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From: "Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson" <halg@google.com>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>,
	 Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Jonathan Calmels" <jcalmels@3xx0.net>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
	"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
	"KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	containers@lists.linux.dev, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson" <halg@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/4] proc: expose userns capability mask as CapUns in /proc/<pid>/status
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 10:42:07 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261119104208.782900-4-halg@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261119104208.782900-1-halg@google.com>

Render cred->cap_userns as CapUns in /proc/<pid>/status alongside other
capability masks, allowing userspace tools to inspect a task's userns
capability mask directly.

Document the new field in Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst.

Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson <halg@google.com>
---
 Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 2 ++
 fs/proc/array.c                    | 4 +++-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
index fa7a468e8edf..9cf45810e41c 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
@@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ read the file /proc/PID/status::
   CapEff: 0000000000000000
   CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
   CapAmb: 0000000000000000
+  CapUns: ffffffffffffffff
   NoNewPrivs:     0
   Seccomp:        0
   Speculation_Store_Bypass:       thread vulnerable
@@ -286,6 +287,7 @@ It's slow but very precise.
  CapEff                      bitmap of effective capabilities
  CapBnd                      bitmap of capabilities bounding set
  CapAmb                      bitmap of ambient capabilities
+ CapUns                      bitmap of userns capabilities
  NoNewPrivs                  no_new_privs, like prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIV, ...)
  Seccomp                     seccomp mode, like prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, ...)
  Speculation_Store_Bypass    speculative store bypass mitigation status
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index f6f75d206762..2b86673aae00 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
 	kernel_cap_t cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_effective,
-			cap_bset, cap_ambient;
+			cap_bset, cap_ambient, cap_userns;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	cred = __task_cred(p);
@@ -320,6 +320,7 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
 	cap_effective	= cred->cap_effective;
 	cap_bset	= cred->cap_bset;
 	cap_ambient	= cred->cap_ambient;
+	cap_userns	= cred->cap_userns;
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	render_cap_t(m, "CapInh:\t", &cap_inheritable);
@@ -327,6 +328,7 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
 	render_cap_t(m, "CapEff:\t", &cap_effective);
 	render_cap_t(m, "CapBnd:\t", &cap_bset);
 	render_cap_t(m, "CapAmb:\t", &cap_ambient);
+	render_cap_t(m, "CapUns:\t", &cap_userns);
 }
 
 static inline void task_seccomp(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
-- 
2.56.1.708.g77570a6a1d-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-19 10:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-19 10:42 [PATCH v2 0/4] userns: per-namespace capability bounding set Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 10:42 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] userns: introduce capability bounding set for user namespaces Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 10:42 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] capability: bound ptrace and cred subset checks by userns ceilings Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 10:42 ` Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson [this message]
2026-11-19 10:42 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] selftests/capabilities: add userns capability bounding set tests Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson

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