From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from 8bytes.org (p4ffe03ae.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [79.254.3.174]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange ECDHE (P-256) server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mail.8bytes.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 993FB454B4 for ; Wed, 12 Mar 2025 10:21:15 +0100 (CET) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=8bytes.org; s=default; t=1741771275; bh=0yKk5ua4G6T/J3gwTYG2sZh6Y5d7KAgpLaV/lX5QKgA=; h=Date:From:To:Subject:From; b=BZg+ovwM1O60RrtLJLvJ4MtiqC81eMTZ5tQ3arTbAjOyWyXSIzOGF0bNu4jFk2QWf BoJH2tGBsjTJAL4IncnrGQRSBS58yuqbZ3FUDN2swHHuteCHM6YQe6sCxziDpBlYh3 NbW0OUwiZrh3pr/a0w1sTN1zrs/sF3cYG3CtcRz2vgsxI8urfNg0oOpbBwOcMyd9hp LgjpKiswzBeoJEgybFZybSzss3ADw3thKZSTExYqJ6Ous1yphun747tBYmRNcxUj4G YUOl4lUwFZQJpnlPMllw8ulozzgarbXUHnJjmDQJxMg6svL3JZk37o+l2+t7UHHXO7 pV4IRtWJvpF0g== Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2025 10:21:14 +0100 From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?J=F6rg_R=F6del?= Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Subject: [svsm-devel] SVSM Host Kernel KVM Update Required List-Id: COCONUT-SVSM development list List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: svsm-devel@coconut-svsm.dev Hi everyone, As some of you already noticed there is a regression with the current SVSM tree, as it does not boot the SVSM-kernel anymore on KVM with SEV-SNP hardware. The problem was in our host kernel, for which I just merged a fix. So please update your host environments with the updated kernel if you experience this problem. The reason for the breakage was a PR to unconditionally compile in the shadow-stack code in all builds and do detection at runtime. Unfortunately this broke on KVM because our SVSM Linux kernel tree does still intercept all shadow-stack MSRs. So when COCONUT accesses these MSRs it will cause a #VC exception and the kernel panics. My fix disables the intercepts of the shadow-stack MSRs in our host kernel. This is safe because Linux does only implement user shadow-stacks so far and that state is switched via the FPU load/unload path. Regards, Joerg