From: Oren Laadan <orenl-eQaUEPhvms7ENvBUuze7eA@public.gmane.org>
To: Matt Helsley <matthltc-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Containers
<containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] checkpoint/restart of robust futex lists
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2009 13:12:18 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4A3A7572.9030907@cs.columbia.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090603041919.GO9285-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Matt Helsley wrote:
> Save and restore the [compat_]robust_list member of the task struct.
>
> These lists record which futexes the task holds. To keep the overhead of
> robust futexes low the list is kept in userspace. When the task exits the
> kernel carefully walks these lists to recover held futexes that
> other tasks may be attempting to acquire with FUTEX_WAIT.
>
> Because they point to userspace memory that is saved/restored by
> checkpoint/restart saving the list pointers works.
>
> While saving the pointers works during checkpoint, restart is tricky
> because the robust futex ABI contains provisions for changes based on
> checking the size of the list head. So we need to save the length of
> the list head too in order to make sure that the kernel used during
> restart is capable of handling that ABI. Since there is only one ABI
> supported at the moment taking the list head's size is simple. Should
> the ABI change we will need to use the same size as specified during
> sys_set_robust_list() and hence some new means of determining the length
> of this userspace structure in sys_checkpoint would be required.
>
> Rather than rewrite the logic that checks and handles the ABI we reuse
> sys_set_robust_list() by factoring out the body of the function and
> calling it during restart.
>
> Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <matthltc-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
What happens if we checkpoint on a system with CONFIG_FUTEX and
restart on a a system with !CONFIG_FUTEX ?
Clearly, if processes used futex, restart should fail.
If they didn't - then all we know is that at the time of the
checkpoint they didn't. It could be that they didn't and will
never try, so restarting on a futex-less kernel is correct.
But it could be that they perhaps did and perhaps will attempt
again later on. In this case, restarting on a futex-less kernel
is incorrect, because it isn't compatible with the (intention)
of the original execution.
I suppose it's time to come up with some scheme to encode the
capabilities of a kernel in the checkpoint image. At restart
we can test compatibility of current kernel with original one,
and decide what to do.
The decision itself, or part of it - like the question above -
can be done in userspace.
The opposite case (checkpoint with !CONFIG_FUTEX and restart on
CONFIG_FUTEX) is always ok, because it will overwrite with null
values on the restarting tasks.
Oren.
>
> diff --git a/checkpoint/process.c b/checkpoint/process.c
> index b604a85..084a2e4 100644
> --- a/checkpoint/process.c
> +++ b/checkpoint/process.c
> @@ -42,6 +42,17 @@ static int checkpoint_task_struct(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct task_struct *t)
>
> h->task_comm_len = TASK_COMM_LEN;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
> + /* These are __user pointers and can be saved without the objhash. */
> + h->robust_futex_list = t->robust_list;
> + h->robust_futex_head_len = sizeof(t->robust_list);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
> + h->compat_robust_futex_list = t->compat_robust_list;
> + h->compat_robust_futex_head_len = sizeof(t->compat_robust_list);
> +#endif
> + /* FIXME save pi futex state?? */
> +#endif
> +
> /* FIXME: save remaining relevant task_struct fields */
>
> ret = ckpt_write_obj(ctx, &h->h);
> @@ -366,6 +377,20 @@ static int restore_task_struct(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
> memset(t->comm, 0, TASK_COMM_LEN);
> ret = _ckpt_read_string(ctx, t->comm, h->task_comm_len);
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
> + /* Since we restore the memory map the address remains the same and
> + * this is safe. This is the same as [compat_]sys_set_robust_list() */
> + if (h->robust_futex_list) {
> + struct robust_list_head __user *rfl = h->robust_futex_list;
> + do_set_robust_list(rfl, h->robust_futex_head_len);
> + }
> +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
> + if (h->compat_robust_futex_list) {
> + struct compat_robust_list_head __user *crfl = h->compat_robust_futex_list;
> + do_compat_set_robust_list(crfl, h->compat_robust_futex_head_len);
> + }
> +#endif
> +#endif
> /* FIXME: restore remaining relevant task_struct fields */
> out:
> ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
> diff --git a/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h b/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h
> index cd427d8..f226f8f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h
> +++ b/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h
> @@ -163,6 +163,12 @@ struct ckpt_hdr_task {
> __u32 exit_signal;
>
> __u32 task_comm_len;
> +
> + __u32 robust_futex_head_len;
> + __u32 compat_robust_futex_head_len;
> + __u64 robust_futex_list; /* a __user * */
> + __u64 compat_robust_futex_list; /* a __user * */
> + /* FIXME need futex prio inheritance state? */
> } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
>
> /* namespaces */
> diff --git a/include/linux/compat.h b/include/linux/compat.h
> index f2ded21..f311e36 100644
> --- a/include/linux/compat.h
> +++ b/include/linux/compat.h
> @@ -165,7 +165,8 @@ struct compat_robust_list_head {
> };
>
> extern void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr);
> -
> +extern long do_compat_set_robust_list(struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head,
> + compat_size_t len);
> asmlinkage long
> compat_sys_set_robust_list(struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head,
> compat_size_t len);
> diff --git a/include/linux/futex.h b/include/linux/futex.h
> index dd0e06b..8685d1c 100644
> --- a/include/linux/futex.h
> +++ b/include/linux/futex.h
> @@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ union futex_key {
> #define FUTEX_KEY_INIT (union futex_key) { .both = { .ptr = NULL } }
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
> +extern long do_set_robust_list(struct robust_list_head __user *head, size_t len);
> extern void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr);
> extern void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr);
> extern int futex_cmpxchg_enabled;
> diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
> index f405c73..cf80e7c 100644
> --- a/kernel/futex.c
> +++ b/kernel/futex.c
> @@ -1680,13 +1680,7 @@ pi_faulted:
> * the list. There can only be one such pending lock.
