Re: [PATCH v3 00/16] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns

[Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>]

On 12/7/21 10:17, Christian Brauner wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 06, 2021 at 12:25:44PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> The goal of this series of patches is to start with the namespacing of
>> IMA and support auditing within an IMA namespace (IMA-ns) as the first
>> step.
>>
>> In this series the IMA namespace is piggy backing on the user namespace
>> and therefore an IMA namespace gets created when a user namespace is
>> created. The advantage of this is that the user namespace can provide
>> the keys infrastructure that IMA appraisal support will need later on.
>>
>> We chose the goal of supporting auditing within an IMA namespace since it
>> requires the least changes to IMA. Following this series, auditing within
>> an IMA namespace can be activated by a user running the following lines
>> that rely on a statically linked busybox to be installed on the host for
>> execution within the minimal container environment:
>>
>> mkdir -p rootfs/{bin,mnt,proc}
>> cp /sbin/busybox rootfs/bin
>> PATH=/bin unshare --user --map-root-user --mount-proc --pid --fork \
>>    --root rootfs busybox sh -c \
>>   "busybox mount -t securityfs /mnt /mnt; \
>>    busybox echo 'audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC' > /mnt/ima/policy; \
>>    busybox cat /mnt/ima/policy"
>>
>> Following the audit log on the host the last line cat'ing the IMA policy
>> inside the namespace would have been audited. Unfortunately the auditing
>> line is not distinguishable from one stemming from actions on the host.
>> The hope here is that Richard Brigg's container id support for auditing
>> would help resolve the problem.
>>
>> The following lines added to a suitable IMA policy on the host would
>> cause the execution of the commands inside the container (by uid 1000)
>> to be measured and audited as well on the host, thus leading to two
>> auditing messages for the 'busybox cat' above and log entries in IMA's
>> system log.
>>
>> echo -e "measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \
>>          "audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \
>>      > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
>>
>> The goal of supporting measurement and auditing by the host, of actions
>> occurring within IMA namespaces, is that users, particularly root,
>> should not be able to evade the host's IMA policy just by spawning
>> new IMA namespaces, running programs there, and discarding the namespaces
>> again. This is achieved through 'hierarchical processing' of file
>> accesses that are evaluated against the policy of the namespace where
>> the action occurred and against all namespaces' and their policies leading
>> back to the root IMA namespace (init_ima_ns).
>>
>> The patch series adds support for a virtualized SecurityFS with a few
>> new API calls that are used by IMA namespacing. Only the data relevant
>> to the IMA namespace are shown. The files and directories of other
>> security subsystems (TPM, evm, Tomoyo, safesetid) are not showing
>> up when secruityfs is mounted inside a user namespace.
>>
>> Much of the code leading up to the virtualization of SecurityFS deals
>> with moving IMA's variables from various files into the IMA namespace
>> structure called 'ima_namespace'. When it comes to determining the
>> current IMA namespace I took the approach to get the current IMA
>> namespace (get_current_ns()) on the top level and pass the pointer all
>> the way down to those functions that now need access to the ima_namespace
>> to get to their variables. This later on comes in handy once hierarchical
>> processing is implemented in this series where we walk the list of
>> namespaces backwards and again need to pass the pointer into functions.
>>
>> This patch also introduces usage of CAP_MAC_ADMIN to allow access to the
>> IMA policy via reduced capabilities. We would again later on use this
>> capability to allow users to set file extended attributes for IMA appraisal
>> support.
>>
>> The basis for this series of patches is Linux v5.15.
>> My tree with these patches is here:
>> https://github.com/stefanberger/linux-ima-namespaces/tree/v5.15%2Bimans.v3.public
> I have one small procedural favor to ask. :)
>
> I couldn't apply your patch series directly. It if isn't too
> inconvenient for you could you pass --base with a proper upstream tag,
> e.g. --base=v5.15.
>
> The branch you posted here doesn't exist afaict and I had to peruse your
> github repo and figured the correct branch might be v5.15+imans.v3.posted.
>
> In any case, --base with a proper upstream tag would make this all a bit
> easier or - if it really is necessary to pull from your tree it would be
> nice if you could post it in a form directly consumable by git and note
> url-escaped. So something like
>
> git clone https://github.com/stefanberger/linux-ima-namespaces v5.15+imans.v3.posted
>
> would already help.

Sure, will do.

   Stefan


>
> Christian