From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge-A9i7LUbDfNHQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] xattr: Enable security.capability in user namespaces
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 22:00:07 -0500
Message-ID: <20170726030007.GA10087@mail.hallyn.com>
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To: Mimi Zohar <zohar-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso-3s7WtUTddSA@public.gmane.org>, Mimi Zohar <zohar-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>, containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org, linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>, casey-iSGtlc1asvQWG2LlvL+J4A@public.gmane.org, lkp-JC7UmRfGjtg@public.gmane.org
List-Id: containers.vger.kernel.org

On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 03:26:14PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Fri, 2017-07-14 at 13:17 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> > Which brings us to the semantic question of would it be nice to have
> > stacked IMA/EVM on the same file.
> > 
> > I really don't think we do.  I think allowing multiple keys for
> > different part of trusting files is easy enough that we should have no
> > need to fight over which keys do which.
> 
> We definitely want to support different policies on the native and in
> the namespace with different keys and keyrings.

Ok, so Stefan's code to support userspace in a container reading
security.ima and getting back the value for security.ima@uid=1000
(if 1000 is the kuid of the container's root user) is in fact
useful to IMA?