiszka
2025-03-04 15:10 ` Quirin Gylstorff
2025-03-04 15:12 ` Jan Kiszka
2025-03-05 7:25 ` Claudius Heine
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