From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org (Eric W. Biederman) Subject: Re: Controlling devices and device namespaces Date: Sun, 16 Sep 2012 05:17:44 -0700 Message-ID: <87d31mupp3.fsf@xmission.com> References: <20120913205827.GO7677@google.com> <20120914183641.GA2191@cathedrallabs.org> <20120915022037.GA6438@mail.hallyn.com> <87wqzv7i08.fsf_-_@xmission.com> <20120915220520.GA11364@mail.hallyn.com> <87y5kazuez.fsf@xmission.com> <20120916122112.3f16178d@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> <87sjaiuqp5.fsf@xmission.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <87sjaiuqp5.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Sun, 16 Sep 2012 04:56:06 -0700") List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: containers-bounces-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org Errors-To: containers-bounces-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org To: Alan Cox Cc: Aristeu Rozanski , Neil Horman , containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, Michal Hocko , Tejun Heo , cgroups-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, Paul Mackerras , "Aneesh Kumar K.V" , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Johannes Weiner , Thomas Graf , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Paul Turner , Ingo Molnar List-Id: containers.vger.kernel.org ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org (Eric W. Biederman) writes: > Alan Cox writes: > >>> One piece of the puzzle is that we should be able to allow unprivileged >>> device node creation and access for any device on any filesystem >>> for which it unprivileged access is safe. >> >> Which devices are "safe" is policy for all interesting and useful cases, >> as are file permissions, security tags, chroot considerations and the >> like. >> >> It's a complete non starter. Come to think of it mknod is completely unnecessary. Without mknod. Without being able to mount filesystems containing device nodes. The mount namespace is sufficient to prevent all of the cases that the device control group prevents (open and mknod on device nodes). So I honestly think the device control group is superflous, and it is probably wise to deprecate it and move to a model where it does not exist. Eric