Re: [PATCHv3 8/8] cgroup: Add documentation for cgroup namespaces

[Richard Weinberger <richard-/L3Ra7n9ekc@public.gmane.org>]

Am 05.01.2015 um 23:48 schrieb Aditya Kali:
> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 3:05 PM, Richard Weinberger <richard-/L3Ra7n9ekc@public.gmane.org> wrote:
>> Aditya,
>>
>> I gave your patch set a try but it does not work for me.
>> Maybe you can bring some light into the issues I'm facing.
>> Sadly I still had no time to dig into your code.
>>
>> Am 05.12.2014 um 02:55 schrieb Aditya Kali:
>>> Signed-off-by: Aditya Kali <adityakali-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
>>> ---
>>>  Documentation/cgroups/namespace.txt | 147 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>  1 file changed, 147 insertions(+)
>>>  create mode 100644 Documentation/cgroups/namespace.txt
>>>
>>> diff --git a/Documentation/cgroups/namespace.txt b/Documentation/cgroups/namespace.txt
>>> new file mode 100644
>>> index 0000000..6480379
>>> --- /dev/null
>>> +++ b/Documentation/cgroups/namespace.txt
>>> @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
>>> +                     CGroup Namespaces
>>> +
>>> +CGroup Namespace provides a mechanism to virtualize the view of the
>>> +/proc/<pid>/cgroup file. The CLONE_NEWCGROUP clone-flag can be used with
>>> +clone() and unshare() syscalls to create a new cgroup namespace.
>>> +The process running inside the cgroup namespace will have its /proc/<pid>/cgroup
>>> +output restricted to cgroupns-root. cgroupns-root is the cgroup of the process
>>> +at the time of creation of the cgroup namespace.
>>> +
>>> +Prior to CGroup Namespace, the /proc/<pid>/cgroup file used to show complete
>>> +path of the cgroup of a process. In a container setup (where a set of cgroups
>>> +and namespaces are intended to isolate processes), the /proc/<pid>/cgroup file
>>> +may leak potential system level information to the isolated processes.
>>> +
>>> +For Example:
>>> +  $ cat /proc/self/cgroup
>>> +  0:cpuset,cpu,cpuacct,memory,devices,freezer,hugetlb:/batchjobs/container_id1
>>> +
>>> +The path '/batchjobs/container_id1' can generally be considered as system-data
>>> +and its desirable to not expose it to the isolated process.
>>> +
>>> +CGroup Namespaces can be used to restrict visibility of this path.
>>> +For Example:
>>> +  # Before creating cgroup namespace
>>> +  $ ls -l /proc/self/ns/cgroup
>>> +  lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 2014-07-15 10:37 /proc/self/ns/cgroup -> cgroup:[4026531835]
>>> +  $ cat /proc/self/cgroup
>>> +  0:cpuset,cpu,cpuacct,memory,devices,freezer,hugetlb:/batchjobs/container_id1
>>> +
>>> +  # unshare(CLONE_NEWCGROUP) and exec /bin/bash
>>> +  $ ~/unshare -c
>>> +  [ns]$ ls -l /proc/self/ns/cgroup
>>> +  lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 2014-07-15 10:35 /proc/self/ns/cgroup -> cgroup:[4026532183]
>>> +  # From within new cgroupns, process sees that its in the root cgroup
>>> +  [ns]$ cat /proc/self/cgroup
>>> +  0:cpuset,cpu,cpuacct,memory,devices,freezer,hugetlb:/
>>> +
>>> +  # From global cgroupns:
>>> +  $ cat /proc/<pid>/cgroup
>>> +  0:cpuset,cpu,cpuacct,memory,devices,freezer,hugetlb:/batchjobs/container_id1
>>> +
>>> +  # Unshare cgroupns along with userns and mountns
>>> +  # Following calls unshare(CLONE_NEWCGROUP|CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS), then
>>> +  # sets up uid/gid map and execs /bin/bash
>>> +  $ ~/unshare -c -u -m
>>
>> This command does not issue CLONE_NEWUSER, -U does.
>>
> I was using a custom unshare binary. But I will update the command
> line to be similar to the one in util-linux.
> 