> */
>
> -/**
> - * sys_set_robust_list - set the robust-futex list head of a task
> - * @head: pointer to the list-head
> - * @len: length of the list-head, as userspace expects
> - */
> -SYSCALL_DEFINE2(set_robust_list, struct robust_list_head __user *, head,
> - size_t, len)
> +long do_set_robust_list(struct robust_list_head __user *head, size_t len)
> {
> if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
> return -ENOSYS;
> @@ -1702,6 +1696,17 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(set_robust_list, struct robust_list_head __user *, head,
> }
>
> /**
> + * sys_set_robust_list - set the robust-futex list head of a task
> + * @head: pointer to the list-head
> + * @len: length of the list-head, as userspace expects
> + */
> +SYSCALL_DEFINE2(set_robust_list, struct robust_list_head __user *, head,
> + size_t, len)
> +{
> + return do_set_robust_list(head, len);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> * sys_get_robust_list - get the robust-futex list head of a task
> * @pid: pid of the process [zero for current task]
> * @head_ptr: pointer to a list-head pointer, the kernel fills it in
> diff --git a/kernel/futex_compat.c b/kernel/futex_compat.c
> index d607a5b..eac734c 100644
> --- a/kernel/futex_compat.c
> +++ b/kernel/futex_compat.c
> @@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
> }
> }
>
> -asmlinkage long
> -compat_sys_set_robust_list(struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head,
> - compat_size_t len)
> +long
> +do_compat_set_robust_list(struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head,
> + compat_size_t len)
> {
> if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
> return -ENOSYS;
> @@ -130,6 +130,13 @@ compat_sys_set_robust_list(struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head,
> }
>
> asmlinkage long
> +compat_sys_set_robust_list(struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head,
> + compat_size_t len)
> +{
> + return do_compat_set_robust_list(head, len);
> +}
> +
> +asmlinkage long
> compat_sys_get_robust_list(int pid, compat_uptr_t __user *head_ptr,
> compat_size_t __user *len_ptr)
> {
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-06-18 17:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-06-03 4:19 [PATCH] checkpoint/restart of robust futex lists Matt Helsley
[not found] ` <20090603041919.GO9285-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2009-06-03 15:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20090603155804.GA7848-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2009-06-08 2:28 ` Oren Laadan
2009-06-08 2:37 ` Oren Laadan
[not found] ` <4A2C7972.9090404-eQaUEPhvms7ENvBUuze7eA@public.gmane.org>
2009-06-08 14:08 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20090608140810.GB29432-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2009-06-08 16:31 ` Oren Laadan
[not found] ` <4A2D3CE3.6030400-eQaUEPhvms7ENvBUuze7eA@public.gmane.org>
2009-06-08 16:59 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20090608165951.GA3610-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2009-06-08 18:34 ` Oren Laadan
2009-06-18 17:12 ` Oren Laadan [this message]
[not found] ` <4A3A7572.9030907-eQaUEPhvms7ENvBUuze7eA@public.gmane.org>
2009-06-18 19:24 ` Nathan Lynch
[not found] ` <m31vphgxa0.fsf-e+AXbWqSrlAAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2009-06-19 3:41 ` Oren Laadan
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