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From: Oren Laadan <orenl@cs.columbia.edu>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	SELinux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Linux Containers <containers@lists.osdl.org>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] cr: lsm: restore LSM contexts for ipc objects
Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2009 00:21:34 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4A42FB4E.2070306@cs.columbia.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090623181810.GA23644@us.ibm.com>



Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Stephen Smalley (sds@epoch.ncsc.mil):
>> On Fri, 2009-06-19 at 20:32 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:

[...]

>> Also, where do we get to veto attempts to checkpoint the task in the
>> first place?  If ptrace, I think we'd want it treated as a
>> PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH (also used for /proc/pid/mem) rather than just
>> PTRACE_MODE_READ (reading other /proc/pid info).
> 
> The checkpointing of ipc objects goes through an ipcperms(perm, S_IROTH)
> check in ipc/checkpoint (at top of
> http://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/?p=linux-cr.git;a=blob;f=ipc/checkpoint.c;h=88996e2b7abf328bd1b263400798ed5bd4924f48;hb=HEAD
> )
> 
> But yes, for the task itself we check PTRACE_MODE_READ (line 280 in
> http://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/?p=linux-cr.git;a=blob;f=checkpoint/checkpoint.c;h=a6dee4fb1085a47095f24443c48683a7fbc8ac59;hb=HEAD )
> I had thought that PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH implied the permission to
> actually modify the task.  If it also can imply a "very invasive" read 
> then changing it certainly seems right.

Hmmm... I was unaware of this:   http://lwn.net/Articles/282930/
So yes, probably need to change that.

Oren.


      parent reply	other threads:[~2009-06-25  4:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-06-20  1:32 [PATCH 1/1] cr: lsm: restore LSM contexts for ipc objects Serge E. Hallyn
2009-06-22  5:37 ` James Morris
2009-06-22 16:25   ` Serge E. Hallyn
     [not found] ` <20090620013216.GA4435-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2009-06-22 14:47   ` Stephen Smalley
2009-06-22 17:50     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-06-22 18:23       ` Stephen Smalley
2009-06-23  3:10         ` Casey Schaufler
2009-06-23 17:55 ` Stephen Smalley
2009-06-23 18:18   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-06-23 19:57     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-06-24 13:10       ` Stephen Smalley
2009-06-24 22:07         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-06-25 12:34           ` Stephen Smalley
2009-06-25 12:59             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-06-25 14:06               ` Stephen Smalley
2009-06-25  4:21     ` Oren Laadan [this message]

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