>>> +  # Originally, we were in /batchjobs/container_id1 cgroup. Mount our own cgroup
>>> +  # hierarchy.
>>> +  [ns]$ mount -t cgroup cgroup /tmp/cgroup
>>> +  [ns]$ ls -l /tmp/cgroup
>>> +  total 0
>>> +  -r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 2014-10-13 09:32 cgroup.controllers
>>> +  -r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 2014-10-13 09:32 cgroup.populated
>>> +  -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 2014-10-13 09:25 cgroup.procs
>>> +  -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 2014-10-13 09:32 cgroup.subtree_control
>>
>> I've patched libvirt-lxc to issue CLONE_NEWCGROUP and not bind mount cgroupfs into a container.
>> But I'm unable to mount cgroupfs within the container, mount(2) is failing with EINVAL.
>> And /proc/self/cgroup still shows the cgroup from outside.
>>
>> ---cut---
>> container:/ # ls /sys/fs/cgroup/
>> container:/ # mount -t cgroup none /sys/fs/cgroup/
> 
> You need to provide "-o __DEVEL_sane_behavior" flag. Inside the
> container, only unified hierarchy can be mounted. So, for now, that
> flag is needed. I will fix the documentation too.
> 
>> mount: wrong fs type, bad option, bad superblock on none,
>>        missing codepage or helper program, or other error
>>
>>        In some cases useful info is found in syslog - try
>>        dmesg | tail or so.
>> container:/ # cat /proc/self/cgroup
>> 8:memory:/machine/test00.libvirt-lxc
>> 7:devices:/machine/test00.libvirt-lxc
>> 6:hugetlb:/
>> 5:cpuset:/machine/test00.libvirt-lxc
>> 4:blkio:/machine/test00.libvirt-lxc
>> 3:cpu,cpuacct:/machine/test00.libvirt-lxc
>> 2:freezer:/machine/test00.libvirt-lxc
>> 1:name=systemd:/user.slice/user-0.slice/session-c2.scope
>> container:/ # ls -la /proc/self/ns
>> total 0
>> dr-x--x--x 2 root root 0 Dec 14 23:02 .
>> dr-xr-xr-x 8 root root 0 Dec 14 23:02 ..
>> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Dec 14 23:02 cgroup -> cgroup:[4026532240]
>> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Dec 14 23:02 ipc -> ipc:[4026532238]
>> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Dec 14 23:02 mnt -> mnt:[4026532235]
>> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Dec 14 23:02 net -> net:[4026532242]
>> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Dec 14 23:02 pid -> pid:[4026532239]
>> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Dec 14 23:02 user -> user:[4026532234]
>> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Dec 14 23:02 uts -> uts:[4026532236]
>> container:/ #
>>
>> #host side
>> lxc-os132:~ # ls -la /proc/self/ns
>> total 0
>> dr-x--x--x 2 root root 0 Dec 14 23:56 .
>> dr-xr-xr-x 8 root root 0 Dec 14 23:56 ..
>> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Dec 14 23:56 cgroup -> cgroup:[4026531835]
>> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Dec 14 23:56 ipc -> ipc:[4026531839]
>> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Dec 14 23:56 mnt -> mnt:[4026531840]
>> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Dec 14 23:56 net -> net:[4026531957]
>> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Dec 14 23:56 pid -> pid:[4026531836]
>> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Dec 14 23:56 user -> user:[4026531837]
>> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Dec 14 23:56 uts -> uts:[4026531838]
>> ---cut---
>>
>> Any ideas?
>>
> 
> Please try with "-o __DEVEL_sane_behavior" flag to the mount command.

Ohh, this renders the whole patch useless for me as systemd needs the "old/default" behavior of cgroups. :-(
I really hoped that cgroup namespaces will help me running systemd in a sane way within Linux containers.

Thanks,
//richard