public inbox for containers@lists.linux.dev
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com,
	christian.brauner@ubuntu.com, containers@lists.linux.dev,
	dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
	mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com,
	puiterwi@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
	rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 11/16] securityfs: Move vfsmount into user_namespace
Date: Mon,  6 Dec 2021 12:25:55 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211206172600.1495968-12-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211206172600.1495968-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com>

Move vfsmount into user_namesapce so that every instance of the
virtualized SecurityFS can have this parameter. Use simple_pin_fs only for
the init_user_ns expecting that the parent node can be found using the
vfsmount from the user_namespace for non-init_user_ns case.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
---
 include/linux/user_namespace.h |  3 +++
 security/inode.c               | 25 +++++++++++++++++--------
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index 5249db04d62b..89663e6e0e85 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ struct user_namespace {
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA
 	struct ima_namespace	*ima_ns;
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS
+	struct vfsmount		*securityfs_mount;
+#endif
 } __randomize_layout;
 
 struct ucounts {
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index 6c326939750d..f1006cec6ce6 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 
-static struct vfsmount *mount;
-static int mount_count;
+static int securityfs_mount_count;
 
 static void securityfs_free_inode(struct inode *inode)
 {
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,
 					const struct file_operations *fops,
 					const struct inode_operations *iops)
 {
+	struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
 	struct dentry *dentry;
 	struct inode *dir, *inode;
 	int error;
@@ -118,12 +119,15 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,
 
 	pr_debug("securityfs: creating file '%s'\n",name);
 
-	error = simple_pin_fs(&fs_type, &mount, &mount_count);
-	if (error)
-		return ERR_PTR(error);
+	if (ns == &init_user_ns) {
+		error = simple_pin_fs(&fs_type, &ns->securityfs_mount,
+				      &securityfs_mount_count);
+		if (error)
+			return ERR_PTR(error);
+	}
 
 	if (!parent)
-		parent = mount->mnt_root;
+		parent = ns->securityfs_mount->mnt_root;
 
 	dir = d_inode(parent);
 
@@ -168,7 +172,9 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,
 	dentry = ERR_PTR(error);
 out:
 	inode_unlock(dir);
-	simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count);
+	if (ns == &init_user_ns)
+		simple_release_fs(&ns->securityfs_mount,
+				  &securityfs_mount_count);
 	return dentry;
 }
 
@@ -294,6 +300,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_create_symlink);
  */
 void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
+	struct user_namespace *ns = dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
 	struct inode *dir;
 
 	if (!dentry || IS_ERR(dentry))
@@ -309,7 +316,9 @@ void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
 		dput(dentry);
 	}
 	inode_unlock(dir);
-	simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count);
+	if (ns == &init_user_ns)
+		simple_release_fs(&ns->securityfs_mount,
+				  &securityfs_mount_count);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_remove);
 
-- 
2.31.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-12-06 17:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-12-06 17:25 [PATCH v3 00/16] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 01/16] ima: Add IMA namespace support Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 02/16] ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 03/16] ima: Namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 04/16] ima: Move delayed work queue and variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 05/16] ima: Move IMA's keys queue related " Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 06/16] ima: Move policy " Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 07/16] ima: Move ima_htable " Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 08/16] ima: Move measurement list related variables " Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 09/16] ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for IMA non-init_ima_ns namespaces for now Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 10/16] ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 17:25 ` Stefan Berger [this message]
2021-12-06 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 12/16] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 13/16] ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem related variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 14/16] ima: Use mac_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 15/16] ima: Move dentries into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 17:26 ` [PATCH v3 16/16] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 21:14 ` [PATCH v3 00/16] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns James Bottomley
2021-12-06 22:13   ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-07 14:59   ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-07 15:16     ` James Bottomley
2021-12-07 15:40       ` James Bottomley
2021-12-07 15:48         ` Casey Schaufler
2021-12-07 17:06           ` James Bottomley
2021-12-07 17:13     ` James Bottomley
2021-12-07 15:17 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-07 15:57   ` Stefan Berger

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20211206172600.1495968-12-stefanb@linux.ibm.com \
    --to=stefanb@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com \
    --cc=christian.brauner@ubuntu.com \
    --cc=containers@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=jamjoom@us.ibm.com \
    --cc=jejb@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com \
    --cc=lhinds@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=lsturman@redhat.com \
    --cc=mpeters@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=puiterwi@redhat.com \
    --cc=rgb@redhat.com \
    --cc=roberto.sassu@huawei.com \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox