Re: [PATCH v2 seccomp 6/6] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache

YiFei Zhu
2020-09-25T03:11:32Z

On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 6:56 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > This file is guarded by CONFIG_PROC_SECCOMP_CACHE with a default
> The question of permissions is my central concern here: who should see
> this? Some contained processes have been intentionally blocked from
> self-introspection so even the "standard" high bar of "ptrace attach
> allowed?" can't always be sufficient.
>
> My compromise about filter visibility in the past was saying that
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN was required (see seccomp_get_filter()). I'm nervous to
> weaken this. (There is some work that hasn't been sent upstream yet that
> is looking to expose the filter _contents_ via /proc that has been
> nervous too.)
>
> Now full contents vs "allow"/"filter" are certainly different things,
> but I don't feel like I've got enough evidence to show that this
> introspection would help debugging enough to justify the partially
> imagined safety of not exposing it to potential attackers.

Agreed. I'm inclined to make it CONFIG_DEBUG_SECCOMP_CACHE and guarded
by a CAP just to make it "debug only".

> I suspect it _is_ the right thing to do (just look at my own RFC's
> "debug" patch), but I'd like this to be well justified in the commit
> log.
>
> And yes, while it does hide behind a CONFIG, I'd still want it justified,
> especially since distros have a tendency to just turn everything on
> anyway. ;)

Is there something to stop a config from being enabled in an
allyesconfig? I remember seeing something like that. Else if someone
is manually selecting we can add a help text with a big banner...

> But behavior-wise, yeah, I like it; I'm fine with human-readable and
> full AUDIT_ARCH values. (Though, as devil's advocate again, to repeat
> Jann's own words back: do we want to add this only to have a new UAPI to
> support going forward?)

Is this something we want to keep stable?

YiFei Zhu